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KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER
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HANNIBAL'S COVENANT.

On a summer day, in the fourth year of Hannibal's war (215 B. C.), the Roman squadron which patrolled the waters off the Calabrian coast noticed a suspect ship sailing from Cape Lacinium (near Croton). Cutters sent by the Roman admiral, P. Valerius Flaccus, captured the vessel. Among the prisoners were Xenocrates, the Macedonian envoy, returning from a secret mission to Hannibal's headquarters in Campania, and three Punic emissaries, Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago, sailing with him to Philip V of Macedonia. The diplomats carried a letter of Hannibal to the Macedonian king and an exemplar of the treaty

NOTE: The following abbreviations are used in this paper: Gsell = S. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, I-IV (Paris, 1916-20); Holleaux = M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques* (Paris, 1923); Korošec = V. Korošec, *Hethitische Staatsverträge (Leipziger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien, LX [Leipzig, 1931])*; Langdon = S. Langdon and A. H. Gardiner, "The treaty of alliance between Hattusili . . . and . . . Ramesses II," *J. E. A.*, VI (1920), pp. 179-205; Luckenbill = D. D. Luckenbill, "Hittite Treaties and Letters," *Amer. Journ. of Semitic Lang.*, XXXVII (1920-1), pp. 161-211; Meissner = B. Meissner, "Die Beziehungen Agyptens," etc., *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländisch. Gesellsch.*, LXXII (1918), pp. 32-65; Michel = Ch. Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques* (Paris, 1900); Oath, see n. 2; *R. I. D. A.* = *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité*; Tod = M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I-II (1933 and 1948); Täubler = E. Täubler, *Imperium Romanum* (Leipzig, 1913); Walbank = F. W. Walbank, *Philip V* (Cambridge, 1940); Weidner = E. F. Weidner, *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien* (Leipzig, 1923); *A. N. E. T.* = *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, ed. J. B. Pritchard (Princeton, 1950).

between both powers. Prisoners and papers were sent to the Senate.¹

Two generations later, Polybius was allowed to make copies of these documents in the Roman archives. He included a transcript of the treaty (and perhaps of Hannibal's letter) in the seventh book of his *Histories*. The book is lost, but a Byzantine compiler, among other excerpts from Polybius' work, has also preserved the text of the oath sworn by Hannibal to Philip V.²

But this Greek text, as philological examination has shown, is a translation of the Phoenician original (often awkwardly literal). Hannibal spoke his oath in his own language. Polybius has reproduced verbatim the official version of this Punic oath, which was given to the Macedonian ambassador by Hannibal. This philological situation makes the interpretation of Hannibal's Oath particularly difficult. The Greek legal language used in this instrument more often conceals than expresses Punic legal terminology. Add that we have no direct, and only a few indirect, parallels to help us in explaining the meaning of a Punic document. Our ignorance of Carthaginian institutions prevents us from fully understanding Hannibal's Oath. Many data, which could be precious, are still meaningless for us. Yet, the knowledge that the Oath is a Punic instrument enables us, if I am not mistaken, to grasp the form and the essence of this unique record.³

¹ Liv., XXIII, 33-34; cf. G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 2 (Turin, 1917), p. 407. On chronology cf. Holleaux, p. 181; Walbank, pp. 70 and 299. As Livy's narrative shows, Hannibal was at this time at Capua (Liv., XXIII, 33, 5), in the beginning of the summer (cf. XXIII, 39, 4).

² Pol., VII, 9. Cf., generally, my paper "An Oath of Hannibal," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 87-102. The latest paper on the subject, so far as I know, is E. Manni's "L'alleanza punico-macedone del 215 A. C.," *Memoria della R. Accademia di Bologna*, Classe di Scienze Morali, Ser. IV, III (1941), which gives bibliography; cf. also Walbank, p. 71, n. 3; cf. particularly Holleaux, pp. 179-83; Walbank, pp. 68 ff.; de Sanctis, III, 2, p. 407. Hannibal's Oath is quoted here according to my edition in the above mentioned article.

³ For myself, I have prepared a detailed commentary on the Oath, but my interpretation rarely throws light upon the difficult passages. For this reason, I here give only some addenda to my previous paper. On the royal style of Philip V cf. now A. Aymard, "Le protocol royal grec,"

I.

The understanding of every document must begin with the explanation of its structure. The Punic record is an oath, the "oath which Hannibal has sworn," as the first line of the document announces. Now, the oath was (and is) essentially a self-imprecation in the case of perjury. "Every oath ends in a curse on the perjurer."⁴ International agreements, in the Orient as well as in Greece, were guaranteed by imprecatory oaths. For instance, Ba'alu of Tyre called down upon himself a dozen calamities, such as to fall into the paws of a hungry lion, if ever he should violate the treaty concluded with Esarhaddon of Assyria. The treaties between Rome and Carthage were also validated by conditional curses. A Roman annalist pictured Hannibal pronouncing an oath to his soldiers and calling upon gods to destroy him should he break faith. Hannibal's vow of eternal enmity to Rome, taken with his hand laid on the entrails of a sacrifice, was, as his gesture shows, a self-imprecation.⁵ Yet, Hannibal's oath tendered to Philip of Macedonia contains no curse. What is the meaning of this deviation?

The oath serves to guarantee an assertion by a supernatural

R. E. A., L (1948), pp. 232-63 and "Basileus Makedonon," *R. I. D. A.*, IV (1950), pp. 61-97. The Oath distinguishes between the king and the Macedonians. Cf. Walbank, pp. 264-6. In the treaty of 264, Hieron is likewise distinguished from the Syracusans. *Pol.*, I, 62, 8. Cf. *I. G.*, XIV, 7; A. Wilhelm, *J. O. A. I.*, III (1900), p. 168; W. Hüttel, *Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus* (Reichenberg, 1929), p. 136. On the Punic gods invoked by Hannibal cf. R. Dussaud, "Astarté, Pontos et Ba'al," *C. R. A. I.*, 1947, pp. 201-25 and *idem*, *Syria*, XXV (1946-8), pp. 205-30. Hannibal distinguishes between the full citizens of Carthage and the "plebs" (see *Oath*, 97). The same distinction in New Carthage (*Pol.*, X, 17, 6-7): πολιτικοί and χειροτέχνοι. Cf. also the co-existence of *astoi* and *Alexandreis* in Alexandria. Cf. *Rev. Phil.*, LIII (1927), p. 162 and now V. Arangio-Ruiz, *R. I. D. A.*, IV (1950), pp. 1-20.

⁴ *Plut.*, *Q. Rom.*, 44. On the oath as conditional curse cf. R. Hirzel, *Der Eid* (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 137-41; J. Pederson, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* (Strassburg, 1914), pp. 108-19.

⁵ Ba'alu treaty: E. F. Weidner, "Ein Staatsvertrag," *Archiv für Orientforschung*, VIII (1931-2), pp. 31-4. English translation in D. D. Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Assyria* (Chicago, 1927), II, pp. 229-33. Hannibal's oaths: *Liv.*, XXI, 45, 8; *Pol.*, III, 11, 5. Cf. the adjurations in Eshnun-Eshmun'azar inscription: G. A. Cooke, *A Text-Book of North Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1903), p. 5.

power.⁶ (*Est enim ius iurandum adfirmatio religiosa*, Cic., *De Off.*, III, 104.) Whether the oath-taker invokes the Almighty as witness or speaks standing on the hide of a tiger, he brings a third partner into the agreement between himself and the opposite party. The proper function of the oath is precisely that: to transform the bipartite relation of the contracting parties into a triangular bond in which the sacral force has a share. Thus, every oath must necessarily have these two parts: a) the assertion, and b) its supernatural confirmation. The self-imprecation furnishes the third component of the oath. Without the curse, the supernatural guarantor may not strike down the faithless partner. Thus, his word would remain unconfirmed and, ultimately, valueless. The oath without adjuration would be like a law without sanction, a *lex imperfecta*.

Yet, the opposite party is more interested in the fulfillment of a promise than in punishment of the broken faith. The sacred force, invoked by the oath, may also be brought in, not to punish the perjurer, but to prevent the perjury. This affirming oath, oath without curse, is particularly fitting to establish a lasting partnership. Saxo Grammaticus, a Danish author of the thirteenth century, tells that the ancient Danes, in choosing a king, stood on stones "in order to foreshadow from the steadfastness of the stones that the deed would be lasting."

The rites of the artificial brotherhood, which occur all the world over, are of the same type. There is no curse. But in sucking one another's blood, or sharing the same meal, or smoking the calumet together, and so on, men by these ritual acts confirm their will to establish a mutual bond. The Hebrew *berit* ("covenant" of the English Bible) was also a stabilizing oath, without curse, in which God was invoked to make the promise stand firm. Lacking the imprecation, all these oaths were bipartite. They contained the assertion of the swearer and the invocation of divinity. In describing the conclusion of a blood-covenant between two Oriental princes, Tacitus (*Ann.*, XII, 47), with his usual insight and skill, sharply distinguishes this rite from the usual oath. The covenant was guaranteed (not by a

⁶ For the theory of the oath see my paper "Couper une alliance," *Archives d'histoire du droit oriental*, V (1951), pp. 133-56.

curse, but) by the bond of blood. *Id foedus arcanum habetur quasi mutuo cruore sacratum.*⁷

The "covenanted" form of the oath was not peculiar to the Hebrews among the North-West Semitic peoples. It was also used by the Arabs and other neighbors of Israel. Biblical authors speak of *berit* between Edom and its confederates, between Solomon and Hiram of Tyre. Moreover, the existence of a god called Baal-berit at Shechem offers an incontrovertible proof that Canaanites, i. e., the Phoenicians, also used the "covenanted" pledge. A recently discovered Canaanite (Phoenician) incantation speaks of an "everlasting bond" (*'alat*) made by the god Assur with the bearer of the amulet. It seems that this bond was again a covenant like *berit*. Thus *'alat* may have been the Phoenician term for covenant.⁸

The Carthaginians brought not only their religion but also their diplomatic style from Phoenicia. A rather obscure clause in the first treaty between Rome and Carthage became meaningful when the same provision was discovered in the agreement between Esarhaddon of Assyria and a king of Tyre. The mention of Rivers, Lakes, and Springs among the gods witnessing Hannibal's oath, exceptional in Greece, was a standing formula in the Near Eastern treaties. Besides his own gods, Hannibal also invoked "all the gods who possess Macedonia and the rest of Greece." This reference to gods of the other party is so alien to Greek and Roman (and modern) practice that commentators regard the passage as interpolated. Yet, the formula again belongs to the diplomatic style of the ancient East. The king of Tyre mentioned before called down upon himself the conditional curse not only of Phoenician gods but of "the gods of Assyria and Accad" as well. A thousand male and female deities of Khatti land, together with the same number of deities

⁷ Saxo quoted in J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, I (3rd ed., London, 1907), p. 160. On *berit* cf. J. Pederson, *Israel* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), I-II, pp. 278-308; W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (3rd ed., New York, 1927), Index s. v. Covenant; J. Begrich, "Berit," *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentl. Wissenschaft*, LX (1944), pp. 1-10.

⁸ Obad. 7; I Reg. 5, 26; 15, 19. Baal-Berit: Jud. 9, 4. For, *'alat* see Th. H. Gaster, "A Canaanite Magical Text," *Orientalia*, XI (1942), pp. 39-79. Further cf. W. F. Albright, *Bull. Am. Sch. Orient. Res.*, CXXI (1951), pp. 21-3.

of Egypt, were invoked by both partners in the treaty between Ramses II and Hattushil.⁹

The form of Hannibal's Oath is equally antique. Toward the end of the sophisticated third century B. C., in the age of Archimedes and Chrysippus, in dealing with a Hellenic king, the Punic captain had recourse to the ancient rite of friendship, which long ago bound together Hiram of Tyre and King Solomon. As the quoted parallels show, the bipartite Oath of Hannibal, lacking imprecation, is a *berit*, the covenant without execration of the perjurer. Hannibal's Oath is the sole "covenanted" treaty which has come down to us. Elsewhere, the international *berit* is only referred to.

II.

A covenant could be inaugurated by a solemn ceremony, for instance, by a common meal. But the compact could be constituted as well by pronouncing the sacramental words in the presence of gods. That made them parties to the covenant. King Josiah "stood by the pillar and made a *berit* before the Lord, to walk after the Lord and to keep His commandments" (II Reg. 23, 3). Hannibal "deposes" his oath "in the presence of all the gods who are in the expedition and who preside over this oath." Greek words here veil some Punic expression and a Phoenician thought.¹⁰ Does Hannibal think of the gods who "watch over" the oath or has he in mind the deities who are

⁹ Cf. R. Laqueur, "Symbola," *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), pp. 469-72. On the worship of living waters cf. Smith (above, n. 7), pp. 169 and 588; R. Mouterde, *Mélanges de l'université St. Joseph*, XXV (1942), p. 58; Langdon, p. 195, Korošec, p. 96. For Greek practice cf. L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques* (Paris, 1938), p. 367. On the inclusion of gods of the other party in the oath cf. Gsell, IV, p. 223, n. 1; Korošec, p. 95. Different is the oath by common deities of two States, as e. g. in *S. I. G.*³, 366; *I. G.*, IX, 1, 98.

¹⁰ "Ὀρκος δὲ ἔθετο Ἀννίβας . . . ἐναντίον Διός. The expression is a solecism. In Greek, one can deposit pledges, documents, etc. (cf. e. g. Pol., III, 67, 7; Milet, III, 140; *P. Enteuxeis*, 22) but not an oath, except in a poetical figure (Aesch., *Agam.*, 1570). *Anth. Pal.*, V, 133: ὀρκους εἰς ἀνέμους ρίθεμαι means "throwing to winds." In Hannibal's Oath the solecism covers a Phoenician formula. Cf. LXX, II Reg. 23, 5: διαθήκην (*berit*) . . . ἔθετο. LXX, Prov. 29, 24: ἐὰν δὲ ὀρκον προτεθέντος (there is no verb in the original).

present here? ¹¹ In any case, he has his *dii castrenses*, probably represented by emblems on the standards, before him while he pronounces the words of the oath.¹² Otherwise, the deities may not catch the utterance. He speaks not for himself alone, but accompanied by co-jurors who probably repeated his words. Joshua entering into the covenant with the Gibeonites was also supported by the chiefs of Israel, who swore with him. Hannibal's co-jurors were probably members of his *concilium*, that is, the higher officers, responsible for the conduct of operations. After the capture of Saguntum, the Romans demanded the extradition of the "general Hannibal and his councillors." The names of two or three of these co-jurors have been preserved; the other names are lost in a lacuna of the Greek manuscript.¹³ Besides the co-jurors, mentioned by name, "all Carthaginian senators" in the camp and all Carthaginians in the campaign with Hannibal are swearers of the oath. The mention of senators again is paralleled in the treaty between Esarhaddon and Ba'alu, the king of Tyre. In a passage (unfortunately damaged), the "Elders" figure besides the Phoenician ruler. On the other hand, the citizen army, as in every ancient city, is qualified to represent the whole city. There are Punic coins, minted in Sicily, bearing the legend: "the people of the Camp."¹⁴

¹¹ It is difficult to say whether the Greek word *ἑφεσθήκασιν* corresponded to *paqad* or to *qum* in the original. Cf. R. Helbing, *Die Kasussyntax der Verba bei den Septuaginta* (Göttingen, 1928), p. 287. In the Bar-g'yh treaty (n. 20), the pact is concluded "before" (*qedem*) the gods who are asked to "open the eyes."

¹² Altar and *lepà σκηνή* in Punic camp: Diod., XX, 65. For standards cf. R. Labat, *Le caractère religieux de la royauté assyro-babylonienne* (Paris, 1939), pp. 259-65; J. Faulkner, *J.E.A.*, XXVII (1941), pp. 12-18; K. Gallang, *Biblisches Reallexikon* (Tübingen, 1937), pp. 160-3. On the national gods of troops cf. F. Zucker, "Die Doppelinschrift," etc., *Abh. Preuss. Akad.*, 1937, no. 6, p. 23.

¹³ Joshua 9, 15; cf. e. g. I Macc. 6, 61; Tod, II, 158, etc. On co-jurors cf. E. Seidl, *Der Eid im ptolemäischen Recht* (Diss. jur., Munich, 1929), p. 55; A. Heuss, "Abschluss und Beurkundung," *Klio*, XXVII (1934), p. 17. Hannibal's council: Pol., III, 20, 8; 34, 8; 71, 5; 85, 6. Cf. Gsell, II, p. 220.

¹⁴ W. F. Albright kindly referred me to the "Elders" in the Ba'alu treaty (see above, n. 5). Punic coins: B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (Oxford, 1911), p. 877: the legend: 'am mahnat. In the Bar-g'yh treaty (n. 20) the "citizens" (*ba'ali*) of Katka and Arpad are parties to the pact after and beside the kings of both towns.

III.

Hannibal "lays down" the oath of friendship. The Greek words he uses to describe this conception are strange and ungrammatically assembled: τὸν ὄρκον τοῦτον θέσθαι· περὶ φιλίας καὶ εὐνοίας καλῆς, φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἀδελφούς, ἐφ' ᾧ τ' εἶναι . . . The Greek words here obviously cover a Punic idiom which is unknown to us. But an Oriental parallel helps us to grasp the meaning of the clause. In the Accadian text of the treaty between Hattushil of Hatti and Ramses II of Egypt, the latter says: "Behold, now I give good brotherhood and good peace between us forever, in order to give good peace and good brotherhood . . . for ever." The same idea that amity is concluded now in order to have it permanent is then expressed in other sections of the instrument. In modern treaties a similar statement of the objects of the treaty is usually given in the preamble.¹⁵

The surprising adjective *καλός* in the quoted passage of Hannibal's oath corresponds to the adjective *damqa* (that is, good, gracious, pious, etc., according to the lexicon) in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. In Phoenician the adjective was probably *na'im*. In the same manner, Greek scribes rendered the Latin formula *bona fide* by *καλῇ πίστει*. On the other hand, *φιλία* as a term of international law corresponds to *šalama* ("peace") in the Accadian passage quoted and to *šalom* in Phoenician, while *εὐνοια* expresses some term for "goodwill." In the treaty between Ramses and Hattushil, the kings speak of "brotherhood, friendship (or peace) and goodwill (or favor)" between them.¹⁶

By entering into the covenant, the parties become "friends, kinsmen and brothers." That again reproduces the traditional terminology of Oriental diplomacy. Naptera, wife of Ramses II,

¹⁵ Cf. e. g. the treaty of Ghent (1814): Great Britain and the United States, "desirous of . . . restoring peace, friendship and good understanding . . . agreed . . . there shall be a firm and universal peace," etc.

¹⁶ The terms are: *aḫu-ut-ta-ni sa-la-ma-a-ni u da-miḫ-ta* (Langdon's transliteration). Cf. also the expression *te-ma dam-ka damqa* in a Ramses letter, transliterated and translated in Meissner, p. 43. *Φιλία* in the Oath means "peace," as § 12 shows. H. L. Ginsberg suggests that *šekel na'im* may have been the Phoenician original of *εὐνοίας καλῆς* and refers to Ps. 111, 10; Prov. 3, 4, so that *καλή* is tautological in Greek, but not in the Semitic original. A. Goetze, *A. N. E. T.*, p. 202, renders the treaty formula as: "good brotherhood (and) good peace."

writes to the queen of Hatti after the conclusion of the Hattushil-Ramses treaty: "I am in peace and brotherhood with the great queen my sister," while "brotherhood and kinship" are terms used by Hattushil to describe his relations with the Babylonian king.¹⁷

Hannibal adds that the oath is made "in order that" or "under the conditions that." This signifies that the amity between the partners is conditioned by the fulfillment of the stipulated obligations. The same formula was used in the first agreement between Rome and Carthage: there is to be friendship between the Romans and the Carthaginians "on the following conditions" (*ἐπὶ τοῖσδε*).¹⁸

The condition of the amity is that the Carthaginians should be "preserved and guarded" by the Macedonians, and vice versa. The Greek verbs here correspond to the Punic idiom of the same meaning (*nsr wsmr*) which has been found on some amulets. And again, the same terminology was used in the second millennium B. C. in the Near East. The first duty of a vassal of Hatti is to "preserve" (*našaru*) the overlord and his empire. As is said in the treaty between Mursil, king of Hatti, and an Asiatic prince: "As the Sun (that is, the king of Hatti) guards his own head and his land, so may he also guard the head and land of Shumashshura," who likewise takes the same obligation with respect to Mursil.¹⁹

So far, the structure and terminology of Hannibal's Oath roughly correspond to the language and composition of the Near

¹⁷ These letters are transliterated in Meissner, pp. 59-60; English translation in Luckenbill, pp. 194 and 202.

¹⁸ Pol., III, 22, 4: *ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις...καὶ Καρχηδονίοις*. Cf. Pol., I, 62, 8; III, 22, 4; 23, 2. Cf. E. Täubler, p. 263; A. Heuss, *Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik* (Leipzig, 1933), p. 17. Greek parallels are rare: Roman treaty with Antiochus III: Pol., XXI, 43, 1; Michel, 19 (Smyrna and Magnesia): *ἐπὶ τοῖσδε συνέθεντο τῇμ φιλίαν*. Cf. also Michel, 26.

¹⁹ The amulets: M. Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für Semitische Epigraphik* (Giessen, 1903), I, p. 172. Cf. the wish formula in Ugaritic letters: *tṛrk tšlmk* (C. H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Handbook* [Rome, 1947], no. 138), that is "guard and keep whole" (H. L. Ginsberg's rendering). For the terms referring to the duty of mutual protection cf. Korošec, p. 66. Murshil's document is transliterated in Weidner, p. 88 and translated in Luckenbill, p. 181.

Eastern treaties of the second millennium B. C. Bearing in mind that a thousand years separated Hannibal from Ramses II and the Hattite kings, and that the Oriental treaties we have quoted belonged to Babylonian and not to Phoenician civilization, we must acknowledge that the similarity is astonishing. Yet, inasmuch as *berit* is a peculiar juristical institution, the dissimilarity is no less striking.

IV.

In the ancient world, in the Near East as well as in Greece or Italy, a treaty became binding only through its ratification by oath. The difference between the agreed stipulations (*leges foederis*, *συνθήκαι*) and their sworn acceptance (*foedus*, *ὄρκοι*) was fundamental in the ancient law of nations. The oath was not only the best security for the observance of good faith but was equivalent to ratification in modern international law. When Ramses II wished to explain that he was bound by the treaty with the land of Hatti, he wrote as follows: "Behold, the writing of the oath, which I swore for . . . the king of Hatti, . . . is placed under the feet of Teshub, before the great gods. They are the witnesses of these words. And behold, the writing of the oath, which . . . the king of Hatti swore for me, is placed under the feet of Ra, before the great gods. They are the witnesses of these words." In this case, since both parties were obligated, the oaths were exchanged. But in one-sided engagements, while one party stipulated conditions, the other accepted the agreement by oath. Thus, in the conventions between the king of Hatti and his vassals, the former stated the terms, while the latter took oath to observe these conditions. On the other hand, when the city of Theangela capitulated on certain conditions, only Eupolemus, the conqueror, was bound by oath, since the city after surrender was in any case at the discretion of the victor. A passage in Ezekiel, which seems to puzzle commentators, refers to the same use. The Babylonian king made *berit* with Zedekiah—that is, the conditions of the agreement, and "brought him under a curse"—that is, the unilateral oath to observe these conditions.²⁰

²⁰ Cf. Korošec, pp. 24-35 and 65-79. For Greece cf. Heuss (n. 18), pp. 20-25; F. Schehl, "Zum Korinthischen Bunde," *J.O.A.I.*, XXVI (1931-2), pp. 124-31. The same pair "agreements and oaths" *l'dh wlzqrh* in the Aramaic Bar-g'yh treaty. Cf. H. Bauer, "Ein Aramaischer Staats-

Accordingly, the oath-taker could invoke divine punishment on the violator of the agreement: such is the formula in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. Or, he could enumerate his obligations and promise their fulfillment: such is the usual formula in the ancient world. Sometimes a cautious oath-taker made the promise on the explicit condition that the other party should also keep good faith.²¹ But the swearer obviously could not include the obligations of the opposite party in the formula of his oath. He could not call down a curse on himself in the event that the other partner should be faithless. The oaths which validated the treaties in the ancient Near East, of course, did not refer to the obligations of the other party. These duties were, however, enumerated in the treaty itself. Each party mentioned its own obligations first in its copy of the pact. Yet, Hannibal in his oath states the obligations of both parties, beginning with the Macedonians. The explication of these anomalies is that *berit* is no "oath." Since the *berit* contains no curse but only presents a solemn declaration made before the Deity, it necessarily enumerates the conditions of the covenant. The *sefer-ha-berit* in Exodus (24, 7) offers a parallel. Here (Ex. 21-3) God enumerates His *mishpatim*, His conditions of the covenant, that is, the obligations of Israel toward the Lord. Then, the Lord promises to be the foe of Israel's foes and adversary of Israel's adversaries and to give the promised land to the chosen people. As a matter of fact, the *berit* (as well as the rite of artificial kinship elsewhere) was often, and perhaps originally, the unilateral act by which a man of power granted the covenant to a client. Under such conditions, the formula of the compact, spoken by the future patron, naturally mentioned the duties of the client as well.²²

vertrag," *Archiv für Orientforschung*, VIII (1932-3), pp. 1-17. J. N. Epstein in *Qedem*, I (1942), pp. 78-83; cf. A. Dupont-Sommer, *Les Araméens* (Paris, 1949), pp. 56-60. Eupolemus: L. Robert, *Collection Froehner* (Paris, 1936), p. 56. M. Rostovtzeff, *R. E. A.*, XXXIII (1931), p. 8. Ramses' letter: Meissner, p. 58 (Engl. transl.: Luckenbill, p. 196). Ezek. 17, 13 ('*alah* = "curse").

²¹ See e. g. the oath of the Cans, Tod, II, 142.

²² Cf. Korošec, p. 25. For Roman-Punic treaties cf. Täubler, p. 263; for treaties between Rome and Greek states cf. Täubler, p. 49. Conditional *berit*: I Sam. 11, 2; II Sam. 3, 12; I Reg. 20, 34. On *berit* as grant cf. Begrich (above n. 7), p. 2. Cf. e. g. Trilles, *Les Pygmées*

The essence of *berit* is mutual protection. Hannibal's Oath, as we have seen (p. 9), is explicitly made to hinge on this provision. But the *berit* establishes a state of peace and mutual affection permanently. *Berit* is synonymous with *shalom*, "peace," in the full sense of this word. Men or peoples bound by a covenant are brothers. They cannot do evil one to another, they are bound to help each other. This implicit meaning of the covenant explains two significant lacunae in the Oath. In the first place, there is no reference to the length of its contemplated validity. The Oath does not even contain an assurance of eternal duration of friendship which is repeatedly given in the Ramses-Hattushil treaty. On the other hand, there is no non-aggression clause which was necessarily the first and fundamental provision in ancient agreements of peace and amity. "The Hittites shall do no evil to the Mitannies and the Mitannies shall do no evil to the Hittites."²³

Positively, mutual security meant a defensive alliance, which, as always in the Orient and sometimes also in Greece, refers not only to foreign foes but also to internal enemies of the contracting powers.²⁴ In the oath the parties agree that they shall not plot against one another. The stipulation appears in Greek oaths of allegiance. In the mouth of Hannibal it means the promise not to aid and abet plots against Philip, and vice versa. It would be interesting to know whether this clause was part of the style of Phoenician treaties or corresponded to a wish of the Macedonian king who had many enemies in his dominions.

The Oath, then, establishes a military alliance between the contracting parties. Without any subterfuge, the Macedonians should be "foes of the Carthaginians' foes," and vice versa. As Hattushil writes, referring to his alliance with Ramses: "We are brothers . . . with an enemy who is our common foe, verily

(Paris, 1932), p. 497: the blood-covenant is only used to accept a foreigner into a clan or to make the head of a clan a vassal of a more powerful ruler.

²³ Treaty between Shubbiluliuma and Mattiuaza. Transliteration: Weidner, pp. 2 ff., translation: Luckenbill, p. 167. On this clause cf. Korošec, pp. 62 and 68. For Greek international law cf. my observations in *R. I. D. A.*, IV (1950), p. 103.

²⁴ Cf. Oath, 96. Mutual aid against the disturbers of internal quiet: Korošec, pp. 63, 73, and 76. In Greek law see e.g. the Athenian alliances concluded in 362 and 361: Tod, nos. 144 and 147.

we shall be hostile and with our common friend verily we shall be at peace." This promise of mutual assistance is essentially different from the duty imposed on a vassal to follow the suzerain: "with my friend he shall be at peace, with my enemy he shall be at enmity."²⁵ Yet, this provision in Hannibal's Oath is not identical with the Greek clause of defensive alliance. In the latter the only *casus foederis* was the invasion of the territory of the other partner. Likewise, in the treaty of Ramses-Hattushil, the contracting powers, and in Hittite treaties of vassalage, the suzerain, had to assist the other partner only if the latter's territory was invaded. Accordingly, in the Greek law of nations it was permissible for an ally to give military assistance to an enemy of his partner as long as the territory of the latter remained unviolated. But the *berit* established a perfect union. Hosea reproaches Israel that, having entered into covenant with Assyria, she delivers oil to Egypt, a foe of Assyria. That shows, incidentally, that the oracle was uttered in the time of king Hoshea who (in 727) intrigued with Egypt against Assyria. It also brings to mind the prohibition of giving a tribute to Egypt, "which thy fathers paid," imposed on the king of Amurru (North Syria) by Mursil II of Hatti. The obligation to be the enemy of his ally's enemy in Hannibal's Oath expressly excluded the usual Greek limitations of reciprocal obligations of the allied powers.²⁶

A new alliance necessarily raises the question of its compatibility with the other engagements of the parties. Hannibal's war originated in a dispute about the question of whether the

²⁵ Hattushil's letter; transliterated Meissner, p. 60; translations: Luckenbill, p. 202. I reproduce Langdon's translation, p. 202. The military duties of the vassal: Korošec, pp. 72-3 and 69, 1 (the formula quoted in the text).

²⁶ On the Greek principle of limited assistance cf. *R. E. G.*, LVI (1943), pp. 291-4. The Persian wars originated in this law of *epimachia*, exercised by the Athenians in favor of Miletus but against Persia. Cf. Herod., V, 99. The *casus foederis* in the Hittite treaties of vassalage: Korošec, p. 90. On *berit* with Assyria: Hos. 12, 2. Cf. II Reg. 17, 4. Amurru treaty: E. Forrer, "Staatsverträge" (*Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen-Aegyptischen Gesellschaft*, XXXI [1926]), p. 13. Goetze, *A. N. E. T.*, p. 204. Cf. generally Korošec, p. 46. Cf. the alliance between Athens and Regium (433-2 B. C.): [οὐκ] ὠφελήσομεν [τοὺς ἐ]χθροὺς τοὺς Ἑγγύων (Tod, I, p. 58).

term "allies" in the Roman-Punic peace of 241, included only those who were such at the time of making this treaty or also those who became allies afterwards. The Carthaginians interpreted the clause in the former meaning. Accordingly, Hannibal expressly states that the term "allies" in his oath is restricted to the present confederates of each party, with the specific inclusion of his future allies in Italy. On the other hand, Hannibal stipulates that military aid does not need to be furnished against allies of one's own who became enemies of the other partner. In other words, according to the general principle of legal interpretation, the earlier treaty must stand against a later. Ben Hadad of Damascus entered into covenant with Baasha of Israel. When the latter attacked Judah, Asa of Judah asked Ben Hadad for help, referring to the *berit* already made by their fathers. Ben Hadad broke his covenant with Baasha and sent his army against Israel. Hannibal expressly refuses to be placed in such an awkward position. If one of his allies attacks Philip of Macedonia, he is not obliged to espouse the latter's cause.²⁷

Such limitations made it particularly necessary to state emphatically that the Macedonians should assist Hannibal in the present war against Rome until victory. The natural obligation not to desert an ally was often expressly confirmed in Greek

²⁷ Pol., III, 21 and 29; I Reg. 15, 17. In some Greek treaties there is a clause prohibiting engagements incompatible with the present instrument. See e.g. the alliance between Antigonos Doson (?) and Eleutherna: τὰς Ἐλευθερναίους [ποιεῖν τὸν] πόλεμον πρὸς οὓς ἂν βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος πολεμῇ· μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ ἑτέραν συμ[μαχίαν τίθεσθαι ἐναντίαν πρ]ὸς Ἀντίγονον καὶ Μακεδό[νας]; cf. M. Guarducci, *Inscr. Oreticae*, II (Rome, 1939), ch. XII, no. 21. It follows a clause of the same meaning with reference to the obligations of Antigonos. In the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna aid is promised against an aggression by some ally of Hierapytna: Michel, 17 = *S.I.G.*³, 581 = Guarducci, III, p. 32: εἰ δὲ καὶ συστῇ πόλεμος Ῥοδίοις ποτὶ τινα τῶν ἐν συμμαχίαι ἐόντων Ἱεραπυτνίοις εἰ μὲν καὶ πολεμῶντ(α)ι Ῥόδιοι, ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν Ῥοδίοις Ἱεραπύτν(ε)ιοι, εἰ δὲ καὶ πολεμῶνται κατάρξαντες πόλεμον, μὴ ἐπάναγκες ἔστω Ἱεραπυτνίοις ἀποστελλεῖν συμμαχίαν Ῥοδίοις. Sometimes, there is an exception to the advantage of a third party: the treaty between Miletus and Heracleia establishes a complete alliance between both cities, but reserves the rights of Rhodes (*S.I.G.*³, 633): μὴθὲν ὑπεναντίον πρᾶσσόντων τῶν δῆμων τῇ πρὸς Ῥοδίων συμμαχίαι. Cf. also Diod., XX, 99, 3; Pol., IX, 36.

treaties.²⁸ But in the latter it was also usual to stipulate that the assistance must be given "in the most effective manner." To Hannibal, however, the aid was to be furnished "according to the need and to the future understanding."²⁹ Hannibal, thus, paradoxically stipulated a general alliance for the future, but only a limited help for the present war. Yet, this paradox is only apparent. The general obligation of mutual security was a part of a *berit*. But the conqueror of Italy did not wish to have a Macedonian as a principal power beside him in the war against Rome. The law of nations, ancient as well as modern, distinguished between the principal ally, who carried on the war with all his forces, and the associated powers, who merely furnished the former with a number of troops. The auxiliary had no right to any share in conquests, and the principal alone made peace, in which the associates were only included. Thus, in the peace between Magnesia and Miletus, it was agreed that "the same peace shall be also for Priene, which assisted Magnesia, and for Heracleia, which assisted Miletus."³⁰ This device to extend the benefits of peace to the States which were auxiliaries (or simply had some interest or other in the new political relationship) allowed the principal contracting powers to negotiate among themselves without taking into account the wishes and whims of their associates.

Hannibal reserved for himself the sole right of making peace with Rome provided that Philip should be comprehended in it.

²⁸ See e.g. Thuc., V, 23; V, 47; VIII, 58; *Griech. Dialekt. Inschr.*, III, 5041, etc.

²⁹ Cf. the alliance of 420 B.C. in Thuc., V, 47: *τρόπῳ ὁποῖω ἀν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ*. Cf. also e.g. the Chremonidean alliance (*S. I. G.*³, 434-5), that between Miletus and Heracleia (*ib.*, 633); Michel, 17; Michel, 21, etc.

³⁰ *S. I. G.*³, 538 = *Milet*, III, 148: *εἶναι δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰρήνην καὶ Πριηνέυσιν τοῖς συμμαχήσασιν Μάγνησιν καὶ Ἡρακλεώταις τοῖς συμμαχήσασιν Μιλήσιοις*. On powers that are comprehended in a treaty of peace cf. my article in *Rev. Phil.*, LXI (1935). I add that the Aetolian-Roman alliance of 212 also stipulated that either party making a separate peace with Philip should include the ally in it. Liv., XXVI, 24, 12: *si Aetoli pacem cum Philippo facerent, foederi adscriberent, ita ratam fore pacem si Philippus arma ab Romanis . . . abstinuisset*, etc. This is neither the prohibition of a separate peace (Täubler, p. 430), nor the beginning of Roman protection of the Aetolians (M. Holleaux, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 125).

Hannibal promised 1) that the effects of peace should be extended to Macedonia, 2) that Rome should abandon her possessions on the other side of the Adriatic Sea and 3) should return hostages to Demetrius of Pharos, an Illyrian ruler and auxiliary of Philip. But not wishing to give the status of a principal belligerent to Philip, Hannibal obviously could not demand more than limited help. Inasmuch as auxiliary troops were paid by the assisted party, Hannibal, whose financial situation was bad in 215, reserved the decision about the assistance he might need and require.³¹ Again, it was usual that the principal power furnished ships to carry the auxiliary force offered by the overseas ally.³² Yet, Hannibal had no fleet, and Roman naval superiority was obvious and uncontested.

The treaty, further, stipulated that Philip's assistance should be given "according to the need," that is, only if Hannibal requested it. Unbidden reinforcements were not wanted. For instance, in 169 the Romans refused the contingent offered by the Achaeans for the war against Perseus of Macedonia.³³ Both points of the clause (aid to be given when needed and on the conditions to be fixed later) were in no manner exceptional. The first one was already usual in Oriental agreements of the second millennium B. C.³⁴ Yet, although natural in a defensive alliance against a future and indefinite aggressor,³⁵ the clause is odd in an offensive agreement concluded during the war against the foe explicitly named.

After the peace with Rome, the offensive alliance against this power will become a defensive one. Both signatories will help

³¹ Liv., XXII, 61, 2 (in 216): *Hannibalem maxime huiusce rei (sc. pecuniae) egentem*. In 216 Hannibal requested financial assistance from Carthage (Liv., XXIII, 12, 4) but, as it seems, did not obtain it (Liv., XXVIII, 12, 5 and XXX, 2, 2). Cf. Pol., IX, 25, 6. Cf. E. Groag, *Hannibal als Politiker*, p. 105.

³² Holleaux, p. 186.

³³ Pol., XXXVIII, 13, 5. Cf. Thuc., V, 61, 1. Particular and future agreements on the number and character of auxiliary forces and their employment are, for instance, referred to in the alliances of 418 between Sparta and Argos (Thuc., V, 79).

³⁴ Cf. e.g. Ramses-Hattushil treaty, § 9, Korošec, p. 73. For the Roman law of nations cf. Täubler, p. 57.

³⁵ Cf. e.g. *I. G.*, I², 96 (Athens-Argos); Thuc., VIII, 58 (Sparta-Persia); Liv., XXXI, 46, 3 (Aetolians and Attalus in 200 B. C.); Liv., XXVI, 24, 12 (Rome and Aetolians in 212).

one another against future Roman aggression. In a kind of afterthought, the redactor of the instrument then extended the same mutual guarantee with reference to any future aggressor. A clause allowing changes and amendments in the treaty, with the agreement of both parties, ends the instrument. Such provision was usual in Greek treaties.³⁶

V.

Our examination of Hannibal's Oath has produced two conclusions, one juristical, the other historical, but has also raised many problems which the present writer is unable to solve.

In the first place, Hannibal's Oath offers the sole existing document of international *berit*. The instrument shows a remarkable mixture of traditional clauses, which were already used a millennium before Hannibal, with provisions current in Hellenistic documents. It is as if in Oriental diplomacy, Abraham suddenly should become a contemporary of Polybius. This combining of new and of antique elements shows that the old-fashioned form of the "covenant" was adapted in Hellenistic Carthage to the needs of a new time.³⁷

The comparison with the three Punic treaties, concluded with Rome, is instructive.³⁸ Although known only through Polybius' resumés of their Latin versions, these instruments clearly show the standard form of international agreements, the type which was normal in Greece as well as in the Ancient East. These treaties are bilateral "agreements" ("there is to be friendship . . . on the following conditions") which are confirmed by the oath of each party. In the "covenant," as we have seen, the pledge may be unilateral, given conditionally or without condition. Hannibal's Oath was a unilateral declaration. Did he expect a "symmetric" declaration of Philip V? We do not know.

Further, the treaties between Rome and Carthage were con-

³⁶ Cf. e. g. Thuc., V, 23; V, 47, etc.

³⁷ Arist., *Pol.*, III, 9, 11 (1280 a 35) says that Carthaginians (and Etruscans) contracted commercial treaties, written agreements of military secours and *σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν*. The "engagement not to do wrong" would be a perfect interpretation of *berit*.

³⁸ *Pol.*, III, 22-28. Cf. Täubler, p. 264; A. Piganiol, *Histoire de Rome* (Paris, 1939), p. 68; M. David, "The Treaties Between Rome and Carthage," *Symbolae Van Oyen* (Leiden, 1946), pp. 231-50.

cluded by the respective governments. Hannibal was, of course, qualified to enter into military conventions in his campaign. Polybius and Livy refer to alliances concluded between the Punic general and cities and peoples in Italy. For instance, the treaty with the Locrians stipulated that the latter had to help the Carthaginians in peace and war, and that the Carthaginians reciprocally should help the Locrians. Yet, in the same summer of 215, having concluded the preliminary negotiations with Hieronymus of Syracuse, Hannibal referred him to the Carthaginian government for the conclusion of a definitive treaty of alliance. Consequently, he had no unlimited treaty-making power.³⁹

It is permissible to surmise that in Hellenistic Carthage the "covenant" form was used when the engager, let us say a general in the field, was not deputed by the Senate for the conclusion of this treaty. Having no power to convey rights belonging to the central government, the general, however, could engage himself and his army, by means of a *berit*. Hannibal's covenant with Philip V is not concluded in the name of the Carthaginians (as the Roman-Punic treaties). The contracting party is Hannibal himself together with the troops under his command. They swear, but this oath contains no curse on the perjurer. Whatever may happen, gods will be unable to destroy the army of Carthage if this elusive assurance is violated.

These observations throw light on the much discussed treaty of Hasdrubal. This governor-general of Punic Spain gave pledge to the Romans that the Carthaginians should not cross the Ebro for conquest. Modern critics are at a loss to understand this unilateral pledge.⁴⁰ If, however, we suppose that Hasdrubal entered into a covenant with Rome, this unique clause of an agreement becomes intellegible. We have only to remember how Laban set up a pillar to delimit his and Jacob's boundaries.

³⁹ Liv., XXIV, 1, 13 (treaty with the Locrians). Cf. Pol., III, 84-5; VIII, 23 (27); IX, 26, 7; Liv., XXIII, 7; 43, 14; XXIV, 1; XXV, 8, 8; 16; Plut., *De Mul. Virt.*, 6 (246 c) = Polyæn., VII, 50. Negotiations with Syracuse: Pol., VII, 2; Liv., XXIV, 6.

⁴⁰ Pol., III, 27, 9. Cf. Piganiol (above, n. 38), p. 108; H. H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World* (London, 1935), pp. 197-9; G. de Sanctis, *Problemi di storia antica* (Bari, 1932), pp. 161-8 and works referred to by these authors.

Neither should pass over this mark "for harm." "And Jacob swore by the *Pachad* of his father Isaac."⁴¹ Since in Hasdrubal's time there was no danger of a Roman army arriving at the Ebro (the Romans had still to cross the Po at this date), it is quite natural that Hasdrubal's engagement was not only unilateral but also made without conditions.

If the suggested interpretation is exact, the covenant with Philip V was an expedient for Hannibal. The agreement did not bind the government at home. In 218, the Carthaginian Senate with regard to Hasdrubal's treaty emphatically stated that pledges given by Punic generals are not binding for Carthage as being made without the consent of the constituted authorities.⁴² Thus, Hannibal's covenant was no entangling alliance which could impair the relations between Carthage and Egypt and other Hellenistic powers. The pledge engaged the Punic commander-in-chief alone and was valid in the theatre of war: Italy (that is the land south of the Po), the Celtic Land (Gallia Cisalpina), Liguria. Altogether that meant the Italian peninsula. Note that Sicily was not covered by this guarantee.

The draft of the treaty throws some light on Hannibal's political aims. He, naturally, expected to remain the Carthaginian captain-general in Italy after the definitive victory and peace. Thus, he promises to assist Philip in case of a later attack by the Romans or any other power (*sc.* in Italy) not exempt by former treaty with Carthage. The stipulation shows that the most implacable foe of Rome did not plan the destruction of the City of the Seven Hills. He rather admitted that even after the conclusion of peace, Rome would remain a military power free to declare and able to conduct a new war against Macedonia or Carthage. Hannibal was brought up in the polite traditions of Hellenism. The idea of *Carthago delenda* could originate only in the mind of barbarians.

Hannibal viewed the Carthaginian dominion in Italy as a confederation, members of which retained the right to make war. That is again a Greek conception. It is no less remarkable that Hannibal gave back the right of minting to his Italian allies,

⁴¹ Gen. 31, 53. On the term *pachad* cf. W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (2nd ed., Baltimore, 1946), p. 188.

⁴² Pol., III, 21.

while Carthage did not allow Utica to strike coins, and Hellenistic kings equally monopolized the coinage. If it could be proved that Hannibal imposed the Phoenician standard in Italy, that would show, however, that he planned an economic annexion of Italy by Carthage.⁴³

But why did Philip offer aid to the Punic general in the summer of 215 B. C.? Why did he send his plenipotentiary to Hannibal and not to Carthage? The envoy had to reach Hannibal across the Roman lines; according to the annalistic version he was even captured on the way by Roman troops; he surely became a prisoner on the way back. To understand Philip's action we have first to put out of our minds the knowledge of the surprising events which were to follow Hannibal's triumph but which still lay hidden in the unknown future at the time when the Macedonian envoy crossed the Adriatic Sea.

On hearing the results of the battle of Trasimene (September 217), Philip hastened to make peace with the Aetolians in order to regain liberty of action.⁴⁴ According to Polybius, he planned to intervene in Italy. The vision of Italy pursued him even in his sleep, and the conquest of Italy was to be the first step to world domination.⁴⁵ It is probable that this interpretation of Philip's dreams is a hostile invention of Achaean informants. The possession of a harbor on the seaboard of Italy would be necessary in order to bring troops to that country. So far as we know, Philip made no effort to solicit Tarentum or let us say Thurii. The Roman fleet controlled the sea lanes.⁴⁶

As a matter of fact, the king rather undertook to lay hands on

⁴³ Cf. W. Giesecke, *Italia Numismatica* (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 150-70; P. Willeumier, *Tarente* (Paris, 1939), p. 144; J. Heurgon, *Recherches sur l'histoire . . . de Capoue* (Paris, 1942), p. 218. Yet, according to this author Capua under Hannibal used the Roman standard. The Punic coinage (of Attic weight), with the name of Carthaginian towns in Sicily (e. g. Motya) on the coins, falls between ca. 410 and 310 B. C. Thus it virtually precedes the coins struck at Carthage itself in the Hellenistic period. These coins follow the Phoenician (Ptolemaic) standard. Cf. C. Seltman, *Greek Coins* (London, 1933), pp. 249-50.

⁴⁴ For the following cf. Holleaux, *C. A. H.*, VII, ch. V.; Walbank, pp. 68-108.

⁴⁵ Pol., V, 101. Cf. Manni (n. 2), p. 8.

⁴⁶ In 212 Syracuse sent an envoy to Philip; Liv., XXV, 23, 8. Cf. de Sanctis (n. 1), III, 2, p. 410.

Roman possessions in Illyria. It is doubtful whether these seaports (Oricum, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos in the north) and the Illyrian tribes under Roman protectorate were of any military or political importance for Macedonia. Mountain chains separate Macedonia from Albania. The latter is open toward the West but closed toward the East. Greek colonists or traders reached Illyria by sea and not by land. The kings of Macedonia had no interests in the Adriatic, except that they sometimes engaged Dalmatian pirates against Aetolian privateers. On the other hand, the Romans established no colonies or garrisons in Illyria; they did not even have permanent agents in the Dalmatian protectorate. The kings of Macedonia, who tolerated Egyptian stations on the Thracian coast, had nothing to fear from Rome's nominal domination of and intermittent interventions in Albania. Polybius again suggests that the occupation of Illyria was essential for Philip's future crossing to Italy. But Philip was already the master of Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Leucas in the Ionian Sea. Yet, in the early summer of 216, Philip tried to take Apollonia by surprise, a city which later became a Roman gateway to Macedonia but which could hardly be used as a base against Italy.

As a matter of fact, Philip simply followed the rule-of-thumb of Hellenistic statecraft: to grasp at every prize within one's reach. Rome's sudden weakness offered the opportunity, as it seemed, for acquiring new territories in Illyria. The Roman fleet stationed at the western point of Sicily was far away. But when Philip's flotilla, after sailing round the Peloponnese, at last reached the bay of Aulon, the king learned that a Roman squadron was approaching. Philip abandoned the expedition and returned to Macedonia.

In the meantime, Hannibal triumphed at Cannae. That changed the whole situation, and Xenophanes was hastily sent to the Punic camp. The Roman annalists later imagined that both foes of Rome intended to divide the world between them, and that Philip was invited by Hannibal to come to Italy with all his host and to participate in the war against Rome at sea and on land.⁴⁷ All that is invented anachronistically, with the knowledge of subsequent events. In the spring of 215, Hannibal

⁴⁷ Liv., XXXIII, 33; App., *Mac.*, 1; Zonar., IX, 4, 2; Just., XXIX, 4.

would hardly have welcomed a new Pyrrhus in Italy. But the "second front," small as it was, which Philip prepared to open, was a helpful military diversion for the Punic captain.⁴⁸ On the other hand, Philip had no reason now to seek an alliance with Carthage. As the political situation was in the spring of 215, a pact with Carthage would have placed the heir of Alexander on the level of Hieronymus of Syracuse. Carthage was now the greatest military power in the world. Her allies were her vassals. But it was still possible in helping Hannibal to obtain a part of his spoils.

After Cannae, almost all of southern Italy seceded from Rome. Hannibal was now in possession of some seaports where Punic reinforcements could land: some weeks later Bomilcar put ashore at Locri soldiers, elephants, and supplies sent from Carthage, while other aid landed in Bruttium. Should the war go on, Hannibal could hope that his next victory would surpass that of Cannae. But he rather expected a peace. He could promise to the Capuans that their city soon would be the capital of Italy.⁴⁹ As we have noted, Hannibal expressly excluded Philip from participation in the coming peace conference with Rome. But if Rome was about to come to terms with the conqueror, was it not to be expected that Illyrian harbors should be ceded to the great commercial city of Africa? It was to the advantage of Philip to preempt the Dalmatian coast before the Carthaginians. His military coup missed, but his diplomacy succeeded. In exchange for future, more or less nebulous, military aid, the invincible Hannibal solemnly pledged to obtain Illyria for Philip. From now on, the wily Punic, ensnared by the superior arts of Greek statecraft, fought not only for his city, but also . . . *pour les beaux yeux du roi de Macédoine*. Whether the victorious peace should be signed this summer, or next winter, or even after the next campaign (you surely do not think that the Romans will stand this beating any more?), the Senate would have to abandon the possessions on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. In the meantime, the king could strengthen his position in Greece, for instance, by establishing his garrison in Messene. This

⁴⁸ Pol., VII, 4, 5; IX, 22, 5.

⁴⁹ Punic reinforcements: Liv., XXIII, 41, 10 and 43, 6; Hannibal's hope of a new victory: Liv., XXIII, 43, 4; his promise to Capua: Liv., XXIII, 10, 2.

reasoning fitted perfectly in the whole system of Hellenistic politics. If the first rule was to grab at any accessible prize, the second one was to compromise after a crushing defeat. A year before Cannae, defeated in the pitched battle at Raphia, Antiochus III hastened to conclude a negotiated peace with Ptolemy IV. Philip himself acted accordingly in his wars with Rome. War *à outrance* was no longer fashionable. In a letter written in the fall of 215, Philip expressed his admiration for the political wisdom of the Romans with regard to their naturalization of foreigners.⁵⁰ How could he in the spring of 215 imagine that the Romans would not behave like every civilized power with respect to the peace with Carthage? Following the same line of reasoning, Napoleon in Moscow daily expected the coming of Russian peace emissaries.

Yet, the Romans did not ask for peace, neither after Cannae, nor in 215, nor in 214. In 214 the tide of victory had still not turned against Hannibal, but the "Fabian" warfare of the Romans deprived him of any chance of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion then. In 214, then in 213, Philip invaded Illyria, not without success. But these successes brought about the Roman-Aetolian alliance of 212 and the First Macedonian War. We do not know whether Hannibal, more and more hard-pressed by the Romans, ever reminded Philip of the promised aid.⁵¹ Philip probably never thought of sending it, and, in any case, never tried to do it.

But all that was still not woven on the spindle of the Parcae when Xenocrates crossed the Adriatic Sea. If Rome had concluded the peace with her conqueror in 215, posterity would have lauded to the skies the diplomatic genius of Philip—provided, of course, that Hannibal, on this occasion, should have kept his part of the bargain. Nothing, indeed, is more fascinating than history that did not happen. But in the spring of 215, nobody, not even the young P. Cornelius Scipio, could see the coming glory of Zama through the night of Time.

ELIAS J. BICKERMAN.

⁵⁰ Philip's letter to Larissa: *S. I. G.*², 543.

⁵¹ Livy (XXIV, 13, 5) says that Hannibal occupied Tarentum (in 213) with a view to Philip's landing.

SENECA'S *APOCOLOCYNTOSIS* AND *OCTAVIA*:
A DIPTYCH.

The attribution to Seneca of both the *Apocolocyntosis* and the *Octavia* has been questioned, the form of both is unusual and their significance far from clear. I believe that they are closely related and that the link that connects them strengthens the arguments in favor of Seneca's authorship. I shall, in this paper, attempt to show what his purpose was in writing the former during the first days of Nero's reign and the latter during the last months of his own life, at the time of the Pisonian conspiracy.

Before proceeding with the discussion, a brief summary of the traditional arguments for and against the genuineness of these two works is in order. That Seneca composed an *Apocolocyntosis* of Claudius which satirized the emperor's apotheosis is vouched for by Dio (συνέθηκε μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σενέκας σύγγραμμα ἀποκολοκύντωσιν αὐτὸ ὥσπερ τινὰ ἀθανάτισιν ὀνομάσας).¹ The fact that the difficult word *Apocolocyntosis* does not appear in the title given by the best manuscript, *Sangallensis* 569 (saec. 9/10) or by the inferior manuscripts, is sufficiently accounted for by the following hypothesis: The archetype's title *Diui Claudii Apocolocyntosis* was glossed *Apotheosis per saturam*, the word *Apocolocyntosis* dropped out to be replaced by the gloss. The resulting title in *Sangallensis* (*Diui Claudii ΑΠΟΘΗΩΣΙΣ Annaei Senecae per saturam*) is thus inaccurate and tautological but it does introduce the satire mentioned as Seneca's by Dio.² The fact that

¹ Bibliography in Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. der Röm. Lit.*, II (1935), pp. 471 f.; L. Herrmann, "Recherches sur le Texte de la Satire sur l'Apothéose de Claude," *Rev. Belge Philol. et Hist.*, XI (1932), pp. 549-76; C. F. Russo, "Studi sulla Divi Claudii ΑΠΟΚΟΛΟΚΥΝΤΩΣΙΣ," *La Parola del Passato*, I (1946), pp. 241 ff., and his edition of the *Apocolocyntosis* (1947).

² Another possible solution was suggested by K. Schenkl in *Wien. Sitzungsab.*, hist. Kl. (1863), pp. 3 f.: like many of Varro's satires this work had a double title, one in Greek and one in Latin. See also K. Barwick, "Senecas *Apocolocyntosis*, eine Zweite Ausgabe des Verfassers," *Rh. M.*, XCII (1944), pp. 159-73. His arguments in support of two separate editions of the *Apocolocyntosis* by Seneca do not seem convincing to me. See also F. Bornmann, "*Apocolocyntosis*," *La Parola del Passato*, V (1950), pp. 69 f.

the pun (Apocolocyntosis on the analogy of apotheosis) is confined to the title instead of being carried out in the text is not unique in literature and need not detain us. One more argument, this one psychological, has been adduced against Seneca's authorship. He is known to have composed the *Laudatio funebris* read by Nero at Claudius' funeral. Is it conceivable that he should at the same time have written the ludicrous satire against the dead emperor known as the *Apocolocyntosis*?

It has been suggested that overstress of laudation results in the acutest satire and that Seneca used this device in the funeral oration he composed for Nero to read.³ The fact that the audience laughed when Claudius' wisdom and foresight were mentioned in this speech may indicate that Seneca wrote it with his tongue in his cheek (Tac., *Ann.*, XIII, 3). At any rate protocol demanded that the traditional eulogy of the departed ruler be recited by his heir. Since Nero could not compose it himself (Tac., *ibid.*) Seneca wrote, according to the conventionally correct formulae of rhetoric, the panegyric demanded by tradition and Agrippina. Neither sincerity nor grief was expected of him. Once his official task was performed he could proceed to attack and satirize the dead man, whatever his motive may have been in writing the *Apocolocyntosis*, without incurring any blame for inconsistency or lack of decorum. In Pliny's terse phrase (*Pan.*, XI, 1): *dicavit caelo . . . Claudium Nero ut irrideret*. Thus there seems to be no convincing reason either in the manuscript tradition or in the occasion of its composition for doubting the genuineness of the *Apocolocyntosis* or for questioning its identity with the work mentioned by Dio.

If Seneca wrote the *Octavia* he must have done so at the very end of his life since events are mentioned which happened up to the year 65 (the great fire, work begun on the *domus aurea*). The many arguments against its attribution to Seneca were to my mind convincingly disposed of some time ago by Pease⁴

³ A. Momigliano, *L'Opera dell' Imperatore Claudio* (Firenze, 1929), pp. 136-9; W. H. Alexander, "Seneca's ad Polybium *De Consolatione*: A Reappraisal," *Trans. Royal Soc. of Canada*, XXXVII (1943), pp. 33-53; A. Rostagni, *Senecae Divi Claudii Apokolokyntosis* (ed. Torino, 1944), pp. 20-2.

⁴ A. S. Pease, "Is the *Octavia* a Play of Seneca?" *C.J.*, XV (1919-20), pp. 388-403. For bibliography see E. C. Chickering, *An Introduction*

and have recently been reviewed by S. Pantzerhielm Thomas⁵ who concludes in favor of its genuineness. If the E recension of the tragedies, which does not include the *Octavia*, represents an edition published or prepared for publication by Seneca during his lifetime, and the A recension, which does include it, represents an edition published after his death, when the *Octavia* could safely appear,⁶ then only one serious argument remains against Seneca's authorship. This is the claim made by many critics that the author knows details of Nero's and Poppaea's deaths. The passage on which their objections are mainly based is an oracular speech of Agrippina's in which her son is threatened with an early death (vv. 614-30). This has seemed to others as it does to me far too vague and general to constitute a *vaticinium ex eventu*. Von Ranke⁷ and Siegmund⁸ long ago showed that it contains stock literary themes and that both the mythological examples (see *Apocol.*, 14, 4) and Agrippina's other threats are found elsewhere in the poets. Moreover a well-known prophecy was current during Nero's lifetime foretelling that some day he would be deserted (Suet., *Nero*, 40, 2: *praedictum a mathematicis Neroni olim erat fore ut quandoque destitueretur; unde illa vox eius celeberrima* Τὸ τέχνην ἡμᾶς διατρέφει . . .). Some such utterance announcing a wretched death for the tyrant as well as literary models,⁹ as for instance

to *Octavia Praetexta* (N. Y., 1910); K. Münscher, *J. A. W.*, CXCHII (1922), pp. 198 ff.; "Senecas Werke. Untersuchungen zur Abfassungszeit und Echtheit," *Philol.*, Suppl. XVI, 1 (1923), pp. 1-145; Léon Herrmann, *Octavie Tragédie Prétexte* (Paris, 1924); Schanz-Hosius, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 1), Joanna Schmidt in *R.-E.*, V. Ciaffi, "Intorno all' Autore dell' *Octavia*," *Riv. di Filol.*, LXV (1937), pp. 246-65.

⁵ S. Pantzerhielm Thomas, "De *Octavia Praetexta*," *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXIV (1945), pp. 48-87.

⁶ See Herrmann, *op. cit.*, (*supra*, n. 4), pp. 1-5.

⁷ *Sämmtl. Werke*, LI-LII, p. 65.

⁸ A. Siegmund, "Zur Kritik der Tragödie *Octavia*," *Progr. Bohm Leipa*, 1909-1910.

⁹ Lucretius (II, 978-1023) had given of these punishments an explanation which appealed to Seneca (*Ep.*, 24, 18). Cf. also Vergil, *Aen.*, VI, 595-627. For the sufferings of Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion, and Tityus in Seneca's tragedies see *H. O.*, 942-7, 1069 ff.; *Pha.*, 1229 ff.; *Ag.*, 15 ff. (note also 43: *daturus coniugi iugulum suae*); *Th.* 6 ff., etc. Kings threatened with death and desertion: *H. O.*, 609 ff.; *Ag.*, 79 ff.; *Pho.*, 646 ff., etc. See also *Apoc.*, 14, 4. Doubt has been cast on the

Ovid's *Ibis* (159-80), are sufficient to account for the dark prophecy of Agrippina. The parallel with Suetonius' description of Nero's death (which may contain legendary as well as historical elements) is remote and does not indicate for the *Octavia* a date later than Seneca's death. As for Poppaea, her *tristes rogos* are mentioned in the play (vv. 595-8), though we know that she was not cremated (Tac., *Ann.*, XVI, 6: *corpus non igni abolitum, sed regum externorum consuetudine differtum odoribus conditur tumuloque Iuliorum infertur . . . ; gravida ictu calcis adflicta est*), and the brutal manner of her death passed over, whereas it would doubtless have been included in the catalogue of Nero's sins had this been compiled after the event. Pease and Pantzerhielm Thomas have scrutinized the play minutely and shown that it contains no details circumstantial enough to indicate a date later than Seneca's death. No evidence sufficiently strong to disprove the manuscript tradition has been brought forward. But doubt is contagious and the assertion that the play contains inconsistencies and anachronisms has gained plausibility through frequent repetition.

Still, if we accept the traditional attribution to Seneca, we must account for one anomaly: Seneca appears as one of the characters in the *Octavia*. Hosius¹⁰ points out that this never occurs in serious drama. Cratinus had represented himself in the *Pytine*, Herondas in one of his mimes (*The Dream*). Aristophanes uttered personal comments in the parabases as Terence and others did in their prologues. Adam de la Halle and more recently Molière, Grabbe, and Immermann all appear in their own plays.¹¹ The effect is apt to be irony or humor. What then was the impression which Seneca intended to produce in thus impersonating himself in the pseudo-drama called the *Octavia*? The Seneca he has sketched is a man he never claimed

reliability of Suetonius' account of the death of Nero by J. Köhm, *Phil. Woch.*, LV (1935), pp. 772-80.

¹⁰ *Gnom.*, XIII (1937), pp. 132-5.

¹¹ See also Karl Kraus, *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*. In Varro's *Eumenides* and in his *Gloria* the author appears to be speaking in his own name and the phrase *vosque in theatro* might indicate a work of dramatic character. He may also have appeared in person in the *Marcopolis*, *περὶ ἀρχῆς*. We do not know what genre Varro selected for his *Τρικλᾶρος* in which he satirized the first triumvirate.

to be in real life, a man secure in the possession of truth, fearless, serene, invulnerable. He appears as the exponent of Stoicism rather than as a real person, his *sententiae* are delivered in oracular style, his every word is marked with the dignity, superhuman calm, and philosophy of the Stoic ideal. In the *De Vita Beata* he had already explained that he never intended to imply that he had attained this ideal: *haec non pro me loquor . . . sed pro illo cui aliquid acti est* (17, 4). When he spoke as a sage he was only the spokesman of his school of philosophy. He knew his own weakness but could show the way to the highest good. Though he realized that the acquisition of wisdom and perfection was far beyond his power, his task was to be the mouthpiece of those who had formulated and, like him, attempted to follow the rules of reason and philosophy. In the *Octavia* he once more used this convenient device of the diatribe and other genres.

I have called the *Octavia* pseudo-drama, in spite of the fact that it is always referred to as the only extant *tragoedia praetexta*.¹² When the fragments of *praetextae* available to us and the information concerning them in ancient sources are compared to the *Octavia* it is clear that Seneca's work belongs to a different genre. It shares with the *praetextae* the framework of a tragedy and the portrayal of native characters of high position. But in the *praetextae* dramatic expression was given to the traditions of the heroic age, or to praise of more recent heroes. They treat of great events connected with the history or the legend of Rome, of national heroes who fought or died nobly. Their style seems to have the solemnity, dignity, and magnificence of epic poetry. They record great victories or great disasters with a kind of magnificence. Patriotism above all, pride, courage, are portrayed directly and dramatically in lofty and resounding words. The *Octavia* contains none of the elements which, with their emphasis on valorous deeds, made the *praetextae* dramas eminently suitable for presentation on the Roman stage. Totally lacking in anything dramatic, the *Octavia* is in fact a diatribe against Nero. It can hardly be said to have a plot but consists rather of a series of monologues and duologues which tell a pathetic story and proceed to moralize it. All is told, nothing acted. The only clash of personalities is a cold and argumentative debate between the

¹² Bibliography in K. Ziegler, *R.-E.*, s. v. *Tragoedia*, xxiii.

emperor and his minister. All is static exposition, without progress, growth, or crisis. The *Octavia* is deliberately composed, not as drama, but as the imitation of drama. The author could, had he meant this to be a true *praetexta*, have exploited the conflicts and crises inherent in the situation which appears so dramatic in the pages of the historians. There is no feeling for staging, no regard for an audience, and the scenes which would have stirred the spectators' or the readers' emotions, had this been conceived as a true tragedy, are deliberately omitted. Nero never meets Octavia or Poppaea nor do the two women ever come face to face. The situation itself is moving but it is analyzed, never acted. As there is no tying of the threads, no rising of tension, and no suspense, so there is no untying and no resolution of conflict. The *Octavia* is a versified representation in dialogue of tragic events, apparently meant to produce pity and fear, but it is dramatic in form only, not in the treatment of characters and situations. It is not a true tragedy, any more than Seneca's remaining nine plays are tragedies in the accepted sense of the word.¹³ By adapting and combining elements belonging to different genres (tragical history, philosophical and political dialogue, diatribe, satire), he contrived in the *Octavia* a new and not altogether successful type of pseudo-drama. As he had already used the tragic mold to expound his own brand of Stoicism, so now he represented dramatically the philosophical and political implications of the contemporary state of affairs.

We must now consider what Seneca's purpose was in writing a ludicrous and at times coarse satire against Claudius and a pseudo-dramatic piece which could not be published during Nero's lifetime. About both works opinion is sharply divided. Scholars have called the *Apocolocyntosis* a political squib (Sikes),¹⁴ a silly and spiteful attack (Mackail),¹⁵ a venomous political satire (Teuffel).¹⁶ Duff says¹⁷ that Seneca detested

¹³ B. M. Marti, "Seneca's Tragedies: A New Interpretation," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 216-45; "The Prototypes of Seneca's Tragedies," *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 1-16; "Place de L'Hercule sur l'Oeta dans le Corpus des Tragédies de Sénèque," *Rev. Ét. Lat.*, XXVI (1948), pp. 189-210.

¹⁴ *Cambridge Ancient History*, XI, p. 727.

¹⁵ *Latin Literature*, p. 174.

¹⁶ *Gesch. Röm. Lit.*⁶ (1910), p. 228, § 289. 7.

¹⁷ *Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age*, p. 244. O. Weinreich

Claudius, "he had an old score to wipe out: he probably felt a sincere contempt for his pedantry: and thus a clever and venomous pasquinade was written by a man of flesh and blood, a Spaniard who could let his feelings—especially those of hatred—go." Others read more in it than spiteful revenge. Rostagni¹⁸ believes that it represents Seneca's contempt for the official fiction of deification and that it was mainly responsible for the eventual cancellation of Claudius' apotheosis (Suet., *Claud.*, 45). Nock calls it a clever skit and a parody but warns against taking it as an attack against the institution of imperial deification.¹⁹ For Bickel²⁰ it represents Seneca's announcement of a new political program (and must have been written late in December 54 or perhaps early in 55). Waltz²¹ and Birt²² see in the satire a political move against Agrippina since it mocks a ceremony organized at her instigation. Münscher²³ also believed that through Claudius it was Agrippina whom Seneca was attacking without ever mentioning her name. For Kurfess²⁴ on the other hand it represents the official version of the emperor's death (Claudius is shown to have died naturally while watching some comedians). In case this version were not believed, it protects Agrippina from censure by so disparaging Claudius that no one would worry about the possibility of his having been forcibly put out of the way. Viedebannt,²⁵ for whom this work is a political pamphlet, stresses the fact that Seneca, prime minister and in fact regent for a very young prince, was not in any position to publish a spiteful satire on purely personal grounds.

If we had more of Varro's Menippean satires we might find a

(tr. of the *Apocolocyntosis* [Berlin, 1923]) also considers it as a personal attack against the dead emperor.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3).

¹⁹ *Cambridge Ancient History*, X, p. 50.

²⁰ *Phil. Woch.*, XLIV (1924), pp. 845 ff.

²¹ R. Waltz, *Sénèque, L'Apocoloquintose du divin Claude* (ed. Paris, 1934), pp. ii ff.

²² Th. Birt, *Aus dem Leben der Antike* (Leipzig, 1919), pp. 180 ff.

²³ K. Münscher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4).

²⁴ *Phil. Woch.*, XLIV (1924), p. 1308; cf. also A. P. Ball, *The Satire of Seneca on the Apotheosis of Claudius* (New York, 1902), p. 19.

²⁵ O. Viedebannt, "Warum hat Seneca die Apokolokyntosis geschrieben?" *Rh. M.*, LXXV (1926), pp. 142-55.

clue as to why this particular form was chosen and what model inspired it. In any case it seems to be far more complex a piece than we are able to judge now, with its omission of Agrippina's name and the many jokes which are meaningless to us and must have been pregnant with political implications and allusions. The most striking passages are the long, solemn panegyric of Nero and his coming rule, and the divine Augustus' savage attack against Claudius. Even if the latter speech contains some parody of Augustus' sayings it seems to have been written in dead earnest. The grotesque elements in the satire, the harsh jests, buffoonery, and humor serve as foil by contrast to the two serious passages. The description of the golden age which is at hand contains reminiscences of the Fourth Eclogue. It breathes not only relief at being at last free of a detestable emperor but the hope in a new deal, in a Utopia in which a virtuous prince will, in Apollo's words, "give to the weary world bright and happy years (*felicia saecula*) and put an end to the silence of the laws." Yet the work is not just a declaration of faith and principles but a deterrent example to point the lesson of crime and punishment. Seneca might have been expected to compose, in these early days of his rule, a treatise for the guidance of his princely pupil. But the young are particularly sensitive to ridicule and derisive laughter. Seneca must have thought that Nero, seventeen at the time of Claudius' death, would profit more by this kind of literary scarecrow than he would from a more solemn treatise on the duties of a prince. This seems to be a hastily written substitute for a *Mirror of Princes*. Under the facetious form of a Menippean Satire, this, like any Roman satire, is meant to instruct and it does so by exposing the vicious folly of the preceding ruler. Somehow the bitterness of the scathing attacks against Claudius serves to emphasize the glorious hopes raised by the accession of Nero. By judiciously combining flattering praise of the new with denunciation of the dead ruler, serious warning and censure with Rabelaisian mockery, Seneca contrived an original type of political textbook *ad usum Delphini*.

In the *Octavia* the situation represented some ten years later is reversed. Seneca has acknowledged failure both as tutor and as minister. After the murder of Octavia and the great fire he realized that Nero's excesses had become intolerable and that he would not reform. He must have felt the artist's urge to create

something which would externalize his sense of disaster and personal tragedy and which would prove his own actions to have been consistent with his philosophy. He must produce a work which would embody his thoughts, present the situation as clearly as a historian would, and perhaps also influence the attitude of others.

Opinion is divided as to whether Seneca took an active part in the Pisonian conspiracy. His age and his fall from grace may have prevented him from joining his nephew and many of his friends in their plot against Nero. But he could not have ignored their efforts and must have sympathized with them. The immediate motive which prompted him to write the *Octavia* may thus have been the feeling of urgency which caused others to plan more violent measures. The very facts mentioned by Tacitus as having caused particular indignation are singled out by him: Nero's divorce from Octavia, the great fire in Rome, the exile and death of prominent men like Plautus and Sulla, the marriage to Poppaea and the projected murder of Octavia, the growing arrogance and tyranny of the emperor. If, as many believe, Seneca was among the conspirators, the *Octavia* may have been circulated *sub rosa* and served useful ends as resistance literature. Tacitus says that in the beginning of the conspiracy the conspirators would gather to talk over Nero's crimes (*Ann.*, XV, 50). This reminds one of Brutus who, when he was organizing his plot against Caesar, would test men and bring them over to his side "by the roundabout method of philosophical discussions" (Plut., *Brutus*, 12). But for Seneca, a practical man as well as an artist, conversations would not be enough, and writing would seem the best way of continuing his lifelong task, self-examination and the teaching of his fellow men.

A historical pamphlet, treating the contemporary situation in the tragic manner, or a diatribe, or a philosophical dialogue similar to those in which Cicero had represented his friends discussing political problems, might have served his purpose. He may even have remembered the dialogue on Caesar's death, the *σύλλογος* which Cicero had long planned to write (*Att.*, XIII, 30, 3 and elsewhere in the letters to Atticus). But he was sensitive to the literary taste of his contemporaries (*Tac.*, *Ann.*, XIII, 3: *ut fuit illi viro ingenium amoenum et temporis eius auribus*

accommodatum). Their interest in mime and dramatic recitations may have influenced his choice of a pseudo-dramatic form for the *Octavia*. We know that among the members of the opposition Piso himself had composed *praetextae* and sung tragic pieces (Tac., *Ann.*, XV, 65), that Thræsea Paetus had been concerned with the production of mimes (*ibid.*, XVI, 21), and that Lucan had written a *Medea* (*Vita Vaccae*). Others doubtless shared this interest, as Nero did, a fact which may have added a touch of grim humor to Seneca's choice of medium.

Seneca's immediate purpose may have been to talk out the situation with himself and to impress with the gravity of the crisis the few privileged to read the *Octavia*. But even more, it is his own justification before posterity, after the failure of the high hopes aroused by the events of 54. About this time he represents himself to Lucilius as having withdrawn from men and affairs in order to work for other generations: *secessi non tantum ab hominibus, sed a rebus, et inprimis a meis rebus; posterorum negotium ago; illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse conscribo* (*Ep.*, 8, 1-3). He adds that he points out to other men the right way which he has discovered late in life, when already weary with wandering.

As he had written the *De Vita Beata* partly to vindicate himself against accusations of corruption and loose living, so he composed the *Octavia* as his political apology. Having failed as Nero's tutor in spite of all his efforts, he thought that now rebellion offered the only solution. If his friends, or perhaps his associates, did not succeed, he knew that there could be only one outcome for them all. In this more than in any of his earlier works Seneca is haunted by the thought of death. He has placed the evidence before his readers, appealing first to their emotions through fear, pity, and indignation. He has then represented an idealized picture of himself arguing the case of good government with Nero. In this scene both characters are almost impersonal and symbolic. Nero is the wicked, foolish tyrant who obeys his passions and through terror attempts to enslave human beings. Seneca, aloof and coldly rational, expounds that part of the Stoic catechism which deals with a ruler's duties. The philosopher and the tyrant are stock characters out of a textbook rather than real men selected among the actors of the

contemporary tragedy. *Sententia* follows *sententia* in a scene more akin to diatribe than to any other genre. Under the bitterness of the present struggle Seneca communicates to his readers his awareness of the eternal quality of this struggle between innocence, justice and tyranny. The particular events are lifted to the level of the universal, the significance of the fight against the tyrant is shown to be part of the never-ending conflict between virtue and evil.

The consequences of Nero's evil choice are briefly sketched but the reader is left with a sense that nothing is solved, nothing completed. There is no catharsis. If Nero has made the wrong choice, others are left to do otherwise. Seneca has indicated the basis of the conflict and championed the side of reason. He has shown an evil which cannot be amended and therefore must be removed because it interferes with the fundamental freedom and dignity of man. It is now up to the reader to commit himself if he so chooses, and it will be the task of posterity to pass judgment. "Virtue is never lost to view; and yet to have been lost to view is no loss. There will come a day which will reveal her, though hidden away or suppressed by the spite of her contemporaries. That man is born merely for a few who thinks only of his own generation. Many thousands of years and many thousands of peoples will come after you; it is to these that you should have regard. Malice may have imposed silence upon the mouths of all who were alive in your day; but there will come men who will judge you without prejudice and without favor. If there is any reward that virtue receives at the hands of fame, not even this can pass away" (*Ep.*, 79, 17, tr. R. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library).

My conclusion is this: As he had used the tragic mold to illustrate his own brand of Stoicism, so now Seneca borrowed the form of the *praetexta* to present the implications of the contemporary crisis. A kind of irony, far more subdued than that of the *Apocolocyntosis*, may be implicit in the form of the Roman national drama which he selected. What should have developed into a Roman *praetexta* with the expected praise of a hero and the usual emphasis on the valor of a Roman leader, turns out to be a satire and a heartbreaking lament for Octavia. The tyrant himself is utterly lacking in the stature, his crimes in the grandeur, which might have inspired a writer of tragedy or

of epic. Like the hero of the *Apocolocyntosis* this tyrant is mean, stubborn, petulant, and utterly without heroic wickedness. So the *Octavia* too is something of a parody, the opposite of a *praetexta* by the nature of the characters and situations it portrays. I believe that the *Apocolocyntosis* was very much in Seneca's mind when he composed the *Octavia*. The *praetexta* is the reverse of a medal on which he had depicted the new ruler, fair as Apollo. It would be odd indeed if the contemporary readers had not remembered the early explosion of relief and optimism in the *Apocolocyntosis* as they now shared Seneca's bitter disappointment. The two texts make a pair and are matched almost like a diptych. The characters involved in both are of the house and stock of Claudius, both dishonor the name of Augustus (*Apoc.*, 10: *sub meo nomine latens*; *Oct.*, 251: *nomen Augustum inquinat*). In the first piece Agrippina, though never mentioned, is nevertheless present, for she is the cause of the outrageous deification of Claudius. In the second she who had murdered her husband has in her turn been murdered by her son and her ghost appears to utter vengeful and prophetic words. In the *Apocolocyntosis* the judge of the lower world considers letting off some of the old sinners, Sisyphus, Tantalus, or Ixion, to transfer their sentences to Claudius. In the *Octavia* the classic trio of mythology (to whom is added Tityus) provides the model for the doom with which Nero is threatened. There is bitter irony in the fact that Agrippina's denunciation of Nero plays in the *Octavia* a rôle similar to Augustus' attack in the *Apocolocyntosis*. While in the earlier piece the approach of the Golden Age was heralded, in the later one it has again receded to the distant past. The tyranny which Augustus had so scathingly denounced in Claudius and which was to be absent from the new rule is praised by Nero as the only shrewd and wise policy. A phrase which is a sort of leitmotiv in many of the tragedies seems particularly significant in linking the two works: *petitur hac coelum via* (*Oct.*, 476). The very point of the *Apocolocyntosis* had been to show Nero how not to attempt to storm heaven (*Apoc.*, 11: *Hunc nunc deum facere vultis? . . . dum tales deos facitis, nemo vos deos esse credet*). The lesson is drawn in the *Octavia* (472-8):

Pulchrum eminere est inter illustres viros,
consulere patriae, parcere afflictis, fera
caede abstinere tempus atque irae dare,
orbi quietem, saeculo pacem suo.
haec summa virtus, petitur hac coelum via.
sic ille patriae primus Augustus parens
complexus astra est colitur et templis deus.

Here the phrase is meant, not for the tyrant whom Seneca addresses for he has proved that he is past redemption, but for future rulers. To the last Seneca is a teacher, and there may be a touch of the dour optimism of the Stoics in the lack of a definite conclusion. The ways of tyranny have been shown in two monstrous examples, with Nero the object of Seneca's anxious care in the first and the cause of his helpless defeat in the second. They remain for the edification of future generations, for the Stoic is never daunted, even by repeated failure.

BERTHE M. MARTI.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

THUCYDIDES' WORDS FOR "CAUSE."

I.

Thucydides uses three words specifically denoting cause, *πρόφασις*, *αἰτία*, and *αἴτιον*, and shows a marked preference for the first two. These two words are used by Thucydides, as by many writers, with great elasticity of meaning. In the case of *αἰτία*, the range of meaning is moderate enough to obviate serious misunderstanding. It always, or nearly always, has its root meaning of "responsibility," the thing responsible, "grounds," as *αἰτία δ' ἦν ἡ . . . εὐπραγία* (IV, 65, 4), or, abstractly, either "guilt," "responsibility," e. g. *τὸ πλεόν . . . τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν* (I, 83, 3), or the imputation of responsibility, "blame," "charge," as in the phrase *ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχειν* (II, 59, 2, etc.). Sometimes it is difficult to decide whether concrete grounds or the resultant feeling of blame is the meaning intended. But this embarrassment is trifling in comparison with the confusion occasioned by the word *πρόφασις*.

Πρόφασις is used thirty-four times by Thucydides, in a wide variety of meanings. A glance at the article on the word in *LSJ* reminds one that this variety is not at all peculiar to Thucydides, for the word is used by many writers in a number of more or less distinctly different meanings, some of them far removed from the presumably original notion of a "showing forth," or "that which shows forth," i. e. "reason," alleged and presumably true.¹ This meaning remains common in classical writers, but increasingly the meaning of alleged but untrue reason, "pretext," becomes normal. In addition to these, *πρόφασις* can mean "cause" in a quite general, impersonal sense (as distinguished from "reason"), "occasion" or "excuse," and, in the medical writers, it often has the technical meaning

¹ There is no conclusive evidence, so far as I know, to show that "alleged reason" is the original meaning of the word. It is assumed to be, however, in *LSJ*, and the assumption is a reasonable one, especially if the word is related to *προφαίνειν*, as modern lexicographers believe it to be. The order of development of meanings is not of primary importance for this study. In any case, *πρόφασις* as "reason" provides a central meaning from which the others radiate in effect, if not as a historical fact.

of "exciting cause." There are examples of most of these meanings in Thucydides. In the majority of cases the context shows which one is intended, but in a number of passages contextual assistance is inadequate, and three such cases occur in critically important references to the causes of the war.²

Although in casual speech it often matters very little whether a cause is termed "reason," "motive," "grounds," or "explanation," there are occasions when distinction among these meanings is essential; to understand as exactly as possible an author's usage of words for cause may be vital to the understanding of his whole approach to his subject. This is eminently true of Thucydides. When he uses *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* in reference to the causes of the war, it is clearly necessary to know, if we can, whether he means *his own* explanation, or the reasons, motives, etc. of the participants. The question of the precise meaning of the words for cause in these places is not just a lexicographical minutia, but has a bearing on the question of Thucydides' historical method. The present paper is based on a study of the three words *πρόφασις*, *αἰτία*, and *αἴτιον* in Thucydides and in writers who may have influenced, or have been thought to have influenced, the usage of Thucydides. Its purpose is to establish the range of meaning that these words have in Thucydides, and to show that these patterns of meaning are in harmony with the general method of Thucydides' presentation of history.

The nature of the problem and the extent of scholarly disagreement about its solution can be seen from a study of I, 23, 5-6, the celebrated introduction to Thucydides' account of the causes of the war. The passage is the crux of our discussion, and is therefore quoted in full:

διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰταὶ αἷδ' ἦσαν ἐκατέρων, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.³

² I, 23, 6; 118, 1; 146. These will be discussed below.

³ A grammatical irregularity in the sentence τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθ. πρόφ. κτλ . . . has been supposed by some editors. Krüger (Berlin, 1846), and Boehme-Widman (Leipzig, 1882) explain the sentence as a combina-

It is clear that Thucydides is distinguishing between kinds of cause, and that the *αἰτίαι* (further defined as *διαφοραί*) are more obvious and less basic than the cause expressed by *πρόφασις*. The main difficulty of the passage is to determine the precise meaning of *πρόφασις*. There are three interpretations which have the backing of authoritative scholars. One is that it here means the historian's explanation. This interpretation was proposed by Marchant, and adopted by the Loeb translator, who translates "the truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced."⁴ A second interpretation, implicit in many translations, is explicitly set forth by A. W. Gomme, that the word here means "psychological motive," but that there is no inherent difference of meaning between *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* when they describe the causes of the war; the same idea could just as well have been expressed by *αἰτία*, and *πρόφασις* is used here merely for the sake of variety.⁵ The third interpretation has, in the past thirty years, attained to something like orthodoxy. This is the theory that Thucydides is here imitating a Hippocratic term, *πρόφασις* meaning scientific, real, or basic cause, as opposed to mere *casus belli* (here expressed by *αἰτίαι*). It was first stated, I believe, by Eduard Schwartz, who translates *πρόφασις* as *Ursache* in contrast to *Rechtsgründe* (*αἰτίαι*), and calls it "das Wort . . . mit dem die ionische Physik und Medizin den wissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsbegriff ausdrückt." Apparently independently of Schwartz, C. N. Cochrane, as a part of his thesis that Thucydides was deeply indebted to medical science for his whole view of history and for the plan of his book, declares that *πρόφασις* "means in Thucydides 'exciting cause' . . . The word, as used by the historian, is in the highest degree

tion of two logically independent constructions, *τὴν δὲ πρόφ. τοὺς Ἀ. ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας* and *τοὺς Ἀ. ἡγοῦμαι ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολ.* Most editors, more simply, take the whole construction after *τὴν δὲ πρόφ.* as an infinitive phrase, object of *ἡγοῦμαι*, and this seems better to me. The central point of the statement is *φόβον παρέχοντας*, while *μεγάλους γιγνομένους* gives the cause of it and *ἀναγκάσαι* the result: "Through their growing power the Athenians inspired the Lacedaemonians with fear and so forced them . . ."

⁴ *Thucydides, Book I*, edited by E. C. Marchant (London, 1905), p. 172. Loeb edition, I, p. 43.

⁵ A. W. Gomme, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1945), p. 153.

technical." This interpretation of *πρόφασις* has been accepted by Werner Jaeger in *Paideia*: "The conception of *cause* is borrowed from the language of medicine, as is clear from the word *πρόφασις*, which Thucydides uses; for it was medical science which first made the scientific distinction between the real causes of an illness and its symptoms." J. H. Finley has also adopted this view in his *Thucydides*: "He applies to the causes of the war the same word *πρόφασις*, by which the medical writers commonly denote the cause, or, more literally, the 'explanation' of disease."⁶

⁶ Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*² (Bonn, 1929), p. 250. The first edition appeared in 1919. I do not understand the reference to "Physik"; there is no evidence, so far as I know, for the use of *πρόφασις* in a scientific sense by Ionian scientists other than the medical writers. The index to Diels-Kranz, *Vorsokratiker*, lists two instances of the word, both in fragments of Democritus, both meaning "pretext." It does not seem necessary to argue at length against Schwartz's theory (restated by W. Schmid in Schmid-Stählin, I, 5, 2, 2 [1948], pp. 128-31) that the use of *πρόφασις* here represents a view of the historian about the causes of the war entirely different from that expressed by *αἰτίαι*, and belongs to a different draft of the history. There is not the slightest evidence to support this idea. (Cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 154.) The present paper does not attempt to deal in any way with the "Thucydidean Question" of composition; some of its conclusions have, however, this much bearing on the matter, that they give further support to what most recent scholarship has agreed on, the essential unity of Book I.

C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford, 1929), p. 17. Cochrane's views, though it is generally recognized that he exaggerated the influence of the Hippocratics, have been influential, and for the most part deservedly so. But in the important paragraph from which I have quoted there are a number of transparent misstatements, due perhaps to excessive enthusiasm for the theory which they are intended to support. It is asserted that in "Homer, Herodotus, and later writers" *πρόφασις* "unquestionably connotes 'formulated reason' or 'pretext'." Examples of other uses are easily found in Homer, Herodotus, and many later writers. The unqualified assertion that in Thucydides the word means "exciting cause" and is "in the highest degree technical" is quite wrong even on Cochrane's theory, for the word often means "pretext" in Thucydides. In the next sentence Cochrane says that the word "is uniformly used by the Hippocratics in the sense of 'exciting cause'." Examination of some Hippocratic essays will show that there is no such uniformity.

Paideia, English translation by Gilbert Highet, I² (New York, 1945), p. 393.

J. H. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 68. Although

This third interpretation, in spite of the impressive authority which it has enlisted, is demonstrably baseless. In view of its prevalence, it seems worth while to make the rather long excursus necessary to refute this mistaken opinion.

The fact is that in the Hippocratic corpus *πρόφασις* is not generally used as a special word for "real" or "basic" cause. In the first place, it is altogether misleading to speak as though there were only one Hippocratic use of *πρόφασις*. The meaning of the word is by no means uniform in these writings. In many essays it is used interchangeably with *αἰτία* and *αἴτιον* and is given all the shades of meaning that these words can have. It is true that there is a special meaning of *πρόφασις* that is, apparently, peculiar to medical writers, but this meaning is not that of basic or real cause. A few examples will illustrate this meaning.⁷ In *Epidemics* 3 (III, p. 38), it is said of a patient, *μετὰ . . . προφάσιος πῦρ ἔλαβε*, "from some exciting cause he was seized with fever" (Jones). What the exciting cause was in this case is not specified. But elsewhere in this work there are numerous examples of what can constitute this kind of *πρόφασις*. In one case (III, p. 56) *πῦρ ἔλαβεν* (the patient) *ἐκ κόπων καὶ πόνων καὶ δρόμων παρὰ τὸ ἔθος*, in another (III, p. 60) *ἐξ ἀποφθορῆς νηπίου*, and in another (III, p. 142) *ἐκ λύπης*. In section 3 of this essay an epidemic of erysipelas is described as occurring (III, p. 70) *τοῖσι μὲν μετὰ προφάσιος, τοῖσι δ' οὐ*. There is one "medical" use of the word in Thucydides, and it is exactly parallel to our last example. The passage (II, 49, 1-2) runs as follows: "It was generally agreed that that year was particularly free from other diseases; and if anyone had been suffering from

he adopts this interpretation of *πρόφασις*, Finley observes that the general scientific spirit shared by Thucydides and the medical writers is to be found in other works of the period, and that it is therefore unsafe to ascribe everything to the medical writers (*ibid.*, pp. 69-73).

There have been many other interpretations of *πρόφασις* here, now discarded. Many of the older translators were inclined to protect themselves with ambiguity in translating the word; thus a number of nineteenth century versions have "real occasion." Cornford's insistence, in *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907), on translating it by "pretext" has not won any approval.

⁷In citing the Hippocratics I have given references, in parentheses, to volume and page of Littré's edition. I have, however, used the English titles of the Loeb translation of W. H. S. Jones.

any ailment, it invariably ended up as the plague. In the case of others, terrible heat in the head . . . overcame them ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, suddenly, while they were in good health." What makes the parallel even closer, and more telling for the present argument, is that in both cases the passages quoted are immediately preceded by descriptions of the general conditions at the onset of the disease. It is in these, presumably, that one would look for the basic cause; yet Thucydides uses for the general word not πρόφασις, but αἰτίαι (II, 48, 3). No similar comprehensive word is used in the passage in *Epidemics* 3, but in *Airs, Waters, Places*, ch. 4 (II, p. 20), where a similar use of πρόφασις occurs, αἷτιον is used for basic or original cause: ἔμπνοί τε πολλοὶ γίνονται ἀπὸ πάσης προφάσιος. τούτου δὲ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ἔντασις καὶ ἡ σκληρότης τῆς κοιλίης. Many examples of this meaning of πρόφασις can be adduced. In the *Aphorisms* we find ἐκ πάσης προφάσιος, 3, 12 (IV, p. 490); also 2, 41 (IV, p. 482), 5, 45 (IV, p. 548), where πρόφασις is again used in explicit distinction from the basic cause, as the immediate exciting cause, and *Prognostic*, ch. 2 (II, p. 114).

In this special use, then, πρόφασις does not mean basic cause.⁸ It means a physical state which is in some way the forerunner or indicator of the disease or condition under consideration, the "physical antecedent of a physical state,"⁹ sometimes even opposed to the basic cause. Transferred into historical matter it would be of the nature of an incident that touches off a war (e. g. the siege of Potidaea) rather than the underlying cause of the war. This use has been imitated very accurately by Thucydides, in the likeliest possible place, the description of the plague (II, 49). Between this use and that of πρόφασις in reference to the causes of the war there is no connection at all. It should be noticed, further, that the Hippocratic corpus does not show complete uniformity even in this technical usage, for once in

⁸ The suggestion is not intended that this technical use is unimportant. The recognition of the importance of such "preliminary states" in the treatment of disease is obviously one of the great contributions of the Hippocratic school. A sentence from the first chapter of the *Prognostic* (II, p. 110) is typical of the attitude of these writers: "A doctor will be most successful in healing a disease when he knows the future in advance, from the present state."

⁹ So designated by Cochrane, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

the *Aphorisms*, 4, 41 (IV, p. 516), αἰτία is used in exactly the same manner: ἄνεν τινὸς αἰτίας φανερῆς. Nevertheless, it can be assumed with a good deal of confidence that in this one passage Thucydides was consciously adopting a medical term.¹⁰

Apart from this technical sense, πρόφασις is used in the Hippocratic corpus quite as other words denoting cause, αἰτία, αἴτιον, and the adjective αἴτιος. Of twelve essays¹¹ examined by the present writer, only one, the well known *Sacred Disease*, uses πρόφασις exclusively for cause both in the special sense noticed above and for general cause. In the *Prognostic*, only πρόφασις is used, but always in its special meaning (II, pp. 114, 160, 180). In *Airs, Waters, Places*, we have seen above that in one passage πρόφασις is used with its special meaning, and that αἴτιον is used for basic cause. In another place in this essay, πρόφασις means basic cause: in ch. 15, the physique of the people who live by the river Phasis is ascribed to the climatic and botanical environment; marshy land, fog, hot and stagnant river water (which they drink), stunted and improperly ripened fruits, etc. The word used to describe these conditions is πρόφασις (διὰ ταύτας δὲ τὰς προφάσεις [II, p. 60]).¹² If we turn to *Ancient Medicine*, we find all three words, αἰτία, αἴτιον, and πρόφασις used for general and basic cause. At one point αἰτία and αἴτιον are contrasted, ch. 21 (I, p. 624): τὴν αἰτίαν τούτων τινὶ ἀνατιθέντας καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ἀγνοεῦντας. Here αἰτία is the thing held responsible, in distinction from the real cause, αἴτιον. Earlier in the essay αἴτιον is used in an excellent definition of cause, ch. 19 (I, p. 616): "We must surely consider the causes (αἴτια) of each complaint to be those things the presence of which of

¹⁰ I do not know of any authoritative explanation of the development of this meaning. Jones regularly translates "exciting cause," Littré sometimes "cause occasionelle." It is probably cognate with the meaning "occasion" which, as we shall see below, occurs in Thucydides. Possibly the usage found at *Iliad*, XIX, 302 is its forerunner (cf. *infra*, p. 48).

¹¹ *Ancient Medicine, Airs, Waters, Places, The Sacred Disease, Prognostic, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Regimen, Epidemics* 1 and 3, *Aphorisms, The Art, Breaths, The Nature of Man*. All are believed to be of the late fifth century.

¹² Hans Diller, "Wanderarzt und Aitiologie," *Philol.*, Suppl. XXVI (1934), p. 41, observes that in this essay πρόφασις and αἴτιον are used for cause, αἴτια for "responsibility."

necessity produces a complaint of a specific kind, which ceases when they change into another combination" (Jones). Yet in the course of the essay *αἰτία* is the word most often used for real cause; both *αἰτία* and *αἴτιον* are commoner than *πρόφασις*. In *The Art*, *αἴτιον* is used in the one passage where the notion of general cause is required, ch. 11 (VI, p. 20): τὸ εἰδέναι τῶν νούσων τὰ αἴτια. In the same chapter, *αἴτιος* is twice used as Thucydides uses it, meaning "responsible." In the curious work *Breaths*, which pretends to prove that "breaths" (air in the body) are the cause of all diseases, *πρόφασις* is never used, *αἴτιον*, *αἰτία*, and *αἴτιος* are used indiscriminately and repeatedly for general or basic cause. In the last chapter, for example, we find (VI, p. 114): "All the rest are additional and secondary causes (*συναίτια καὶ μεταίτια*); I have demonstrated that this is the real cause (*αἴτιον*, Littré: "cause effective") of diseases."¹³ In *The Nature of Man*, general cause is expressed once each by *αἰτία*, *αἴτιον*, twice by *πρόφασις*, and five times by *αἴτιος*. The commonest way of expressing cause is the phrase γίνεται ἀπό. *Regimen in Acute Diseases* has one instance of *πρόφασις* meaning "reason," one of *αἴτιον* meaning "cause." In *Regimen*, neither *πρόφασις* nor *αἴτιον* appears at all, *αἰτία* five times, *αἴτιος* twice.

This is a sample of Hippocratic usage, not a complete survey. Yet the conclusions necessary for our argument can be drawn with certainty. First, apart from the technical use of *πρόφασις* to mean exciting cause, the various words which denote cause in the general vocabulary of Greek writers are used without distinction. Usage varies from essay to essay, sometimes *αἰτία* and *αἴτιος* are restricted to what is held responsible, as opposed to real cause, but general Hippocratic usage shows no discrimination in its choice of words to denote general cause. Secondly, there is no one word consistently used to mean basic or real cause. About all that can be said is that our evidence indicates

¹³ Jones (II, pp. 224-5) believes that both *The Art* and *Breaths* may be sophistic rather than Hippocratic, but preserved in the library at Cos. This might explain the absence of the technical use of *πρόφασις*. The essays would still be valid as evidence for other medical usage, for there is no reason to suppose that the expressions for cause in a sophistic work on a medical subject would be at variance with medical usage, even if less technical. Littré (VI, p. 88) also believes *Breaths* to be sophistic.

that *πρόφασις* is used less often, for basic cause and for general cause, than either *αἰτία* or *αἴτιον*. Hence, if we are to suppose that Thucydides modeled his use of *πρόφασις* on that of the medical writers, we ought to suppose, not that he used it with a special significance of basic cause, but, as Gomme believes with regard to references to the causes of the war, that there is no distinction between *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία*, except in the one obvious medical use at II, 49, which has no bearing on the general question. It should be observed, further, that *πρόφασις* in the meaning of general cause is not restricted to the medical writers, and is very unlikely to have originated with them. Herodotus too uses *πρόφασις* to mean general cause, several times. In Herodotus as in most non-technical writers, the word most often means "pretext" or "excuse," but occasionally it is used to mean simply "cause," as in IV, 79, 1: *ἐπεῖτε δὲ ἔδεέ οἱ κακῶς γενέσθαι, ἐγένετο ἀπὸ προφάσιος τοῦτ' οὗδε* (cf. II, 161, 3).

The upshot of our excursus is that the notion that Thucydides took over from the medical writers a special use of *πρόφασις* in the sense of "basic cause" is without foundation. It has not been proved that Thucydides was not influenced by their usage, but it is clear that their influence would only lead him to use words for general cause without discrimination.¹⁴

¹⁴ After the present paper was completed there came to my attention a study by K. Deichgräber, "*Πρόφασις*: Eine terminologische Studie," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin*, Bd. III, Hft. 4 (Berlin, 1933), pp. 1-17, a cursory survey of the use of the word from Homer to late antiquity, with special reference to the medical writers. The author's interest in the word is chiefly restricted to the Hippocratics, and his study has little value apart from them. In general, his conclusions are the same as mine with regard to the Hippocratics, and the reader will find in his study further examples of the technical use of *πρόφασις*. I disagree with Deichgräber in two points. First, I see no reason for assuming, as he does (p. 8), that wherever we find a qualifying adjective such as *μικρά*, *βραχεῖα*, *φανερὰ*, or *ἐμφανής* with *πρόφασις* we must suppose that *πρόφασις* itself in these passages has the meaning of general cause. Surely if the context shows that the word is used for "exciting cause," it matters little, for the meaning of the word itself, whether it is called simply "exciting cause" or "obvious exciting cause." Moreover, though *φαν. πρόφ.* is a common phrase, there are no passages contrasting *φαν. πρόφ.* with, e.g., *ἀληθὴς πρόφ.*; on the contrary, *φαν. πρόφ.* is contrasted with *αἴτιον* (e.g. *Aphorisms*, 5, 45 [IV, p. 548]). Secondly, I cannot agree that *πρόφασις*

We can now turn to the second of the three interpretations mentioned above, that though *πρόφασις* here means the motive of the Lacedaemonians, it is only by virtue of the context that we can know this, since *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* are sometimes synonymous in Thucydides. In view of the indiscriminate use we have found in the medical writers, a confusion which can be seen in other writers, Herodotus for example, it would appear a reasonable presumption that in Thucydides also it is idle to look for any consistent difference of meaning in his words for cause. However, though I agree with Gomme that *πρόφασις* means motive here, there is good evidence that *πρόφασις* was not used synonymously with *αἰτία* by Thucydides. At III, 13, 1 the two words are used side by side; the Mitylenean envoys at Olympia, after describing why their city had revolted from Athens, sum up with the words *τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας*. If the two words are synonymous, this passage is a mere tautology, for no apparent reason of style, and this is improbable. In one passage which Gomme cites as showing the synonymy of the words (I, 118, 1), it is clear that Thucydides is regarding several *αἰτίαι* as constituting one *πρόφασις*, and this is by no means equivalence of meaning between the two terms. An examination of the two words throughout the *History* reveals, as will be demonstrated presently, that each of them has a separate and clearly limited range of meaning. It is true that Thucydides sometimes uses *πρόφασις* where the substitution of *αἰτία* would not alter the sense of the passage (e. g. I, 133, 1, quoted *infra*),

"crowds out" (zurückdrängt, p. 8) *αἰτίη* (Deichgräber does not mention *αἴτιον*) in the meaning of general cause. It is true, as Deichgräber observes, that *πρόφασις* as "Ursache schlechthin" occurs with unusual frequency in the medical writers. But it is equally true, though less striking, that *αἰτία* and *αἴτιον* also occur unusually often in this same sense; for the medical writers were unusually concerned with cause.

Deichgräber believes, as I do, that Thucydides' use of *πρόφασις* in reference to the causes of the war was not influenced by the Hippocratics (p. 15). But his treatment of Thucydides is too sketchy to be of much value, and is hampered by the notion that in Attic wherever *πρόφασις* means "real cause" there is also somehow implied in it the idea of "pretext." Only by very strained interpretation can this be maintained anywhere in Thucydides; it is quite impossible in such simple uses as those at I, 133, 1 and III, 13, 1, which Deichgräber does not mention. It is just as impossible in Antiphon, whose usage is not dealt with.

and vice versa, just as in English the same circumstances can be designated "reason," "grounds," or "motive." This does not make the three English words synonymous, nor do such cases suggest that the two Greek words were synonymous for Thucydides.

The ingenious suggestion that *πρόφασις* here means the historian's explanation cannot be proved impossible, but is to be rejected, in my opinion, for the following reasons.¹⁵ First, in I, 23, the very form of the sentence demands that *αἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις* have the same point of reference. The contrast *τὴν μὲν γὰρ . . . πρόφασιν . . . αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι* has real force only if this is so. If *πρόφασις* means Thucydides' explanation, the parallel that is implied, especially in the word *λεγόμεναι*, is lost. Secondly, in the examination of Thucydides' words for cause to which we now turn, we shall discover that both *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* have regularly in Thucydides a *subjective* reference, that is, they are concerned with the emotions of, or the influences on, the persons participating in the events, and do not mean the historian's objective analysis of the situation.

II.

In order to demonstrate the range of meaning of Thucydides' words for cause, it will not, fortunately, be necessary to analyze every instance. The majority are clear and should be beyond dispute. In the following examination, enough examples will be presented to illustrate the different meanings of each word; discussion in detail will be restricted to some few cases in which interpretation has varied, or which are especially important for the present argument. These will be, above all, the references to the causes of the war.

a. *Πρόφασις*.

It is not the business of this study to deal with the use of

¹⁵ The distinction between "historian's explanation" and "the motive of the Lacedaemonians" is not very important so far as the meaning of the passage is concerned, since in either case it is in the final analysis Thucydides' account with which we are dealing. But from the point of view of the historian's method it is extremely important: it is the difference between objective analysis by the historian and a presentation of the minds of the participants.

πρόφασιν in other writers except when this is directly relevant to Thucydides' usage, as it is in the case of those authors most likely to have influenced him. These I take to be Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides' only conspicuous antecedent among Attic prose writers, Antiphon, whose intellect and rhetorical skill Thucydides obviously admired (VIII, 68).

The word occurs only twice in Homer, with two quite distinct meanings. In *Iliad*, XIX, 301-2, we read

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίονσ', ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες
Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἐκάστη.

Patroclus' death was the occasion of the grief of the women who joined Briseis in weeping, but the real cause was their own private sorrow. This is not quite "pretext," but it is easy to see how the meaning of pretext would develop from this. This meaning may well be the forerunner also of the "exciting cause" of the medical writers. In the same book, at 261, Agamemnon declares that he has not laid hands on Briseis,

οὔτ' εὐνῆς πρόφασιν κεχρημένος οὔτε τευ ἄλλου.

Here the meaning is "motive," but this kind of use could underlie the quite general meaning of cause which we have seen in the Hippocratics and in Herodotus. In Herodotus too the word has just two very different meanings; usually it is "pretext," but four times, as in the instance quoted above (p. 45), it means simply "the way it came about," with no special suggestion of either basic or immediate cause.

Antiphon's use of the word is interesting, and in all likelihood more important for Thucydides' than has been recognized. Even if the ancient tradition which makes the historian the pupil of Antiphon is a fiction, the admiration which Thucydides expresses for the slightly older orator and the many affinities between their styles provide a very high probability of influence.¹⁶

All the instances in Antiphon, eight in number, are based on the notion of one's reason or motive for an act. An example of the word meaning "motive" occurs in the speech *On the Murder of Herodes*, 21: ἡ μὲν πρόφασιν ἐκατέρω τοῦ πλοῦ αὐτῇ which follows

¹⁶ For the stylistic similarities between Antiphon and Thucydides see Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I, pp. 23-31.

an account of the motives of Herodes and the accused man for making the voyage in the course of which Herodes disappeared. In 60, the defendant declares that he had no motive (*πρόφασις*) for murdering Herodes. In neither instance is there any emphasis on the idea of *alleged* motive, in fact in 60 the motive which is denied would clearly be an unspoken but real motive. (Other examples of *πρόφασις* meaning motive occur in the same speech, 22 and 59.) *Πρόφασις* can also mean "plea" or "pretext" in Antiphon. In the speech *On the Choreutes*, 14, we find the phrase *προφάσεως ἕνεκα* meaning "in order to exonerate (myself)," literally "for the sake of a pretext (excuse)," and a similar example occurs in the same speech, 26. All instances of *πρόφασις* in Antiphon have this same subjective application; whether true motive or only pretext, the word expresses the feeling or allegation of the person involved.¹⁷

The word has the same pattern of meaning in Thucydides as in Antiphon. Apart from the anomalous medical term at II, 49, 1, all instances in Thucydides have the same subjective quality, and all derive from the same basic meaning of alleged and presumably true reason. As in Antiphon, this meaning is modified in two directions: to alleged but *not true* reason, i. e. "pretext," and to true but *not alleged* reason, "motive."

What has been assumed above to be the basic meaning of the word, "reason" alleged and presumably true, is well exemplified by I, 133, 1, "Pausanias came to him and asked *τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἰκετείας*." Nothing in the context suggests that Pausanias meant on what "pretext" the man had come; he merely asks for his motive or reason. There is no emphasis on the notion of expression, nor is there any suggestion of concealment. The example quoted above (p. 46) from III, 13, 1 illustrates the difference between *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία*; this will be discussed below, in our examination of *αἰτία* (pp. 56-7); for the present it is enough to notice that *πρόφασις* here refers to motives or reasons that have been expressed and can be presumed to be genuine. At V, 22, 1, when the Lacedaemonians are trying to get their allies to accept the Peace of Nicias, the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the Eleans refuse to do so, "for the same reason

¹⁷ *On the Murder of Herodes* is assigned to about 414, *On the Choreutes* to 419/18 in the most recent study of the subject, K. J. Dover, "The Chronology of Antiphon's Speeches," *C. Q.*, XLIV (1950), pp. 44-60.

(τῇ αὐτῇ προφάσει) for which they had in the first place rejected it," namely because the "arrangements did not satisfy them" (V, 17, 2). This is a perfectly candid expression of their reason, and should be so interpreted, not as "pretext," as in the Loeb version.¹⁸

Of the two different developments from this meaning, one is the commonest meaning in Thucydides, as in most writers, "pretext." Of this meaning little need be said. One example, of many, is VI, 76, 2, where Hermocrates tells the Camarineans that the Athenians have come to Sicily προφάσει μὲν ἢ πυνθάνεσθε, διανοία δὲ ἦν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν. The explicit contrast between πρόφασις and διάνοια, pretext and intention, puts the meaning beyond doubt. Sometimes πρόφασις is simply πρόσχημα as at V, 80, 3: ἀγῶνά τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικὸν ποιήσας. Other examples of "pretext" are III, 82, 4; 86, 4; 111, 1; IV, 47, 2; V, 42, 1; VI, 8, 4; 78, 1; 79, 2; VIII, 87, 5.

Intermediate between pretext and reason are several instances where what is alleged is not false, and therefore not merely a pretext, nor yet acceptable as a complete or adequate reason. Such cases are sometimes close to "occasion" (*ansa*, ἀφορμή), sometimes to "excuse." "Occasion" can be exemplified by V, 31, 3, where we are told that the Lepreates, who had been paying tribute to the Eleans, ceased to do so διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου. That is, they made of the war an opportunity or occasion to stop payments. For "excuse," VI, 34, 6 will serve. Hermocrates is urging the Syracusans to forestall invasion by Athens by sending a naval force to meet the enemy off Tarentum; such action, he argues, might cause the Athenians to abandon their undertaking altogether, "especially since their most experienced commander is in command against his will, and would be glad to get an excuse (πρόφασις) for abandoning the expedition." Syracusan aggression would not, in Nicias' view, be only a pretext for quitting; it would be a genuine reason, but not his only reason or his basic one, for this would be his lack of sympathy with the whole scheme of conquest. It would be an excuse, neither false nor the whole truth. Other examples are II, 87, 9; III, 9, 2; 39, 7; 40, 6; 75, 4; 82, 1; IV, 80, 2; 126, 5.

¹⁸ Instances at I, 126, 1 and I, 141, 1 may also belong with this group. In Classen's edition, in a note on πρόφασις at I, 23, 6, they are listed as examples of "der wirklich vorhandene Grund." It is perhaps better, however, to regard them as meaning "excuse."

Concerning the examples mentioned so far, two observations are important for the present argument. The first is that all of them can easily be derived from the basic meaning of expressed and true reason; the second, that all are concerned with the minds of the participants: they are subjective, and never refer to the objective view of the historian or anyone else.

The final category, of true but unexpressed reason, remains to be considered. Two instances of this meaning obviously stand together, that at I, 23, 6, and what is certainly a repetition of the same meaning, as it is of the phrase, at VI, 6, 1, where, in explanation of the Sicilian expedition, there occur the words ἐπιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι. Thucydides is simply re-using a memorable phrase. Reasons for preferring the meaning of unexpressed reason, "motive," to "historian's explanation," at I, 23, 6, were given above (p. 47). A further argument can now be added. Since the basic notion of *expressed* reason underlies all cases of πρόφασις so far examined, it is natural to presume that the same connotation is present in this case too. When regarded in this light, the phrase is seen to be a very artful one: with the original notion of expression felt, it is, in fact, a paradox, for what is ἀληθεστάτῃ and would be expected to be "shown forth," is in fact ἀφανεστάτῃ λόγῳ.¹⁹ Thucydides must have regarded it as an especially felicitous and forceful phrase; that is why he repeated it at VI, 6, 1. Moreover, "motive" is the *natural* meaning in the context of I, 23, and many interpreters have felt it to be so. It is the meaning that Gomme, for one, extracts on the basis of context alone, even though he does not regard it as proper to πρόφασις. What Thucydides is describing here is, quite simply, a subjective motive, that of fear. In VI, 6, 1, the motive is the desire to gain control of Sicily.

Two passages are yet to be examined. These are I, 118, 1 and I, 146. Both refer to the causes of the war, and both certainly mean real cause of some sort. Both can reasonably be taken to mean "occasion," a meaning which we have seen elsewhere in

¹⁹ Thus the passage is analogous with the contrast at VI, 76, 2, προφάσει μὲν...διανοία δέ. In each case πρόφασις has taken on a meaning which permits it to be contrasted with one aspect of the original sense, λόγος and διάνοια respectively. In both cases the contrast is the more striking because of the implicit paradox.

Thucydides, and this is how they are generally interpreted. I believe, however, that they may better be taken to have the same meaning as *πρόφασις* has in I, 23, "motive."²⁰ Both I, 118 and I, 146 are chapters in which the historian sums up the causes of the war, as he does in I, 23. There is, then, an initial probability that when, in these summaries, he uses the same words, they will have the same meaning, that I, 118 and I, 146 echo I, 23.

The relationship of these passages can best be shown by a brief outline of the structure of Book I.²¹ After the introduction (1-22), and a preliminary reference to the causes of the war, with its mention of *αἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις* (23), two of the grievances (*αἰτίαι*) are described in detail, the incidents of Corcyra (24-55) and Potidaea (56-66). At the end of each description the incident is called, in a concluding sentence, an *αἰτία* (55, 2; 66). Thucydides is thus keeping in touch with his preliminary statement in ch. 23. The first Peloponnesian conference at Sparta is next (67-87), and then the brief statement (88) that "the Lacedaemonians voted that the truce had been broken and that war must be undertaken, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of their allies as because they were afraid that the Athenians would acquire even greater power." This is a restatement of the two kinds of cause: the arguments of the allies represent the *αἰτίαι*, the fear of the Spartans the *πρόφασις*, of 23, 5-6. Here and throughout the two conferences, mention of the "breach of the truce" and of the "injustices" of Athens is closely linked with *αἰτία*, not *πρόφασις*.²² Chapters 89-117 contain the Pentecontaetia, the

²⁰ In neither case is there the slightest reason to suppose that *πρόφασις* has a scientific meaning.

²¹ Some points of the following analysis, as the function of the Pentecontaetia and the close connection between 23 and 88 have been noticed many times. Among recent books, I am indebted to Finley, *op. cit.*, ch. 4, and Harald Patzer, *Das Problem der Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides und die Thukydideische Frage* (Berlin, 1937), pp. 109-10.

²² In ch. 67 the siege of Potidaea is called a breach of the truce and an injustice; the treatment of Aegina and the decrees against Megara are said to be "contrary to the truce." In ch. 86, Sthenelaidas urges the Spartans not to "permit the Athenians to grow greater" (*πρόφασις*), and not to "betray their allies" (*αἰτίαι*). In ch. 88 the implication is that the Spartans voted that the truce had been broken not so much because it *had* been broken (i.e. because they considered the *αἰτία*

purpose of which, in the plan of the book, is to illustrate the basis of Sparta's fear of Athens by outlining the growth of Athenian power in the period between the wars, down to the Corcyrean affair. This section, then, is devoted to the *πρόφασις*. But we must not make the mistake of restricting the scope of the *πρόφασις* to the events of this period alone. It is clear from the present participle *γιγνομένων* (23, 6) and from the clause *μὴ ἐπὶ μείζον δυνηθῶσιν* (88) that the Spartan fear is concerned with and arises from present developments as well as the past. After the Pentecontaetia Thucydides again sums up (118): "Not many years later occurred the events described above, the affair of Corcyra and that of Potidaea, and all the incidents *ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη*." The Loeb translation has "occasion" for *πρόφασις* here; Gomme,²³ interpreting similarly, maintains that this passage is a proof that *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* are used interchangeably, since *πρόφασις* means here what *αἰτία* means in ch. 23. But in the present passage several *αἰτίαι* constitute one *πρόφασις*. Real equivalence of meaning would be expressed by something like *ὅσα προφάσεις . . . ἦσαν*. I believe that *πρόφασις* here means the state of mind that was engendered by the various *αἰτίαι*, and that it can best be translated "motive," as at 23. If, however, it means motive and echoes 23, it ought to include in its scope not only the incidents immediately before the war, but also the earlier events of the Pentecontaetia. Literally, earlier events are excluded in this sentence; nevertheless, the whole context strongly suggests that Thucydides was still thinking in terms of the entire period. The next sentence begins *ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἐπραξαν* . . . and then follows a description of the gradual development of Spartan feeling that is altogether reminiscent of 23 and 88: for a long time Sparta did little or nothing to check Athens, "until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising high, and they (the Athenians) were laying hands on their (the Spartans') alliance. Then they could endure no more . . . And so they resolved that the truce was broken and that the Athenians were acting unjustly."²⁴ The echo of

legitimate) as because of their fear (*πρόφασις*). In ch. 121, when the Corinthians declare that they are being treated unjustly (*ἀδικούμενοι*) they clearly have in mind the *αἰτίαι*.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

²⁴ Here again the "breach of the truce" and the "injustices" of Athens are distinguished from the basic feeling of the Spartans.

ch. 88 could not be clearer, and this in turn is generally acknowledged to echo ch. 23. The concentration, in the sentence under consideration, on the incidents immediately prior to the war is probably due to the fact that in Thucydides' opinion it took these *αἰτίαι* to precipitate the latent Spartan feeling.

The second conference occupies 119-125, and then the charges of the Lacedaemonians against Athens and the Athenians' counter-charges, with the resultant description of the last days of Pausanias and Themistocles, come in 126-138. Ch. 139 sums up the Spartan demands on Athens, and 140-145 contain Pericles' first speech and the consequent Athenian rejection of the demands.

The final short chapter is, as we should expect, another summing-up. But as it is generally interpreted it is a one-sided summary, mentioning only the *αἰτίαι* of the previous summaries.²⁵ What Thucydides says is "Such were the grievances and the points of dispute on both sides before the war, beginning with the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra; the opposing sides still were in contact, however, and still visited one another's territory without heralds—not, however, without suspicion. For what was happening constituted a breach of the truce and a *πρόφασις* for war." Here again we should translate *πρόφασις* by "motive"; as in 118, it is often rendered "occasion." Again the passage is a summary, and since we have found that the other summaries echo 23, it is reasonable to believe, in view of the verbal similarity, that this passage does so too. That Thucydides does not say "Such were the grievances and the motive" is not surprising. He never undertook to describe the basic motive, and though he has taken pains to clarify its nature as much as possible, he has not set it forth precisely and in detail as he has some of the grievances. It was pointed out above that the breach of the truce is regularly coupled with the *αἰτίαι* and distinguished from the motive, the *πρόφασις*; when the Lacedaemonians decided that the truce had been broken they were in effect honoring the contention of the allies that Athens was in the wrong (*ἀδικοῦν*), in other words that the *αἰτίαι* were legitimate grounds for war. The phrase *σπονδῶν ξύγχυσις* then, in this final clause, stands for the *αἰτίαι*. What more natural ending to the account of the

²⁵ Patzer, e. g., says *op. cit.*, p. 110: "Die ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις fehlt hier."

causes of the war could there be than a final mention of both *αἰτίαι* and *πρόφασις*? I take the final clause to mean, therefore, that the events that had gone on and were going on (the present participle may be due to the fact that the siege of Potidaea was still in progress) both constituted a realization of the *grievances* and completed the subjective *motive*. Both circumstances were necessary to produce a state of war.

Πρόφασις has then in Thucydides several meanings: "reason," expressed and genuine, "pretext" (expressed but untrue), "excuse" or "occasion," and unexpressed but true "motive." These meanings form a comprehensible pattern; all are subjective, having to do with the mental attitudes of the persons who are engaged in the events being described; all can be derived from the basic idea of a "showing forth."²⁶

b. *Αἰτία*.

This word can be dealt with much more briefly. Its commonest meaning by far is abstract "blame" or "charge." The phrase *ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχειν* occurs often, as at II, 59, 2, where the Athenians *Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον*. (Cf. I, 35, 4; V, 60, 2, 4, 5; 63, 1; 65, 5; VII, 81, 1.) To the same effect are such phrases as *αἰτίαν . . . Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν* (II, 18, 3), *δι' αἰτίας ἔχετε* (II, 60, 4). (Cf. also I, 39, 3; II, 60, 7; III, 13, 7; 39, 6; 46, 6; 53, 3; IV, 86, 5; 114, 5; V, 71, 1; VI, 14, 1; 46, 5; 60, 1.) In one passage *αἰτία* is distinguished from *κατηγορία*, I, 69, 6: "Blame (*αἰτία*) is levelled against friends who are in error, denunciation (*κατηγορία*) against enemies who have acted unjustly." Nevertheless, in several passages *αἰτία* has a meaning not far removed from that of *κατηγορία* here. Alcibiades, for example, asks not to be sent on the Sicilian expedition "with such a serious charge (*αἰτία*)" (i. e. of guilt in the affair of the Herms) against him (VI, 29, 2); similarly, Nicias fears to return, unsuccessful, to Athens (VII, 48, 4) "to be put to death unjustly and on a disgraceful charge." (Cf. III, 81, 4; V, 75, 3; VI, 76, 3; VIII, 33, 4.)

²⁶ One instance of *πρόφασις* has been omitted as being too uncertain, in its exact meaning, for any classification. This is VII, 13, 2, *οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει*. It may mean "as occasion for deserting offered" or "motivated by desertion" (literally, "on the motive of desertion") or, less likely, "as professed deserters" (Loeb).

Still in the general class of "blame," but concrete, are such examples as V, 63, 3, where the Spartan king Agis, in bad repute with his subjects for a series of military and diplomatic blunders, promises *ῥύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος*, "to destroy their grounds for blame by a campaign"; also VI, 105, 2, where we are told that the Athenians, by helping the Argives, "provided the Lacedaemonians with very plausible grounds for blame." (Cf. also II, 60, 1; V, 1, 1; 53, 1.)

Sometimes there is no notion of blame. A clear instance of "responsibility" is I, 83, 3 (quoted in the first paragraph of this paper), where King Archidamus points out to the Lacedaemonians that if they engage in war the greater part of the responsibility for what happens, for good or ill, will be borne by them. The same use is found at VI, 80, 4.

Somewhat commoner is *αἰτία* meaning grounds, thing(s) responsible for an action or a feeling. In IV, 65, 4 (quoted above, first paragraph), in commenting on the enormous optimism of the Athenians, Thucydides says "the cause of it (or the "grounds") was the unbelievable success of most of their undertakings." In I, 99, 1, speaking of the revolt from Athens of Naxos and Lesbos, the historian says "there were other grounds for the revolt, but the main ones were . . ." (*αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε . . . καὶ μέγιστα*). (Cf. also IV, 85, 1, 6; 87, 4; VII, 86, 5.)

There are five more instances to be considered, of which two are in I, 23, where they describe the causes of the war; a third, in I, 146, clearly echoes I, 23; the fourth, I, 66, refers to the Potidaean affair, one of the *αἰτίαι* of 23, and hence is also closely related. The fifth occurs in a passage already mentioned in our discussion of *πρόφασις* (p. 49); the Mityleneans are giving their reasons for having revolted from Athens. The passage constitutes important evidence for a difference in meaning between *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις*, for there is no reason of art or logic for Thucydides to have the Mityleneans use two words for cause here unless they are meant to express two different kinds of cause. The speech of the Mityleneans shows what the two kinds are. In the course of their explanation of the defection, two aspects of their reasoning emerge: they have certain grievances against the Athenians, namely their transformation of the Delian League from an anti-Persian alliance into an engine for the

subjugation of Greece (III, 10, 3) and their enslavement of most of their allies (10, 4-5); as a result of these activities of Athens, a motive for revolt was formed, the fear of the Mityleneans that they too would suffer enslavement: "What in other alliances is made secure by goodwill was with us maintained by fear, for we were held together as allies by fear rather than by friendship; and whichever of us should first gain courage through security was bound to transgress the alliance in some way" (12, 1). These two aspects of their reasoning are then summed up with the words *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* in 13, 1. Which word means which kind of reason can only be determined by other uses of the words; we have seen that *πρόφασις* elsewhere means subjective motive and can reasonably suppose that it does so here. The use of *αἰτία* could be either of two meanings we have observed, "charges," or grounds for blame. It is not possible to know which was intended by the historian here.

The other four instances are all related in context, and in all of them the same difficulty arises: does the word mean the incidents that are the source of blame, the grounds, or does it mean the resultant feeling of blame? In I, 66 it refers to the Potidaean affair: "The Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, had these additional *αἰτίαι*." The word can be understood equally well as grounds or as resultant feelings. In I, 23, 5-6, the reference of the word is to the incidents of Coreyra and Potidaea, the decrees against Megara, and the rest of the immediate causes of the war, but there is again the same uncertainty about the precise denotation of the word. The addition of the explanatory word *διαφοραί*, while it makes it clear that *αἰτία* is being used in the sense of "blame," does not help to distinguish between grounds and emotion. In I, 146, since *αἰτίαι* is an echo of the use in 23, its meaning will presumably be the same.

It is possible that Thucydides did not mean to make any precise distinction between act and emotion in these passages. Both elements were important in bringing about the war, and both are within the scope of the word's normal meaning. Adequate translation is difficult; the word "grievance," with its ambiguity between grounds and blame, is the best single equivalent.

To sum up, *αἰτία*, like *πρόφασις*, always in Thucydides is closely

connected with a state of mind; where it does not actually denote an emotion it is the incident or factor which causes an emotion. Like *πρόφασις* again, it expresses the feelings of the participants (or the basis for their feelings), not an objective explanation. To this extent both words are subjective; but while *πρόφασις* is the mental state which results from one's own reflections, *αἰτία* is objective in that it expresses a reaction to another's conduct.

c. Αἴτιον.

When Cornford said that "there is in Thucydidean Greek no word which even approaches the meaning and associations of the English 'cause' with its correlative 'effect'," ²⁷ he must have altogether overlooked the historian's use of *αἴτιον*. Properly, it is the neuter singular of the adjective *αἴτιος*. The adjective is used by Thucydides in keeping with his use of *αἰρία*, with the meaning of "responsible," generally with a sense of blame.²⁸ As a noun, *αἴτιον* is used quite differently, in the sense of cause with no connotation of emotion, as at III, 89, 5, where the historian states what was in his opinion the cause of a tidal wave on an island off the coast of Locris: *αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου*. He goes on to say that the cause was a violent earthquake. (Other examples are I, 11, 1; II, 65, 8; III, 82, 8; 93, 2; IV, 26, 5; VIII, 9, 3.) Generally, there is no possibility of *αἴτιον* meaning grounds or blame; once or twice grounds is a possible interpretation, as at VIII, 9, 3. But in the majority of cases an objective kind of cause is certainly meant, as in the example quoted above: tidal waves do not have subjective reasons. It is possible that this kind of cause is intended in all uses of *αἴτιον*, certain that it is in most. Thus the word is in contrast with the other two: both *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* refer to the mental attitudes of the persons concerned, *αἴτιον* is objective.²⁹

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁸ *Αἴτιος* is used fourteen times; twelve times it means "guilty," e.g. II, 21, 3 (*Περικλέα αἴτιον ἐνόμιζον*); twice it means "responsible," e.g. VII, 56, 2, *αὐτοὶ δόξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι*.

²⁹ Herodotus' use of *αἴτιον* is strikingly similar. With Thucydides, compare Herodotus, III, 108, 4, *τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τοῦτον τόδε ἐστί*. This kind of phrase is Herodotus' regular use of the word. It seems very likely that his usage influenced that of Thucydides.

d. Summary.

If the reader should take the trouble to test the foregoing analysis, he would, in all probability, not agree with every assignment made to the various categories of meaning. He would, however, agree that the ranges of meaning of the three words are as they have been described. The objective, scientific word for cause in Thucydides is *αἴτιον*. *Πρόφασις* means, basically, "reason"; in its Thucydidean range the reason may be true or false, alleged or unspoken. *Αἰτία* means responsibility, or what is responsible, or the imputation of responsibility. Both *πρόφασις* and *αἰτία* invariably (except, of course, in the description of the plague, which obviously imitates Hippocratic usage and is atypical in Thucydides) are concerned with the feelings of the participants in the scene.

A curious anomaly is thus revealed. Thucydides, the scientific historian, uses his objective word for cause, *αἴτιον*, only seven times. The subjective words, which have to do with the motives, reasons, pretexts, grievances, and charges of the participants, he uses far oftener, and uses these exclusively in his most important discussions of cause, those concerning the causes of the war. An explanation of this apparent renunciation of the scientific approach will form the conclusion of this study.

III.

Why does Thucydides prefer the less scientific and more subjective terms for cause? It is not possible to return to Cornford's view that Thucydides did not understand cause as such, but only grievances, pretexts, and the like, for the way in which he uses *αἴτιον* contradicts this supposition. If he can explain the smallness of the Trojan expedition (I, 11, 1) objectively, scientifically, even with an obvious awareness of the causative force of economic factors, we cannot suppose him to have been unable to express the causes of the Peloponnesian war in the same spirit, had he chosen to.

On the other hand, *πρόφασις*, as he uses it, does not denote scientific cause. The attempt to attach such a meaning to it when it refers to the causes of the war began (in Cochrane's book, at least) as a reaction against the assault by Cornford on the scientific character of Thucydides' work. The reaction was justified, for any reader feels the presence of a scientific spirit in

Thucydides, painstaking, accurate, and objective. It is not necessary, however, in order to vindicate Thucydides, to impute to him a scientific vocabulary in his description of the causes of the war. Thucydides' words do not reveal any want of objectivity on his part; it is rather that they are more *inclusive* than purely objective words could be. For example, Athens' intervention in the quarrel between Corcyra and Epidamnus was important above all for the additional hatred of Athens with which it inspired the Corinthians. To express this wider concept, with its emotional aspect, Thucydides chose the subjective word stressing the mental state of those involved, rather than the mere *γυγνόμενα*. Therefore he described the incident and its results as an *αἰτία*. The notion of *αἴτιον* is included in *αἰτία*. Similarly, *πρόφασις*, when it is used of the causes of the war, is a broader term than *αἰτία*, as in I, 118, where the *αἰτίαι* which have been described are regarded as collectively constituting the *πρόφασις*. The relationship is quite similar in I, 23, even though here Thucydides is more concerned with distinguishing between *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις*. For the Spartan fear of Athens, the real *πρόφασις* of the war, was unquestionably produced by the various *αἰτίαι* described by the historian, as well as by earlier events.

In using *αἰτία* and *πρόφασις* to describe the causes of the war, then, Thucydides was not the victim of an inability to distinguish between cause and mere complaint, but was deliberately using broad and meaningful terms. If we deny the subjective quality of the words, we are not so much attributing a scientific attitude to him as failing to recognize the breadth of meaning of his words.

To present the causes of the war from the point of view of the participants is in keeping with the whole spirit of Thucydides' art of history. Probably the most impressive feature of his manner is its air of dispassionate recording. The story of the Peloponnesian war tells itself. What is written in the person of the historian is in general purely narrative, it moves rapidly, unencumbered by commentary, concise, sometimes even to the point of sparseness.³⁰ Not only coloring but analysis and judg-

³⁰ Thucydides' narrative style is not, however, direct or plain, and in this he is unlike the medical writers. Where these are obscure, it is a result of bad writing, not conscious style, as it often is in Thucydides. The best written Hippocratic essays, such as *Airs*, *Waters*,

ment as well are restricted chiefly to the speeches. There are memorable exceptions to this general procedure: the brilliant character sketch of Themistocles (I, 138) the account of Athens' fortunes under and after Pericles (II, 65), the famous analysis of *stasis* (III, 82-3), to mention only the most conspicuous. But such passages as these are comparatively rare. For the analysis of men's plans and motives, for statements and criticisms of policy, for most, indeed, of the inner action of the war, we depend on the speeches: the statement of Athenian policy under Pericles is spoken by Pericles (I, 140-4), of Spartan policy in Thrace by Brasidas (IV, 85-87); the best comparison of Athenian and Spartan character is given by the Corinthians (I, 69-71); the finest tribute to Athenian democracy is Pericles' funeral oration (II, 35-46), and the cruelest indictment of Athenian political realism the Melian Dialogue (V, 87-111); information about the tensions and emotions felt in a situation has generally to be derived from such pairs of speeches as those of the Corcyreans and the Corinthians in Book I, Cleon and Diodotus in Book III, Nicias and Alcibiades at Athens, Hermocrates and Athenagoras at Syracuse, and Hermocrates and Euphemus at Camarina, in Book VI.

This direct presentation, where the personality of the historian intrudes as little as possible, and the participants explain themselves and each other, is normal in Thucydides. It is, as any attentive reader senses, a highly dramatic method; it was this quality that Cornford so seriously exaggerated in judging Thucydides as a historian. For there is this basic paradox in Thucydides, that he is at once a scientific historian and yet, stylistically, a dramatist. Where Cornford erred was in extending the dramatic quality from presentation to conception; we fall into the reverse error if we attempt to introduce the scientific nature of the historian's view of history into his vocabulary of cause. The historian's explanations and analyses must be sought, not directly, but through his presentation of the minds and the emotions of the participants.

GORDON M. KIRKWOOD.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Places, The Sacred Disease, and Prognostic, have the characteristic Ionian directness, which they share with Herodotus. In spite of specific similarities (cf. Schmid, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2), Thucydides' style is essentially far from Ionian.

POLITICAL MOTIVES IN CICERO'S DEFENSE OF ARCHIAS.

When Cicero accepted the defense of Archias in the year following his consulate, he turned his attention for a time from the exciting political events of the day to prove that a poet, a friend of Lucullus, was a Roman citizen. Archias was not an important person, and no great issue was at stake. The case against him was exceedingly weak, and any lawyer of mediocre ability could have handled it successfully. But Cicero took the case, apparently with relish; and, dispatching the legal arguments in short order, he turned to a larger subject, delivering to his jurymen and his audience a lecture in praise of literature. It is as if poetry, and not a poet, were on trial, and Cicero the man of letters pleads its case before his own generation and all ages to come.

J. Wight Duff and H. J. Rose refer to this speech, or the major part of it, as a charming essay on literature, and J. W. Mackail describes it as a perfect encomium on literature, addressed to "posterity, and the civilized world."¹ I suppose that for most of those who read the *Pro Archia* to enjoy it as a panegyric on humanistic learning that is all they know and all they need to know.

But if we wish to satisfy our curiosity about the motives of Cicero the politician in this case, we can be sure that there is more in it than meets the eye. It is true that he explicitly says in the exordium that gratitude to the man who was his chief adviser in his early literary studies prompts him to defend Archias, and we have no reason for doubting that this was a genuine motive. Another motive is hinted at (28) where Cicero tells us that Archias has begun a poem celebrating the glorious deeds performed by the consul of the preceding year. Cicero could scarcely conceive a nobler theme than this for his poet friend, and when he agreed to defend Archias he surely must

¹ J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age* (New York, 1932), p. 360; H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Latin Literature* (London, 1936), p. 177; J. W. Mackail, *Latin Literature* (New York, 1895), pp. 68-69.

have wanted to encourage the poet in his undertaking. These are personal motives, understandable enough, which may well have been sufficient to move Cicero to accept the defense of Archias.

But it is generally agreed that, just as the attack on Archias was a political manoeuvre, so Cicero's defense was a declaration of his political position. Pompey at this time was in the East, but he had his agents at Rome, one of whom, Metellus Nepos, had tried to secure a dictatorship for Pompey in the Catilinarian crisis and had prevented Cicero from addressing the people at the end of his consulate. Lucullus, Pompey's greatest rival as a military commander, was a leader of the senate;² and that body made no effort to conceal its dislike of Pompey.

Since Archias was an intimate friend of Lucullus, whose exploits he had commemorated in a poem, it is usually assumed that the attack on him was in reality an attack on Lucullus, and that the real assailants were men acting on the side of Pompey, of whom Grattius, the accuser, was only a tool. It is even suspected that Caesar had some share in the business,³ for it is certain that he at this time was trying to win Pompey over to the popular party.⁴ These considerations have led scholars to conclude that Cicero in defending Archias took a definite stand and declared himself on the side of the party of Lucullus in the Senate and against the turbulent agents of Pompey as well as against Caesar and his popular party.⁵ This accounts not only for the eloquent praise of Lucullus (21) but also for most of the digression in praise of poetry. Cicero was happy to have an opportunity in speaking of poets and poetry to demonstrate that the praise of Lucullus meant the praise of Rome (and at the same time to hint that the glory of his own consulship was Rome's undying glory).

² See Dio, XXXVII, 49-50. Cf. Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), p. 33.

³ W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic* (Cambridge, 1923), III, p. 113.

⁴ Caesar had supported Metellus Nepos in his attempt to carry the decree to call Pompey with his army to Rome (Plut., *Cat. Min.*, 27) and had tried to transfer from Catulus to Pompey the honor of rededicating the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (Dio, XXXVII, 44). See W. W. How and A. C. Clark, *Cicero: Select Letters* (Oxford, 1934), II, p. 40; Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, p. 32.

⁵ See James S. Reid, *Ciceronis Pro Archia* (Cambridge, 1877; reprint, 1899), pp. 13-14; W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, III, p. 113.

But this explanation leaves unexplained the passage (12-14) in which Cicero tells what reading and study have done for him personally. We might, of course, say that this passage serves as a transition from the legal arguments to the larger consideration of Archias' contribution as a poet; and I think this is in a sense true. But it is an unreasonably long transition, the longest I know of in the speeches of Cicero. He tells of the refreshment and inspiration he gets from books and insists that his love of scholarly leisure never keeps him from helping his fellow-men (12). He justifies his hours of reading by a comparison with the habits of pleasure seekers and claims that his studies make him more eloquent and effective in the defense of his friends (13). His best inspirations he has drawn from the great books in which he has learnt to love virtue and to contemn personal danger when his country's welfare is at stake. "How many pictures of great heroes have Greek and Latin writers left us not only for contemplation but also for imitation. These were before me always, when I was at the head of the government, and it was my practice to form my mind and heart by pondering on the example of outstanding men."⁶ But were these outstanding men themselves trained in letters? This leads to the distinction between *natura* and *doctrina* and to the assertion that it is the union of the two that produces really great men (15). As examples he mentions Scipio Africanus the Younger, Laelius, Furius, and Cato the Elder, and finally he concludes his long transition (or digression) with the often quoted passage praising the intrinsic worth (as distinct from the practical value) of the delights of literature (16). All this to lead up to the praise of Archias!

This passage, I believe, can be best understood as an echo of the thoughts that were in Cicero's mind when he wrote to Pompey about the same time to acknowledge an official dispatch and a personal letter.⁷ Cicero in replying rejoices at the good

⁶ Cic., *Arch.* 14: *Quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum verum etiam ad imitandum fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt! quas ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum et mentem meam ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam.*

⁷ Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7. The first one, so far as I know, to suggest a connection between this letter and *Pro Archia* was Félix Gaffiot in his introduction to the Budé text of the speech, *Cicéron, Discours* (Paris,

news in the official dispatch but he lets Pompey know that he is offended by the coldness of the personal letter. "I have performed deeds which I thought would elicit some joyful acknowledgment in your letter, because of our personal and political ties. I suppose you have omitted any such acknowledgment out of a fear of giving offense to any one."⁸ But Cicero goes on to say that his actions have won the approval of all the world, and that when Pompey returns he hopes to show that he has the qualities to make him be to Pompey what Laelius was to Scipio. "You are greater than Africanus, and I am not much inferior to Laelius: and on your return the knowledge of my wisdom and statesmanship will surely unite you to me, as Africanus was to Laelius, in public and private life."⁹

At this time Cicero was beginning to see that his political power was on the decline, that as an upstart knight he was not at all popular with the aristocratic Senate, that the *optimates* backed him during the preceding year only because of their fear of Catiline, that he could not hope now, when that fear was passed, to wield the same power in the curia.¹⁰ And yet he was deeply

1938; reprint, 1947), XII, pp. 11-17. The only comment I have been able to find on M. Gaffiot's theory is a brief notice by a reviewer who dismisses it as unnecessarily subtle (Geoffrey Percival, *C.R.*, LIII [1939], p. 70).

⁸ Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7, 3: *Res eas gessi, quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae necessitudinis et rei p. causa gratulationem exspectavi; quam ego abs te praetermissam esse arbitror, quod verere ne cuius animum offenderes.* Cicero had written to Pompey about the suppression of the Catilinarians (*Hic tu epistulam meam saepe recitas quam ego ad Cn. Pompeium de meis rebus gestis et de summa re publica misi . . .* [Cic., *Sull.*, 67]). Since it is clear that Pompey hoped the Catilinarian conspiracy would develop sufficiently to make it necessary for the Senate to call him to Rome with his army (J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero* [New York, 1894], p. 159), it is hard to believe that Cicero seriously looked for hearty congratulations from Pompey.

⁹ Cic., *Fam.*, V, 7, 3: *Sed scito ea, quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari; quae, cum veneris, tanto consilio tantaque animi magnitudine a me gesta esse cognosces, ut tibi multo maiori quam Africanus fuit, me non multo minorem quam Laelium facile et in re p. et in amicitia adiunctum esse patiari.*

¹⁰ See Gaston Boissier, *Cicero and His Friends* (New York, 1897), pp. 49-51. In the following year Cicero tells Atticus that he is keeping up his law practice, no longer as a means of getting into office but rather as a means of maintaining his prestige: . . . *in forensi labore, quem*

convinced that the security of his country depended upon a harmony between the aristocracy and the knights. In thinking of this harmony he had in mind not only the knights who happened to be Roman bankers, but also, perhaps especially, the respectable squires from the country districts of Italy, the class from which he himself had come. He frequently speaks of the *concordia ordinum* along with the *consensus Italiae* or *consensus bonorum*,¹¹ showing that he looked to a union of all the "loyal" elements in Italy to preserve constitutional government.

But he knew that this would be impossible unless he could rally to the cause the support of an outstanding military leader.¹² Pompey seemed to be the best man available.¹³ He was a military genius and had the confidence of his soldiers, he was popular with the knights and the plebeians, and if he was rather generally disliked in the Senate, Cicero thought that he could influence a sufficient number to back Pompey in an effort to preserve the constitution.¹⁴ He was convinced that Pompey, in spite of all

antea propter ambitionem sustinebam, nunc ut dignitatem tueri gratia possim . . . (*Att.*, I, 17, 6).

¹¹ See *Att.*, I, 14, 4 and 16, 6. Cf. W. W. How, "Cicero's Ideal in His *De Republica*," *J.R.S.*, XX (1930), pp. 33-34; J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero*, p. 165.

¹² This thought comes out explicitly in a letter to Atticus the following year (*Att.*, I, 17, 8-10). There Cicero tells of his efforts on behalf of the knights for the sake of *concordia* (*ibid.*, 8-9), but he adds that he is strengthening his position by his friendship with Pompey (*ibid.*, 10).

¹³ Cicero's devotion to Pompey dated at least from his praetorship (66 B.C.), when he delivered the *Pro Lege Manilia*, and lasted to the very end. In 54 B.C. he calls Pompey *princeps vir . . . cuiusque ego dignitatis ab adolescentia fautor, in praetura autem et in consulatu adiutor etiam exstitissem . . .* (*Fam.*, I, 9, 11); and in 50 B.C. he says: *. . . mihi σκάφος unum erit quod a Pompeio gubernabitur* (*Att.*, VII, 3, 5). In addition to speaking for Pompey in the *Pro Lege Manilia*, Cicero voted an extraordinary *supplicatio* for him (63 B.C.), defended his interests in the *De Lege Agraria* (63 B.C.), supported the bill (with modifications) designed to provide for Pompey's veterans (60 B.C.), proposed the extraordinary five-year control of the grain supply for Pompey (57 B.C.), and finally joined Pompey's camp in the Civil War (49 B.C.). Numerous references to public utterances made by Cicero in praise of Pompey are gathered by Jérôme Carcopino, *Les secrets de la correspondance de Cicéron* (Paris, 1947), II, pp. 81-84.

¹⁴ The qualities that Cicero admired in Pompey were: *scientia rei*

his ambitions, had no intention of using his might against the laws; and he felt that, whatever power Pompey coveted at Rome, he sought to win it not by armed force but by the consent of his fellow citizens. He realized that Pompey had no talent for statesmanship in the problems that faced the government at Rome; but he knew that he was an incomparable military commander and a born leader of men, and he hoped to be at his side to supply the political wisdom and principles of right government, which his own practical experience as well as his deep knowledge of ethics, political philosophy, history, and law, had given him.

It would be eight years before Cicero would start to work on his *De Re Publica*, but I think that the ideas later expressed in that work had already begun to take shape in his mind.¹⁵ In particular the notion of a *moderator rei publicae*,¹⁶ presented in the fifth book of Cicero's treatise, seems to be haunting him in the year 62 B.C., and I suspect that he fancied during the preceding year that he himself was destined to play the role. But now it is Pompey that he imagines as assuming this leadership and himself at Pompey's side, supplying the counsel that only a scholar and philosopher can give.¹⁷

militaris, virtus, auctoritas, felicitas (*Leg. Man.*, 28-48); or, again, *fortuna, auctoritas, gratia* (*Att.*, I, 20, 4). But he recognized Pompey's faults: . . . *nos, ut ostendit, admodum diligit, amplectitur, amat, aperte laudat: occulte sed ita ut perspicuum sit invidet. Nihil come, nihil simplex, nihil ex τοῖς πολιτικοῖς inlustre, nihil honestum, nihil forte, nihil liberum* (*Att.*, I, 13, 4). On Feb. 13, 61 B.C., Cicero wrote that Pompey's first speech on his return from the East pleased nobody (*Att.*, I, 14, 1), and in the following year he complained: . . . *nihil habet amplum, nihil excelsum, nihil non submissum atque popolare* (*Att.*, I, 20, 4).

¹⁵ See Martin van den Bruwaene, *Études sur Cicéron* (Bruxelles, 1946), p. 66.

¹⁶ In 49 B.C. Cicero quotes to Atticus from the (now mostly lost) fifth book of the *De Re Publica*: *Ut enim gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit. Huius enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo* (*Att.*, VIII, 11, 1).

¹⁷ After quoting from his *De Re Publica* the description of the *moderator rei publicae* (see above, n. 16), Cicero tells Atticus: *Hoc Gnaeus noster cum antea numquam tum in hac causa minime cogitavit. Dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum beata et honesta civitas*

These thoughts give point, I think, to the otherwise pointless discourse in *Pro Archia* (12-14) on Cicero's own devotion to study. He does not tell his audience that he hopes to be Pompey's intimate friend and counsellor: that would be out of place in the present circumstances. But he does tell them that now, when his active leadership in political life is over, he does not cease to be deeply concerned about the welfare of his country, and that from his scholarly leisure and hours of reflection he is ready to emerge and offer still the wise counsel that might be otherwise lacking among men of action.

That Scipio and Laelius were in Cicero's thoughts at the time of this speech is clear from the very next paragraph where he cites them as examples of men who attained to preeminence because of a mental culture joined to a superior endowment of nature (16). Moreover, as he proceeds to prove that a poet can confer great glory on his country, he cites a number of examples of famous commanders who were intimately associated with poets (19-27). Among them he mentions Pompey and his connection with Theophanes of Mytilene, the chronicler of Pompey's achievements, and he remarks incidentally that Pompey's success has equalled his natural ability (24). As Cicero proceeds to admit his own love of glory and his hope of immortality of name (28-30), we cannot presume that he has any thought of putting Pompey in the shade. Even in the hour of his triumph a few months previously, when he was delivering the *Fourth Catilinarian*, Cicero had sung the praises of Pompey, declaring him greater than Scipio the Elder, Scipio the Younger, or any of Rome's famous generals, but adding in the same breath that his own glory would find some place amidst these great ones for his statesmanlike wisdom which had saved his country at home while Pompey was securing the empire abroad.¹⁸

ut esset (*Att.*, VIII, 11, 2). From this it seems that Cicero had thought of Pompey as his *moderator*. But W. W. How, *J.R.S.*, XX (1930), pp. 38-39, justly remarks: "Again, the reason that made Cicero finally pronounce Pompey unworthy of the part assigned him as 'moderator rei publicae' is neither his long-known political ineptitude, nor his supposed military incompetence, but the conviction that Pompey as well as Caesar lusted after a power founded on force and unfettered by constitutional shackles, and, in fine, was intent, not on the safety and welfare of the state, but on his own domination."

¹⁸ Cic., *Cat.*, 4, 21: . . . *anteponatur omnibus Pompeius cuius res gestae*

The only plausible objection I can see against this attempt to find the thought of Cicero's letter to Pompey echoed in the speech for Archias is the fact that one of the most eloquent passages in the speech is a eulogy on Lucullus and his exploits in the Mithridatic War (21), a passage which, according to James S. Reid, "seems intentionally to avoid all allusion to the career of Pompeius in the East."¹⁹ But this is no real objection. First of all, Cicero is arguing that Archias by his poetry glorified Rome, and he must logically bring in the exploits of Lucullus, which Archias celebrated in one of his poems. Secondly, there can be no question of intentionally excluding all mention of Pompey in this passage. The passage merely summarizes the events which Archias commemorated in his poem, and it is not likely that Archias would have made any mention of Pompey, since he was never in Pompey's retinue. Finally, there is no reason why Cicero could not intend in one and the same speech to show good will towards both Pompey and Lucullus. He had tried it before in the *Pro Lege Manilia* (20-21), and for some time he would continue to attempt to reconcile the bitterly opposed factions of Pompey and Lucullus in his efforts to establish the harmony of the orders.²⁰

By what I have said I do not mean that Cicero intended the *Pro Archia* as a panegyric on Pompey. In fact, it cannot be denied that it contains a very explicit panegyric on Pompey's most pertinacious opponent. But I do think that it contains also a development of the thought that is found in the letter to

atque virtutes isdem quibus solis cursus regionibus ac terminis continentur: erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci mostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur.

¹⁹ James S. Reid, *Ciceronis Pro Archia*, p. 17.

²⁰ Fierce conflicts were waged in the Senate in 61-60 B.C. Pompey was pushing two demands: 1. an agrarian law to settle his veterans on farms; 2. ratification *en bloc* of his acts in the East. The Senate stoutly refused both. Lucullus, who had been treated with contempt by Pompey in Asia (Dio, XXXVII, 49), was especially active in opposing the blanket approval of Pompey's commitments. In this struggle, as well as in the clash brought on by demands made by the knights at this time, Cicero tried to compose differences and consistently worked for a *concordia ordinum*; but in January, 60 B.C., his hope of accomplishing anything began to weaken (*Att.*, I, 18, 3-8). See J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Cicero*, pp. 180-184.

Pompey. Cicero may not have been very anxious to have Pompey read this speech. But in any case he could not hide the fact that he was on good terms with Lucullus, and he seems to have thought at this time that he might bring Pompey and Lucullus together in the harmony of the orders and the union of all loyal citizens for the preservation of what he considered a just and reasonable political system.²¹

JOHN H. TAYLOR, S. J.

ST. FRANCIS XAVIER NOVITIATE,
SHERIDAN, OREGON.

²¹ As late as 45 B.C., when Pompey was dead and Cicero's political ideal was obviously a lost cause, Cicero still liked to believe that from his scholarly retirement he might confer some benefits on his fellow citizens (*Acad. Pr.*, 6):

Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur?

ARISTOBULUS THE PHOCIAN.

All that we are told concerning the nationality of Aristobulus, son of Aristobulus, the historian of Alexander and one of Arrian's principal sources in his *Anabasis*, is that he was a "Cassandrian."¹ This does not mean that he was born in Cassandrea, but that he settled there some time after its foundation in 316 B. C.; his birthplace must be sought elsewhere and he must have been a man of mature years in 316, as he took part in Alexander's expedition and was entrusted with the restoration of Cyrus' tomb at Pasargadae.² The title "Cassandrian," if properly applied, should mean that he was a citizen of Cassandrea and we might reasonably expect him to become a citizen if he settled in this new city; but for lack of positive evidence, such as an inscription recording civic activity, we cannot be sure of it.

He is not the only historian of Alexander to be associated with more than one city. Onesicritus may be Aeginetan as well as Astypalaeon;³ but a better parallel is furnished by Nearchus and two other Greeks who were trierarchs of Alexander's fleet on the Indus, Laomedon and Androstenes. All three of them, according to Nearchus, were "Macedonians from Amphipolis," but Arrian tells us that Nearchus was a Cretan originally,⁴ and in a Delphic inscription which records honours granted to him he is

¹ Ἀριστόβουλος ὁ Κασσανδρεὺς. See Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, IIB, no. 139, F. 3—Plut., *Dem.*, 23; F. 6 and 47—Ath., II, 43D, VI, 251A (F = *Fragmentum*, T = *Testimonium*).

² T. 6—Arrian, *Anab.*, proem; F. 51 a and b—Arrian, *Anab.*, VI, 29, 10; Strabo, XV, 3, 7.

³ Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, IIB, no. 134, T. 1—Diog. Laert., VI, 84.

⁴ Arrian, *Ind.*, 18, lists the trierarchs of the fleet, the Macedonians first, beginning with the group from Pella, ἐκ δὲ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἦγον οἷδε· [ἐκ Κρήτης] Νέαρχος Ἀνδροτίμου, ὃς τὰ ἀμφὶ τῷ παράπλῳ ἀνέγραψε καὶ Λαομέδων ὁ Λαρίχου καὶ Ἀνδρόσθενος Καλλιστράτου. ἐκ Κρήτης is probably an interpolation, and is omitted by many editors, because it is insisted in section 6 that *all* named so far are Macedonians. Then in section 10 the text gives: ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτοῖσιν ἐπεστάθη Νέαρχος Ἀνδροτίμου· τὸ γένος μὲν Κρής ὁ Νέαρχος, ὥκει δὲ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. This note on Nearchus' origin cannot be expelled from the text so easily; but it is certainly due to Arrian himself, not to Nearchus; Arrian, however, still does not tell us of what state Nearchus was a citizen; he is Κρής τὸ γένος, οἰκῶν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει.

called simply a Cretan.⁵ We know that he and Laomedon were both companions of the young Alexander at court before the death of Philip;⁶ and subsequently Nearchus was busy in the service of Antigonos "One-Eye" until 314 at least⁷ and may have had neither need nor opportunity to establish or re-establish citizenship anywhere. Laomedon, who was made satrap of Syria by Perdikkas, is called a Mytilenian and Androstenes a Thasian.⁸ We do not in fact know whether any of them ever became a citizen of Amphipolis and none of them is ever called Ἀμφιπολίτης. If, however, a writer of Roman times did give one of them this title, we should surely be entitled to argue that he had merely drawn a conclusion from the text of Nearchus; it would not follow that such a writer had independent knowledge; and when Plutarch and Athenaeus call Aristobulus a Cassandrian we need not conclude that they knew more about his civic status than we know about Nearchus; all we can say definitely is that Aristobulus' birthplace is not recorded but that he subsequently took up residence in Cassandrea.

In previous discussions of Aristobulus no notice has been taken of a Delphic inscription, which records honours granted to a certain "Sophocles, son of Aristobulus, a Phocian living in Cassandrea":⁹

- Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν Σοφοκλεῖ Ἀριστοβούλου Φωκεῖ ἐν Κασ[σ]ανδρείαι
οἰκοῦντι, Φίλωνι[.] Πελλαίῳ,
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ Δ[. . .]ον Ἐδ<ε>σσαίῳ, Ἀντιγόνῳ Ἀσάνδρον Ἰχναίῳ,
Πολιτάρχῳ [.] Μελισβοίῃ,
3 Ματρικέτῃ Παντέα Περινθίῳ, Μελεσικράτῃ Ἀριστομένει ἐν Ἡραίῳ
τείχει, Διοδώρῳ Μίθρεος Κυζικηνῷ,
Ἰέρωνι Ἀπολλοδώρῳ Καλλατιανῷ, Σωκρίτῳ Κράθωνος Χερσονασίτῃ,
Διονυσίῳ Διονυσίου Βορυσθενίτῃ,
Νικίαι Ἡρακλείδῳ Βουσπορίτῃ, Γλαύκῳ Σίμῳ Κυθνήῳ, Ἱερο[κλ]εῖ
Ἀρτεμιδῶρῳ Βαργυλιήτῃ, Μάχονι
6 Σαμοθράκῃ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐγγόνους προξενίαν, προμάντειαν, προδικίαν,
προεδρίαν, ἀσυλίαν, θεαροδοκίαν,

⁵ *S. I. G.*³, 266 Νεάρχῳ Ἀνδροτίμῳ Κρητί. Cf. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich*, II, p. 269. The inscription cannot be dated accurately.

⁶ Arrian, *Anab.*, III, 6, 5.

⁷ Diod., XIX, 69, 1.

⁸ Diod., XVIII, 3, 1; Strabo, XVI, 3, 2.

⁹ *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 3, 207 (first published by R. Flacelière, "Notes de chronologie delphique," *B. C. H.*, LII [1928], pp. 189-92).

ἀτέλειαν πάντων καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προξένοις καὶ εὐεργέ-
ταις. Ἄρχοντος Χαριξένου,
βουλευόντων Χάρητ[ο]ς, [Τι]μοκράτεος, Καλλιφάνεος.

The name Aristobulus is of course quite common, but there are some reasons for believing that the father of Sophocles is none other than the historian Aristobulus. The inscription belongs to the middle of the third century B. C., though its precise date is doubtful; the most likely date for the archon Charixenus seems to be either 252-1 or else between 263 and 260.¹⁰ A son of the historian Aristobulus, born some time after his father returned from the East in 323, would be of a suitable age about this time to receive these honours at Delphi. Aristobulus himself is supposed not to have started writing his history until he was eighty-four years old—not before 285, then, unless he was already over fifty when Alexander died.¹¹ But nothing else is known about the later years of his life or his activities in Cassandrea; and nothing whatever is recorded of his earlier life before he joined Alexander's expedition. If nothing is recorded about his place of origin, we are entitled to ask what the reason for this may have been.

If he was a Phocian, the reason is easy to see. Philip was largely responsible for the ruin of Phocis in 346 and it is understandable that a Phocian in the service of a Macedonian king might be reticent about his origin. Indeed, if he was a Phocian, the most likely explanation of his position on Alexander's staff is that his family was opposed to the political leaders of Phocis in the Sacred War and left the country before 346 to seek refuge in Macedonia. When the Phocians recovered their position in the Greek world and were reinstated at Delphi in 278,¹² a son of his who could claim that his family had been driven into exile by the "sacrilegious leaders" was a most likely person to be honoured at Delphi. No signs of any special Phocian outlook can be detected in the fragments of Aristobulus or in Arrian's

¹⁰ G. Daux, *F. D.*, note *ad loc.*, and *Chronologie delphique*, pp. 31-2; Flacelière, *loc. cit.* and *Les Aitoliens à Delphes*, pp. 220-1.

¹¹ T. 3—[Lucian], *Macrob.*, 22. See introductory note in Jacoby's commentary on Aristobulus; Berve, *Das Alexanderreich*, II, pp. 64-5; Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, II, pp. 42-3.

¹² Paus., X, 8, 3; *S. I. G.*,³ 399; Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes*, pp. 113-14.

Anabasis. Arrian does remind us, however, that it was the Theban exiles and the Phocians and the Plataeans and the other Boeotians, not the Macedonians, who were really bitter in their hatred of the ruling party at Thebes when Alexander attacked the city;¹³ and we may assume that Arrian learnt this from Aristobulus, not from Ptolemy.

Naturally one cannot prove that this is in fact the history of Aristobulus himself and his family. Cassandra, no doubt, was peopled with settlers from all over the Greek world and it would be absurd to insist that there was only one Aristobulus living there. But at least the historian was important enough to have a son who was honoured at Delphi, and he was also of the right age to be the father of the Sophocles in the inscription. If there is no definite reason for denying their identity, the possibility should certainly be considered that "Aristobulus the Cassandrian" came originally from Phocis.

What does the inscription tell us about Sophocles? The description "a Phocian living in Cassandra"¹⁴ is a curious one, because in the Delphic inscriptions men are styled simply "Phocian" when they represent the *koinon* of Phocis in some official capacity, but otherwise their city is mentioned;¹⁵ and in an honorific inscription it would seem almost like an insult to the city to omit its name. Should we conclude, then, that Sophocles was not a citizen of any particular city in Phocis, but really only Φωκεὺς τὸ γένος, not actually registered anywhere?¹⁶ This indeed would be the position of the son of a Phocian exile, born outside the country; he could call himself a Phocian, but

¹³ Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 7, 11; 8, 8.

¹⁴ Cf. *F. D.*, III, 3, 185 Ἀλεξείνιδης Ἡλείος ἐν Αἰτωλῷ οἰκῶν, who is called simply Ἡλείος in 3, 187 (date 272-1 B. C.).

¹⁵ *F. D.*, III, 3, 42 Αἰλαίεύς, 143 Ἀντικυρεύς, 294 Δρύμιος. It is the same with Aetolians and Boeotians: 198 Κλεοσθένει Αἰτωλῷ ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, 199 Βουθήρα Αἰτωλῷ ἐκ Τιτράν, 95, 96, 102 Βοιωτῷ ἐκ Κορωνείας. Likewise we find Boeotians from Thespieae, Thebes, and Tanagra (81, 82, 94, 100, 101).

¹⁶ For Nearchus see note 4 above. We cannot call Sophocles simply a Phocian citizen, because Phocian federal citizenship was the result, not the basis, of membership of a constituent city. There are a few instances known of honorary federal citizenship (*isopoliteia* with the Phocians) granted to outsiders by the *koinon* of Phocis; but we are hardly justified in assuming this here. See Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde*, pp. 1452-3; *I. G.*, IX, 1, 97; O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia*, no. 34.

could not strictly call any city his own if he was not on the citizen roll. What was his status at Cassandrea? If he was a citizen, we should expect him to be called "Cassandrean" in this inscription; if he was not, it means little to call him a metec unless we know something of the constitution of Cassandrea; we cannot apply Athenian terms to every Hellenistic city; all we know is that he was a person of some importance there; we can only conjecture how he earned the gratitude of Delphi.¹⁷

Tarn recently tried to prove that Aristobulus came from the island of Cos.¹⁸ He noted that one historian of Alexander, whom Strabo quoted, spoke of "five thousand cities in India between Hydaspes and Hypanis, not one of which was smaller than Meropid Cos."¹⁹ He argued that a writer would not take Cos for his basis of comparison unless it were his own home town and, since the only historian of Alexander whose home town was not known was Aristobulus, that Strabo was quoting Aristobulus here and that Aristobulus came from Cos. The method of argument is excellent; but it has to be remembered that there is another historian of Alexander whom Strabo might be quoting, who certainly came from near Cos, and who might very suitably use this city as a basis of comparison because his own native place was small and obscure: Onesicritus of Astypalaea, whom Strabo quotes in his discussion of India even more frequently than he quotes Aristobulus. Hence the claim of Phocis to be the birthplace of Aristobulus is not seriously shaken by Tarn's argument.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

PAGANUS IN *B. G. U.*, 696.

R. O. Fink in his valuable edition of Mommsen's *pridianum*, published in this Journal in 1942, presented a number of new readings. Among the more important of these was the recog-

¹⁷ Flacelière, *B. C. H.*, LII, p. 190, thinks it may be a reward for hospitality shown to Delphic *theoroi*.

¹⁸ *Alexander the Great*, II, p. 32 n.

¹⁹ Strabo, XV, 1, 3; 1, 33.

dition of the centurion sign in Col. i, 20.¹ The entry in which it is found reads as follows:

20 FACTUS EX PAGANO A SEMPRO- (CENTURIO) I
NIO LIBERALE, PRAEF(ECTO) AEGUPT(I),
silvano et augurino co(n)s(ulibus),
sextus sempronius candidus ex v kal(endas)
maias.

The consulship in line 22 is the date of Candidus' enlistment (A. D. 156). It is also the year in which this text was written. (CENTURIO) I (line 20) stands at the right edge of the column, in alignment with similar items above and below. The unit is an auxiliary cohort stationed in Egypt.

Candidus was made centurion *ex pagano*, and the principal question which this entry raises is the meaning of that phrase; or, to be more exact, the meaning of *paganus*, the man's status before his appointment.² In view of the fact that Candidus began his service as a centurion, Fink states, "... it is obvious that the term as used here means more than simply 'private citizen'," ³ despite Mommsen's opinion to the contrary.⁴ Instead, he compares the description of a legionary soldier in *P. Lat. Gen.*, 1 as *pagane cultus* and cites Premierstein's explanation, which is that the soldier on this day went in civilian dress to act as a secret service agent (*Geheimpolizist*).⁵ Fink concludes, "... one may suppose that the present centurion entered the army from the secret service of the civil police."

There are several objections to this explanation, attractive and well-stated as it is. First, it should be emphasized that

¹ *A. J. P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 61-71. Mommsen had taken the sign as a mark to separate the numeral *I* from the rest of the line; *Gesammelte Schriften*, VIII (Berlin, 1913), p. 556.

² Cf., e.g., *factus dec(urio) ex dupl(icario) or sesq(uiuplicario)* in *P. Mich.*, 164.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 65.

⁴ "*Pagani* vocabulum opponitur militi in papyro ita ut apud Tacitum et Plinium aliosque auctores passim"; *op. cit.*, p. 563. Mommsen assumed of course that Candidus was an ordinary recruit, not a centurion.

⁵ A. von Premierstein, *Klio*, III (1903), p. 41. The section of the papyrus containing this entry is a sort of duty roster. The soldier acted as *pagane cultus* on only one of the nine days covered.

paganus in the sense of "civilian" is not only common in writers of all kinds; it is a regular part of the technical language of jurists and others, and is often used precisely where distinctions between "soldiers" and "civilians" are made.⁶ It is found, too, where, as in this papyrus, a change in the status of the same person is involved. Cervidius Scaevola, for example, writes in connection with the privileges of soldiers' wills: *miles si, dum paganus erat, fecerit testamentum. . .*⁷ In a formal military document, one would certainly expect the word to be used with the meaning that is regular in such a context.

Further, one could hardly assume that *paganus* and *pagane cultus* were equivalent in meaning in any context, unless there was good reason to believe so. As often as not, the latter phrase would probably imply, as is true in the only text where it does appear, that the person so described was not actually a *paganus*.

Again, the *pagane cultus*, it will be recalled, was a regularly enrolled legionary. The agents to whom Pliny refers as being in *cultu pagano* were also soldiers (*Ep.*, VII, 25, 6); so too were the others who are similarly described.⁸ One may add that apparently the entire imperial secret police was drawn from the army.⁹ But the date of Candidus' enlistment, as Fink saw, shows quite conclusively that he entered military service only when he became centurion.¹⁰ As a civilian, his previous status consequently was quite unlike that of the *pagane cultus*, and there are

⁶ For a recent summary, see E. Kornemann, *R.-E.*, XVIII, cols. 2296-7, s. v. "Paganus."

⁷ *Dig.*, XXXV, 2, 96; cf. XXIX, 1, 9, 1 (Ulpian): *ut est rescriptum a divo Pio in eo qui, cum esset paganus, fecit testamentum, mox militare coepit*; and XXIX, 1, 38 (Paulus). Many other occurrences of the term will be found in B. Kübler, *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae*, III (Berlin, 1937), p. 475.

⁸ E. g., Tac., *Hist.*, I, 85: *milites sparsi per domos occulto habitu. . .*; Epictetus, *Diss.*, IV, 13, 5: *στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ. . .*

⁹ See O. Hirschfeld, "Die Sicherheitspolizei im römischen Kaiserreich," *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 576-612. For the *frumentarii* see also P. K. Baillie Reynolds, *J. R. S.*, XIII (1923), pp. 180-7.

¹⁰ He was made centurion on April 27. One might argue, if he did not take *paganus* to mean "civilian," that Candidus had enlisted between January 1 and April 26, and had subsequently been promoted. But as he was not transferred from another unit, April 27, the day both of his accession to the cohort and of his appointment as centurion, must also be the day of his enlistment.

really no grounds at all for believing that he had been a member of any sort of police.¹¹

It is, as a matter of fact, the plain if somewhat surprising statement that Candidus was made centurion in this auxiliary cohort directly from civilian status that gives the entry its real interest. Such appointments were apparently quite rare. One may compare, however, the legionary centurions who were appointed directly to the centurionate, often *ex equite Romano*.¹² Unfortunately, there is no evidence for Candidus' claims to preferment, except perhaps his name; the prefect who made him centurion, it will be noted, was also a Sempronius, and it is possible that the two were related or connected in some way.¹³ Again, the papyrus itself gives no clue as to what Candidus' future career might have been. But legionary centurions who began their service at that rank, as is well known, often went on to higher responsibilities,¹⁴ and perhaps Candidus too had prospects of advancement to which most centurions who had risen from the ranks could not aspire.

J. F. GILLIAM.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

¹¹ There were of course civilian police of various kinds, especially in the eastern provinces; see Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 599-612, 613-23; U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, I, 1 (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 411-16; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II (Princeton, 1950), pp. 1514-16, nn. 46, 47.

¹² See A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* (Munich, 1927), pp. 136-67, especially 136-8. No auxiliary centurion is included in his list of those appointed directly to the centurionate. Where the type of unit is known, all are legionary centurions. I know of no collection of the evidence for the *auxilia* comparable to that made by Birley (see n. 14) and others for the legions.

¹³ The importance of patronage and influence in securing appointments during the Empire requires no comment. For one example involving the centurionate, see Pliny, *Ep.*, VI, 25. Candidus' own qualifications, however, may have been sufficient to obtain this post but not one in a legion.

¹⁴ See Dio, LII, 25, 7; and in addition to Stein's work, also H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 277-83; and E. Birley's important study, "The Origins of Legionary Centurions," *Laureae Aquincenses*, II (Budapest, 1941) = *Dissertationes Pannonicae*, II, no. 11, pp. 47-62, especially pp. 60-2.

REVIEWS.

GILBERT HIGHET. *The Classical Tradition, Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature.* New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. xxxviii + 763.

In this substantial, warmly written, and easily read book, Professor Highet conducts us through the centuries of European literature from *Beowulf* to Anouilh and Cocteau, presenting the broad sweep of classical influence, and yet keeping us always or mainly in the presence of concrete literary works and their authors. The volume is primarily a handbook for students, but this basic character is crossed with a strong literary and critical, and propagandist, purpose that gives it a life and an ethos well beyond the nature of a handbook. As a handbook it presents, with conventional periodization, an imposing array of information, generally based (if one reviewer may judge of that) upon the best modern authorities, and set down with a remarkable degree of accuracy. On its important subject no other book exists that is at once so broad in scope and so full of detail; and surely no one can read it without learning much, and learning delightfully. Where Highet's other purposes enter in, in some measure shaping this material, we cannot but have certain reservations; and the book is sometimes too evidently written down to the supposed level of the American undergraduate or college alumnus to whom it seems primarily to be addressed; but the main point is that it unquestionably succeeds in imparting both solid information and legitimate enthusiasm to minds beyond the contracting circle of classical scholars.

The underlying concept is the just and inevitable one that the classical tradition in literature is vital only in works that are vital themselves. With this limiting principle there goes, perhaps not exactly as a deduction, the idea that from the first only works written in the vernacular languages are really alive; classical culture comes home to our business and bosoms only when naturalized in our mother tongue. Accordingly, the whole Latin culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance is left out of direct account, and the early Middle Ages are represented only by Old English literature, with mention of the Carolingian revival in a parenthesis, and the later Middle Ages only by the French romances and Dante. That saves space; does it also imply that, before Dante, the heights and depths of the European spirit were fully reflected in the vernacular literatures? The same principle again saves space by allowing Highet to bring Germany into the picture only with the mid-eighteenth century, and to deny that country any earlier Renaissance. "The sixteenth-century Renaissance did not affect Germany," the Table of Contents roundly states (p. xxix); in Germany there came forward no great vernacular writers but "instead, we find nothing except a few [!] humanists writing Latin—the most distinguished being Ulrich von Hutten [?]"—and some poor vernacular writers, the reason being that "the cultural level of the ordinary public was too low" and

"the class-distinctions of German society kept a gulf fixed between the Latin-reading and writing university men and the outside world" (p. 368). Literature is vital in so far as it keeps in touch with the common people, and an excess of classical culture is as injurious as too little. "Classical culture always produces its finest effects in the modern world when it penetrates to the ordinary people and encourages a Rabelais to teach himself Greek, puts Chapman's Homer in the hands of Keats, or makes Shakespeare enthusiastic over Plutarch" (*ibid.*). In this spirit, an entire chapter is given to Shakespeare's knowledge of the Classics, while Milton is parceled out under Pastoral, Epic, and Drama, and seldom treated with much sympathy; and Classical French tragedy, with "baroque" tragedy in general, is "a comparative failure," largely because addressed to a narrow aristocratic audience. A less extreme view is taken in agreement with Du Bellay (p. 232):

Nationalism narrows culture; extreme classicism desiccates it. To enrich a national culture by bringing into it the strength of a continent-wide and centuries-ripe culture to which it belongs is the best way to make it eternally great. This can be proved both positively and negatively in the Renaissance. It was this synthesis of national and classical elements that produced, in England, Shakespeare's tragedies and the epics of Spenser and Milton. It was the same synthesis in France that, after a period of experiment, produced the lyrics of Ronsard, the satires of Boileau, the dramas not only of Racine and Corneille but of Molière. It was the failure to complete such a synthesis that kept the Germans . . . from producing any great works of literature during the sixteenth century.

In this juster view, Milton and the French tragic writers inevitably revert to their natural eminence, or nearly; for surely Milton and Racine, with more complete assimilation of classical culture, produced finer effects than Keats or Rabelais at least. And the association (here significantly due to Du Bellay) of the growth of Renaissance literature with the rise of national consciousness probably is more historical—though less attractive to the present-day reader—than explanations assuming that French society was more democratic than German in the sixteenth century.

The recognition of a synthesis defines the spirit, but not altogether the method, of the book. Himself seeking to interest a more popular class of readers, Hightet does not adhere with rigor to this principle nor develop its implications. To define the classical tradition in literature as a synthesis is one thing, to define the terms of the synthesis and to carry the ideas so defined through the long dialectic of European intellectual history as reflected in literature is quite another, and not the author's purpose. Otherwise, for example, it would be necessary to include the Latin culture of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance as the matrix of the major ideas and intentions carried over into the vernaculars. It would be necessary to follow the successive literary movements, in France for example, and ask what normative value the Classics had for, say, the rhétoriciens, the school of Marot, the Pléiade, and the school of Malherbe. The history of literary theory would have to be taken into account; also the impact of education. It would be necessary, especially for the six-

teenth century, to find a means of measuring the relative value of popular and humanistic elements, and necessary to note which of the Classics were assimilable in different climates of sensibility, and to what extent. Both sides of the synthesis are compounded and variable. The understanding of antiquity and of individual authors shifts, indeed advances, from age to age, and the literary world follows but seldom is abreast of the advance. Ficino's Plato is not the Plato of Schleiermacher, and even the Platonism of Ficino tends to be reduced by the Renaissance poets to "Platonic love" under the pressure of the courtly love of an older tradition—which itself owed something to an older apprehension of Platonism. Indirect influence and a sort of digestive process, in which the whole "republic of letters" is involved, are essential to assimilation. Doubtless the basic studies are lacking for a firm and connected treatment of some of these essential topics, and to raise the abstract content would very likely lower the concrete content of the book. The author's tact envisages a class of readers who will be more content with a long series of interesting facts and of discussions of individual writers, punctuated by broad and rather unverifiable generalizations about successive historical epochs—social, political, moral, even military in character—from which supposedly the literary phenomena are to be immediately deduced. The intermediate realm of operative causes and occasions—of literary aims, discussions, and schools—is generally passed over; we are presented with results rather than processes, and the material influence of ancient literature is more in evidence than the dynamic influence.

Highet writes less as a scientific historian (of whose attitude he is diffident) or a modern literary critic than as a humanist. That is to say, he allows his authors a considerable degree of freedom from historical and psychological necessity and brings into prominence their personal choices; and he is frequently occupied with the moral content of literature. The stirring Conclusion, though several times promising to return to literary matters, is throughout a sermon on life and conduct. The message of antiquity is, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?—a text which, however, sounds somehow different as paraphrased in Highet's final sentence: "The real duty of man is not to extend his power or multiply his wealth beyond his needs, but to enrich and enjoy his only imperishable possession: his soul." The echo of the Catechism uncomfortably reminds us that neither the Westminster divines nor Plato would have left the real duty of man at that. Nor would Matthew Arnold, "unwilling, pro-pagan Christian" though he be (p. 93)—whose *Hellenism and Hebraism*, as a statement of the "synthesis" upon the moral plane, might well have found mention somewhere in this book. For indeed classical culture has represented a high standard of broad humanity that has guarded religion itself against a narrow and harsh fanaticism, that has fortified the conscience of the West against tyrannies of all kinds, that has upheld the primacy of the intellect and of scientific thought, while providing an antidote to extreme intellectualism by its pervading moral sense; and it has taught literature to rise above the trivialities of the folk-songs and romances of ordinary people to embrace deeper issues in

disciplined forms adequate to the responses of a mature civilization. If Western culture is to retain its values, the Classics can never be just one subject among many or the concern only of specialists—yet that is about where we are. Whatever we may miss in this book in the way of historical nuances, the firm apprehension of this salient point is something to be grateful for.

The limitations of the method, though at the risk of excluding essentials of the subject, enable the author to handle a still enormous material with control and perspicuity. After an Introduction outlining the growth of civilization through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the chapter-headings are as follows: The Dark Ages: English Literature; The Middle Ages: French Literature; Dante; Towards the Renaissance: Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer; The Renaissance: Translation;—Drama;—Epic;—Pastoral and Romance; Rabelais and Montaigne; Shakespeare's Classics; The Renaissance and Afterwards: Lyric Poetry; Transition; The Battle of the Books; A Note on Baroque; Baroque Tragedy; Satire; Baroque Prose; The Time of Revolution; Parnassus and Antichrist; A Century of Scholarship; The Symbolist Poets and James Joyce; The Reinterpretation of the Myths; Conclusion. The main lines are: slow growth ending in the "outburst" of the Renaissance; this outburst checked by the Counter-Reformation and various disturbances, leading to the Baroque period, which is marked by a crisis in the attitude to the Classics (the Battle of the Books), but continues to the revolutionary period; the nineteenth century notable for its knowledge of antiquity, but ending in a decline of classical education; twentieth-century use of the classic myths as symbols for twentieth-century problems.

Though the Battle of the Books is treated as a kind of symbol under which to gather up all opposition at any time to the Classics, there is perhaps a loss of perspective in placing it before the chapters on the baroque authors, inasmuch as, in France, the success of the seventeenth-century writers was the occasion for the Battle and a chief strength of the "moderns." One may wonder whether the term "baroque" has not been stretched well beyond usefulness in recent literary history. Here it is carried pretty far and results in some dubious classifications. Perhaps Calderón (1600-81) is a Renaissance dramatist, while Corneille (1606-84) is a baroque dramatist, but apparently Milton wrote Renaissance epic poems and a baroque tragedy, while Titian somehow goes hand in hand with Tiepolo as a typical baroque painter (pp. 178, 291). There is some chronological confusion also in the account of the "conflicts . . . erupting throughout the early Renaissance" (pp. 178-81), where, among witnesses for the early Renaissance, Tasso, Shakespeare, Donne, Galileo, and Cyrano de Bergerac are clearly misplaced. In a book in which choice must be severe, one finds little to complain of in the omission of authors; and very properly Highet raises his requirements in the most recent period, where he does well to single out "the reinterpretation of the myths" for central attention—especially since with it goes the influence of Greek drama. He keeps close to imaginative literature. Yet one might wish that a little space could have been found for Continental travel-literature after Chateaubriand (Maurice Barrès, *Voyage de Sparte*; Thibaudet,

Les Heures de l'Acropole; Hauptmann, *Griechischer Frühling*) as a significant expression of the *rêve grec*. There are unacknowledged, though necessary, geographical limitations; yet Holberg and Ibsen, for example, might have found a small niche somewhere. The Preface promises to show how Greek and Latin influence has "moulded the literature of Western Europe and America," but, not to think of Latin America, very few American authors are considered; absent from the Index are Emerson, Lowell, Bryant, Hawthorne (though Lew Wallace gets in), E. A. Robinson, and Edgar Lee Masters. (Suggestions here might have been found in John Paul Pritchard's *Return to the Fountains*). Such omissions are, however, relatively unimportant or can be justified; our one legitimate complaint on this score is the absence of a discussion of Molière and the modern comedy of manners. The unfavorable view of baroque tragedy in Chapter 16 seems preparatory to a favorable view of comedy, and the last sentences of the chapter announce the subject. Has a section been excised? The amputation, if such it be, leaves a scar; for of all writers, Molière perhaps best represents the author's ideal of a happy balance between classical influences and the native spirit. La Fontaine too should probably have been included.

In a book on the classical tradition the Renaissance naturally demands a central position. Highet makes it the culmination of his introductory sketch, placing there his remarks on the Revival of Learning, and in the body of the book treats it in a series of chapters on authors and literary species. There is little attempt to understand the Renaissance as an epoch in intellectual history; and from the text of the Introduction and from the references it appears that the author knows of nothing on this subject since J. A. Symonds. Even so, among the topics touched on, humanist education and the humanists themselves need not have been omitted. Indeed, if the decline of classical influence is to be accounted for later on in chapters on the Battle of the Books and a Century of Scholarship, the "outburst" of the Renaissance deserves a chapter on, say, a Century of Humanism to introduce it; and if the failure of latter-day humanist education is emphasized, perspective would be gained by some mention of the success of the "new learning" in the schools of the Renaissance. By such omissions half the meaning of the classicizing movement in the vernacular literatures of the sixteenth century is lost. The *questione della lingua* as a historical actuality does not appear (Bembo, for example, is not mentioned), and except by implication we are not made to see Renaissance literature in its process as a *fond* of older "mediaeval" literary directions yielding to or resisting the conscious efforts at "illustration" by a new classical ideal. The penalty of the handbook method is to make the chapters on authors and literary species exclusive and static. Thus there is no place for the literary dialogue, certainly a chief prose-form of Renaissance literature, and Castiglione, for example, finds no mention. No place is found for Renaissance Platonism (not even Spenser's *Four Hymnes* are noticed), and Platonism as a topic emerges only with Wordsworth and Shelley. The object seems to be to treat literature so far as possible apart from the history of ideas; but this can hardly justify the neglect of Renaissance literary theory,

both Rhetoric and Poetics, which is at the heart of the classical revival. A rapid glance at the *Unities* (pp. 142-3) is not enough. The neglect is little short of disastrous in the chapter on the Renaissance epic poem—the department in which tension between the popular and the classical tradition came to an open crisis in European letters on the question of the *romanzi*, amid which Tasso's *Gerusalemme* was born, and reborn. Instead of entering into this historical situation, so significant for the classical tradition, the author arranges the material on a scheme of his own, rather in the manner of a college essay; differences among the poems apparently reflect only the impulses of the several poets, and the only difference noted between Ariosto and Tasso, for example, is that Tasso introduces Christian doctrine and the Christian supernatural. Even that point had occupied the critics, and had implications. This is certainly not to say that the details of this chapter lack interest; and the descriptive method itself is legitimate and suits the aims of a handbook; but can historical material even be properly seen and described without adequate historical perspective?

It is time to return to the terms of our first paragraph. Such reservations as we have are almost entirely concerned with matters of historical interpretation in the earlier periods. If Highet has sacrificed a certain depth on the side of historical objectivity, he has gained in what is important for his purpose, namely in personal apprehension. He has read widely indeed, and with sensitivity and discrimination; and the judicious control of so much material is the sign of no ordinary mental energy. There are many excellent observations and many excellent pages. I have marked, among others, the passage on Shakespearean and Senecan pessimism (p. 207); that on classical culture as the common ground of Western culture (p. 292); the interesting association of the "curt" or Tacitean style with unorthodoxy and revolt (p. 326); the suggestion that what Byron and Keats lack as poets is what they might have gained from a better knowledge of the Classics (pp. 414, 417); the speculations on why Mommsen did not finish his *History*—more convincing than the suggestions of Collingwood and Toynbee on this topic; the observation of Sir. G. Greenwood, which was new to me, that the opening of Keats' *Ode to a Nightingale* is a direct echo of Horace, *Epod.*, 14, 1-4 (p. 637); and the pages that invite one to read the poems of Carl Spitteler (pp. 528-31).

Reviewers' gleanings are notably small in a book that, though large, shows an admirable control of detail and is cleanly proof-read. A few points, however, seem to call for comment:

P. 1. Modern medicine and music hardly stand apart from the classical tradition in the same degree as do industry and applied science; cf. p. 180. P. 3 (and pp. 11 and 353). The word "savages" gives a false impression of the barbarian invaders of Italy. P. 6. The division of the Empire no doubt ultimately accounts for the line dividing Poland from Russia, but has lived more directly and as fatally (if at the moment less topically) in the line between Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia. P. 16. Barlaam was no "secret agent" of the Eastern Empire; the phrase may represent a hasty reading of Gibbon's "subtle agent." The paragraph on the

recovery of Greek manuscripts should be replaced; Aurispa and Guarino should be mentioned, and Sabbadini not Gibbon [1] used as authority. P. 17. "Lascaris . . . visited the remote monastery of Mount Athos": read "monasteries." How can one touch even lightly upon the recovery of Greek without mentioning Chrysoloras? Coluccio Salutati rather than de' Salutati (also p. 83). Why give space to Byzantine contractions in Greek typography and make no mention of the far more significant humanist Latin script or of *antiqua* type? P. 21. Admirers of the cathedrals may not agree that in the Middle Ages "the sense of beauty" was "hampered and misdirected," to be recovered only in the Renaissance. P. 89. "The characters of the *Decameron* frequently imply contempt for the Christian church": for "church" read "clergy." P. 113. It is hardly correct to say that "almost as rapidly as unknown classical authors were discovered, they . . . were revealed to the public . . . by vernacular translations"; generally speaking, the time-lag was considerable, and significant. P. 114. "Never blotted a line": read "blotted out line." P. 117. The remarks on Amyot are flat, probably because Sturel's masterwork was not consulted. P. 119. French versions of Plutarch's *Moralia* before Amyot are more numerous and more important than the English versions, which alone are cited; Blignières' old but unsuperseded *Essai sur Amyot et les traducteurs français* should have been looked up. P. 151. As often in Milton, there is more in *P. L.*, II, 3 than immediately meets the eye; God's oath is not merely classical but Biblical also (see M. Y. Hughes' ed. *ad loc.*), and the plural "gods" not merely a simple-minded echo of the classical Olympus. P. 155. The paragraph on the invocation of the Muse by modern poets could be bettered; see now E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur*, pp. 233-50. P. 160. The participial titles of Renaissance epic poems, *Orlando innamorato*, *Paradise Lost*, etc., may be not merely *ab-urbe-condita* Latinisms, but borrowed from ancient drama (e. g., *Prometheus Bound*); at least, it is agreed that in continuing the *Innamorato* with *Orlando Furioso* Ariosto took his title from *Hercules Furens*. P. 187. Mlle de Gournay was not literally Montaigne's "adopted daughter." P. 192. The statement that the Theophrastan character-sketch "grew into the modern novel" needs some qualification; cf. p. 340. P. 220. For "My love is like a red red rose / That's sweetly blown in June" read "O, my luve's like a red red rose / That's newly sprung in June." P. 233. The first sentence of the first paragraph needs quotation-marks as a borrowing from Pierre de Nolhac. P. 256. The influence of "the public" requires to be more clearly defined throughout a book that by its intentional limitations constantly raises sociological questions; perhaps Schücking's well-known essay would have been suggestive. If the twentieth-century "public" prefers detective novels to the poetic drama, so, it may be countered, the corresponding "public" in the Renaissance preferred Spanish prose-romances to classicizing tragedies. Pp. 294-5. What is said of Milton's *Samson Agonistes* may be true, but is unsympathetic and onesided; no doubt "there is a subtlety in Sophocles which Milton could scarcely achieve," but the impression is left that Milton lacks subtlety, whereas it is one of his chief qualities. Is there not a subtlety in Milton

that Sophocles could scarcely achieve? P. 395. "Charlotte Corday, before she assassinated Marat, spent the day reading Plutarch." There seems to be no contemporary evidence for this unlikely statement, and the police records are detailed. Certainly the grand-niece of Corneille dramatized herself as a female Brutus, and had read Plutarch, but what she had most in mind, and quotes from in her *Adresse*, was Voltaire's *Mort de César*, then playing to large audiences. P. 397. "In his letter of surrender, Napoleon wrote: 'I throw myself, like Themistocles, upon the mercy of the British people': for Themistocles . . . had . . . thrown himself when exiled upon the mercy of Persia." Napoleon's letter to the Prince Regent was hardly his letter of surrender; he wrote: "Je viens, comme Themistocle, m'asseoir au foyer du peuple britannique"; and this is generally taken to allude to the well-known story (Thuc., I, 136; Plut., *Them.*, 24) of Themistocles as suppliant at the hearth of Admetus king of the Molossians. To compare the British with the Persians would hardly have been tactful—or of good omen for Napoleon himself. P. 400. Virgil, not Vergil, is the name of a village in New York State, and the title of Tennyson's poem (p. 446) is not *To Vergil*. Pp. 489-500. Housman expending intellectual energy upon the text of Juvenal is contrasted unfavorably with Housman on the verge of tears over a poem of Horace. There is doubtless much truth in what is said in these pages about the decline in classical education, and unquestionably more books of an attractive quality, popular in a good sense, should be written on classical subjects; but the whole seems out of focus. Once more, if the rise of humanist education, and its relation to society from the beginning, had been considered, the developments of the last hundred years would have been better understood. It is doubtful if interest in research has been a chief cause of the decline, or if the transplanting to America of Continental methods of scholarship, instead of those of Oxford, has been a bad thing. For a different view of the ogish Continental professor of p. 495, "whose lectures were unintelligible or repulsive to all but his best students," it would be fair to read Professor Spitzer's recent remarks on Meyer-Lübke in *P. M. L. A.*, LXVI (1951), pp. 39-48. (The missionary zeal of foreign scholars is always interesting, and may be helpful, to Americans.) It should be considered whether, given the intellectual climate of recent times, the decline might not have been more rapid if the Classics had taken their stand merely on the aesthetic and moral grounds that Hight stresses, and had not offered able intellects an area for discoveries, great and small, in the early periods of our culture. The evil influence of the natural sciences upon literary scholarship is an unexamined commonplace and probably much exaggerated; it has hardly "been responsible for the fragmentation of classical study" (p. 499), since classical study has advanced on the feet of limited special dissertations since the time of Poliziano and Budé. "Meanwhile, those looking in from outside see no cathedral arising"—the metaphor is hard to interpret. What is required is, if possible, to re-establish a relationship between the Classics and the basic motivations of our age—a relationship that on the whole existed up to the French Revolution. P. 556. The generous Notes (150 pages) begin

here, and are, save perhaps for Chapter 19, conveniently arranged for ready reference. Why do publishers so seldom solve this easy problem? Possibly the student would be better served if the bibliographical references were somewhat increased, with some curtailment of the use of the Notes as an overflow from the text; one would welcome a note bringing together the principal works on Milton and the Classics as is done for Spenser and for Shakespeare. It is doubtful if the student will grasp much of the "point of view of modern scholarship" on Homer from the books listed for the purpose on p. 669. Two old friends, Egger's *Hellénisme en France* and Zielinski's *Our Debt to Antiquity*, seem nowhere to be mentioned. On the value of Cicero and Tacitus to the French revolutionaries (p. 672), it would be well to go beyond the somewhat sketchy remarks of Zielinski's *Cicero* to Aulard's *Eloquence parlementaire pendant la Rév. fr.* Foscolo's line, *Non son che fui; perì di noi gran parte* (p. 680), evidently echoes Horace, *Carm.*, III, 30, 6, as well as IV, 1, 3. G. B. Vico deserves mention in note 6, p. 690; historiography is hardly considered before Bossuet; yet the concept of history distinguishes the heirs of the Greeks from most of the rest of mankind, and until recently historical writing was thought of as literature. Professor M. F. Fisch's Introduction to Vico's *Autobiography* would be suggestive here.

JAMES HUTTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

RENATA VON SCHELIHA. *Patroklos. Gedanken über Homers Dichtung und Gestalten.* Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co. [1943]. Pp. 418. Bound, Fr. 20.

Scheliha is an enthusiastic admirer of Homer and in her well-written book she has done much to communicate her enthusiasm and admiration to the reader. Her book is primarily concerned with two closely related subjects: determining and describing "das Individuell-Homerische," and identifying and analyzing Homer's own modifications of and additions to traditional material. As the statement on the dust wrapper has it, the author presents Homer "als Dichter der Freundschaft und Erzieher zur Humanität." Her book contains many statements which will be questioned even by Homerists who are in sympathy with her general point of view and must therefore be used with caution, but it is an interesting analysis of Homer as a poet and is to be recommended to all those concerned with the literary side of Homeric studies. As in many books on Homer, its main theses are far from established, but the incidental points made along the way are frequently highly attractive.

Scheliha combines with her Unitarianism a willingness to abandon nearly all the portions of the poems regarded with any suspicion by the Alexandrians, even long sections like the *Doloneia* and the *Odyssey* from XXIII, 297 on. Since she finds the position of the chorizontes creates more difficulties than it solves, she accepts the same poet as author of both poems. Her dating of Homer in the eleventh century is earlier than has been fashionable lately, but is

very close to the date arrived at (by completely different methods) in the latest discussion of the subject, W. F. Albright's "Some Oriental Glosses on the Homeric Problem," *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 162-76. Scheliha's reasons for this early date will probably not convince any of those who for reasons she rejects have preferred a later one. Her basic reason is that Homer, she feels, has given such an accurate picture of so much of Mycenaean culture he could not have lived in another cultural epoch. She places much more reliance on the ancient lives of Homer, especially the "Herodotean," than will seem justifiable to many. Although quite often subjective and too uncritical of ancient sources, her discussion of Homer's date is of no little interest.

The account of "Sage und Dichtung zu Homers Zeit" is smoothly written and much of it is sound, but it contains little which is new. Now and then there are flights of fancy: not only are Thamyras, Demodocus, and Phemius conjectured to have been the "Vorbild oder Lehrer" of Homer, but it is suggested that Thamyras was especially significant in the history of pre-Homeric poetry, perhaps introduced a secular content into a poetry hitherto connected with religious cult. The notion that in those passages which Homer introduces by invoking the Muses the content and perhaps even the form go back to older songs has little to recommend it, but it is more than matched by the idea in the footnote that if one assumes Hector and Patroclus are invented characters, this helps to explain *Iliad*, XI, 299 and XVI, 692; in these two passages we have "Selbstbefragung" rather than an invocation of the Muses because Homer is asking about his own inventions and not about traditional material.

With the third and fourth chapters Scheliha really approaches her basic topics; she examines Homer's way of dealing with old saga and with the life around him and then considers the light this examination sheds on his own nature. For evidence on the saga she turns, like many others before her, to the Epic Cycle. She argues that both Homer and the poets of the Cycle got their material in the main from the saga, but that the Cyclic poets were content to take unchanged many cruel and fantastic features which Homer deliberately omitted or modified. Through the Cyclic poets we can sometimes see the material "upon which Homer laid his creative hand." By thus learning something of what lay before Homer, we can also learn how he handled it, what interested him and what did not. The comparison of the old material in the Cycle with the Homeric poems will help to reveal the "Individuell-Homerische." The crucial difficulty with this line of argument, of course, is that it assumes what we do not know at all, that the Cycle, or rather our paltry extant summary of the Cycle, is a valid witness to the content of the pre-Homeric saga, and that we have some magic instrument by which we can separate out the old material. Scheliha makes this assumption especially difficult by separating Homer from the Cycle by three or four centuries, centuries, too, which saw the collapse of Mycenaean civilization and the encroachment upon Greece of her Dark Ages. It is a little as though some contemporary prophecies were borne out, our civilization went down in atomic war and ruin, and then in the year 4000 a critic at the Zambezi Institute for

Advanced Study tried to use a twenty-line summary of Shaw's *Caesar and Cleopatra* as evidence for the material on which Shakespeare laid his creative hand. Scheliha discusses at length a number of features of the Troy Story which Homer omits, modifies (?), or mentions only in passing: the madness of Odysseus, for example, the murder of Palamedes, the rape of Cassandra, the murder of Polyxena. In all of this Scheliha attempts to show how Homer worked steadily to ennoble and humanize his often unseemly material. She is convinced that the civilization Homer describes is the civilization of his own day. But just as in dealing with the data of tradition Homer regularly removed or minimized what was cruel, treacherous, cowardly, magical, or fantastic, so from the life he saw about him he kept and adapted only what suited his idea of man, and presented a civilization uniformly refined, humane, and decorous. This feature of his work is examined in three spheres: warfare, the position of women, the gods. In Homeric warfare, for instance, treachery, poison, even weapons effective from a distance are all more or less eliminated and the fighting is hand to hand and man to man. The great war itself is ennobled by being given an ethical motivation—the sanctity of the relationship of guest and host—instead of being a mere fight for booty. Scheliha's point in these chapters is rather reminiscent of Gilbert Murray's theory of expurgation, but she differs fundamentally from him in making the expurgation the deliberate work of a single great poet and not part of the gradual growth of a traditional book. Her sketch of Homer's motives and procedure is so complimentary to him that lovers of Homer must feel some regret that we do not really know whether anything of this sort went on or not; we keep coming up against the hard fact that we simply do not know to what extent all this chivalry and decency were peculiar to Homer and to what extent they may actually have existed in his world.

The good points in the chapter on Homer's narrative art are frequently marred by some highly improbable subtleties, particularly by a tendency to see cunning connections between parts of the poems widely separated from one another. I cannot believe, for example, that in the *Odyssey* the scene in which Odysseus and Telemachus remove the arms from the hall has been prepared for at the beginning of the poem by having Athena put her spear in the spear-rack, thus reminding us that there are weapons in the hall and making us wonder how under these circumstances Odysseus can possibly destroy the suitors; or that in the *Iliad* Homer had a conscious artistic purpose when he used of Andromache at VI, 389 and at XXII, 460 expressions which are quite like each other.

Chapters VI and VII deal mainly with the subject which is apparently of greatest interest to the author, the characters of the poems who are Homer's original invention. This portion of the book seems to me at once the most skillful in execution and the most misguided in purpose. The discovery of invented characters is particularly important to Scheliha because it contributes so much to the search for the "Individuell-Homerische." A poet who deals with traditional material adds to it new inventions, she argues, because he wants to fashion something which is not in his material,

but which is important to him. If we can separate out the invented characters we can see there better than anywhere else the real Homer, his ideals, loves, and hates, because these characters can be wholly the poet's own. This reason for hunting original inventions in Homer has the advantage of some novelty but not that of validity. Surely, we could just as well get a view of a poet's real nature by examining carefully his methods of dealing with traditional characters, as Scheliha herself recognizes in connection with characters she believes Homer greatly modified. But while one procedure is as good as the other, neither has a great deal of practical value, because on the one hand we do not know what characters Homer invented, and on the other hand the pre-Homeric nature of the traditional characters must be conjectured from Homer himself.

It is vital for Scheliha to begin by demonstrating that certain characters are Homer's own invention, and this she attempts to do. The goal which she has in view here is, I am convinced, a hopeless one, but her treatment of the problem shows some most praiseworthy and welcome innovations. She does not content herself with a series of wild and unsupported dicta as have so many of her predecessors along this well-trodden road. She frankly recognizes that her aim is one of great difficulty, and soberly and soundly describes those difficulties at the outset. She is consistently aware that Homer owed a great deal to tradition, and she does not share the view of so many of her fellow workers in this garden that there is something definitely not respectable about this fact. Many of those who see in Homer a great original inventor treat his indebtedness to tradition rather as we might imagine a Victorian biographer would treat the fact that the subject of his biography was illegitimate. Neither is Scheliha satisfied with the simple syllogism which lies behind so much writing in this field of Homeric studies: All great poets are great original inventors; Homer is a great poet: therefore Homer is a great original inventor. She realizes that, if we are to be able to distinguish invented from traditional characters, we must discover criteria through whose use we can separate one group from the other, and she proceeds to indicate what she considers such criteria should be. All of this represents an adult approach to a problem which has often been treated in a very naive way. I do not believe that her criteria are always sound, and even if they were they would not, I think, be adequate for her purpose, but Scheliha has the great merit of going about the matter in the right way, and if anyone ever does succeed in reaching the goal at which she has aimed he will pretty certainly reach it by the methods she has established.

Scheliha divides the characters of Homer into three groups: 1) Traditional characters already part of the Troy Story (whom Homer may have modified); 2) Traditional characters from other legends whom Homer brought into the Troy Story; 3) Characters whom Homer invented. Here we need concern ourselves only with the class to which Scheliha herself devotes most attention—the invented characters. They can be recognized as follows: no traits are assumed as already known; all their actions are adequately motivated by Homer himself; they play neither in the Troy Story nor in any other saga an indispensable role; their significance works itself out within the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; they have at most a secondary

role in the Cycle; their names and, if they come into question, their origins and ancestors, are invented for precisely these characters. In selecting these criteria Scheliha has obviously been greatly influenced by Scott's attempted proof that Hector is Homer's invention (she expresses admiration for this in her notes, though she is not completely convinced by it), but it is a great help towards clarity to have these tests analyzed and collected as Scott never attempted to do. Stated thus in compact form, the criteria have a certain impressiveness, and I think it would be a fine thing if all those who look for invented characters in Homer would consider them very carefully before making any specific claim. They might have a salutary effect in a negative way by destroying at birth some hopeful visions. They are, however, completely inadequate to demonstrate positively that any character is the invention of Homer. So many of them are so regrettably subjective; Scott showed in his discussion of Hector's epithets what an advocate could do with the first one, for instance. Our vast ignorance removes most of the value from the others. We do not have the early Troy Story or any other early saga; we are dependent in the main on Homer and the summaries of the Cycle. These are not nearly enough to give us reason to believe that we have an adequately full and rounded view of the role or roles of any individual character. Others of the criteria might at most be taken to suggest a relatively late addition to the Troy Story or that a character is not historical but the result of poetical invention. For all of Scheliha's careful and apparently scientific approach we are just about as far as ever from any touchstone which will tell us that a character came from Homer's brain.

Armed with these criteria, Scheliha proceeds to the discussion of a number of characters she is convinced are Homer's invention. Among them are: Thersites, Phoenix, Telemachus, Eumaeus, and, above all, Patroclus, who is given an entire chapter and who provides the title for the book. She does not rigorously apply all of her criteria to the various personages, but usually contents herself with at most one or two. When she does apply them she regularly demonstrates little except the inadequacy of the criteria. In fact, at one point she herself frankly admits that in the last analysis the only reason for her conviction that these characters are the invention of Homer instead of some earlier poets is that they seem peculiarly "Homeric." Here we are obviously in the realms of the purely subjective, and what began as a scientific demonstration has become only a matter of opinion. This is not to say that these chapters are wholly lacking in value. Her analysis of the characters and of Homer's art is often valid and well put. She has, for instance, a fine and vigorous attack on those who hold that in Nestor (whom Scheliha believes Homer transferred to Troy from an old Pylian epos) Homer meant to portray a comical old chattering bore.

After the fashion of this school of searchers after new inventions in Homer, Scheliha gives at times a strangely inconsistent picture of the poet. She believes, for example, that Homer left the names of the Myrmidon leaders out of the Catalogue because he did not want to introduce two new characters, Phoenix and Patroclus, into that traditional passage. This timid worshipper of tradition, unwilling

to make a small addition to one part of the tradition, is elsewhere, however, regarded as a bold disdainer of tradition, who seems to have been more than willing to introduce any number of important new characters or any other new features he chose. If Homer was really as fickle as all this, maybe there was something in Butler's idea about the authoress of the *Odyssey* after all.

Scheliha frequently dwells on the importance which Homer attached to friendship and the emphasis which he gives it in his poems, especially the *Iliad*. Many of her remarks on this topic are worth consideration, but in general, I think, she exaggerates its importance. Neither do I find as much didactic purpose in Homer as she does. "Take my word for it, poor Homer . . . had never such aspiring thoughts." Her pleasant eulogy of Homer as a great poet of friendship ends rather unpleasantly with a discussion of Homer's connection with paederasty in Greece. Although she concludes that Homer did not represent any of his heroes as practising paederasty, she believes that, since his poems stress friendship between men and praise so enthusiastically the beauty of boys, "hat er die griechische Knabenliebe gleichsam inaugurirt" (p. 315). In this connection she might well have considered *Iliad*, XXIV, 130-1.

A good feature of the book is that the author shows far more appreciation and knowledge of works in other languages than most scholars writing in German. At least a third of the works she cites are in languages other than German: Italian, French, and, above all, English (to say nothing of some Latin treatises). The author's familiarity with foreign works on Homer extends even to recent journal articles, for example, those of G. M. Calhoun.

On the physical side the book is handsome and beautifully printed. Nearly all the slips I have noted are probably attributable to the author and not to the printer. Most of these are in the citations from English authors; the most impressive is the reference on p. 389 to Frazer's *Golden Bow*. Incidentally, the statement on p. 346 that Leaf (*Homer and History*, p. 297) thought it possible Homer was born at Pylos is, to say the least, an overstatement of what Leaf really said. The method of footnoting is a curiously ingenious device for tormenting the reader. Not only are the notes in the back of the book instead of where they belong, but there is never any indication in the text that a note exists. The reader must keep turning to the back of the book and laboriously scan the lemmata to see if there are any comments on what he has recently read. The weary reading of a number of contemporary works of scholarship (and the new *Speculum* and *Classical Philology*) makes me suspect that a secret society has been formed on a world-wide basis whose sole purpose is to make footnotes as difficult to consult as possible. I for one wish the members were not such clever inventors.

FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON.

MICHAEL GRANT. *Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius*. New York, American Numismatic Society, 1950. Pp. xviii + 205; 8 pls. \$5.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 116.)

This new product of the prolific Michael Grant's numismatic labors lays all students of Tiberius under a very heavy debt to him. The volume's principal aim is to describe and discuss the Tiberian issues of the *coloniae civium Romanorum* outside the Spanish peninsula—Spanish mintages having been much better collected and studied than the non-Spanish, and the very few issues of *municipia* being treated in an appendix. There are three chapters, a brief conclusion and a dozen appendices.

The first half of chapter one comprises descriptive catalogue with bibliographical matter, etc., of fifty-three coins (though later in the book, p. 138, Grant repeats his doubts about the inclusion of #32), arranged in five geographical categories. The great majority of these coins is also illustrated on the plates. The rest of the chapter discusses their metrology, occasions of issue, signatories and formulas, and the extent of the coinage. Here there appears almost at once an important dictum which recurs repeatedly throughout the book: comparison of Tiberius' principate with that of Augustus must be made, not with Augustus' whole long reign, but with its last sixteen years, the assumption of the title *Pater Patriae* in 2 B. C. marking conveniently the opening of the last period of Augustus' rule. On this just basis of comparison there is no significant contrast between Augustus and Tiberius in the metrology of the colonial mintages, in the founding of colonies and the issue of coins commemorative thereof, in the power of the *quinquennales* over local finance, or in the amount of colonial and municipal coinage. Discussing Tiberius' "policy of gradual encroachment on the Roman cities," Grant interprets with absolute literalness the phrase of Tacitus, *Annals*, IV, 67, *perosus . . . municipia et colonias omniaque in continenti sita*—"hated the Italian colonies and *municipia* in later life." But the context in Tacitus is of course Tiberius' reluctance to leave Capri for the mainland, and surely *perosus* is no more than Tacitean rhetorical exaggeration. Nor does Grant's case require this very dubious support.

The author disputes, on grounds which are to this reviewer entirely convincing, Mattingly's view that local coinage in Africa, Gaul, and Spain was markedly restricted in consequence of the revolts of Sacrovir and Tacfarinas. Rejected also (appendix 8) is Mattingly's corollary theory that the "altar" coinage was suppressed after Sacrovir's revolt.

Chapter two discusses the names and titles of Tiberius; Tiberius and the proconsuls of Africa; Mars, Victoria, Felicitas; Pax Perpetua; and old and new types. Tiberius' official titulatures, Tiberius Caesar Augustus, Tiberius Caesar Divi Aug. f. Augustus and Tiberius Caesar, are linked "not with *imperium*, or for the most part with any formal *potestas*, but with that range of conceptions lying outside the scope of such formal powers and conveniently comprised within the term *auctoritas*" (p. 41, and cf. his *From Imperium to Auctoritas*). From significant comparison of these with

Caesar Augustus Divi f. Pater Patriae in regard to prenominal, gentile, and cognominal positions, Grant concludes that Tiberius was "unwilling to model himself so closely on [Augustus] as to suggest comparison or rivalry" (p. 50). He draws a very illuminating parallel between African (and Sicilian?) and Asian issues of c. A. D. 21 honoring proconsuls who were *amici Tiberii*, and African and Asian issues of 7 B. C. honoring proconsuls who were *amici Augusti*; both occasions are related to rearrangements of the dynastic succession. And, discussing auspices and *imperium*, Grant concludes "that under Tiberius as under Augustus our proconsuls of Africa . . . were subordinate to his auspices; but that these auspices, in relation to that province, were thought of as linked not with *imperium* but with the religious conceptions embodied in the words 'Augustus' and *auctoritas*" (p. 72). Insisting on his own military preeminence and his inheritance from Augustus, Tiberius emphasized Mars and Victoria and Felicitas. In note 280 on p. 77 for *Ann.* 6.34 read, apparently, 6.32; and to the references there 2.64 and 3.47 might be added. Especially interesting is discussion of "the little known *aes* piece, apparently a medallion" possibly depicting the Ara Pacis, with legend PACE AVG PERP. This legend, both in its ablative case and in the employment of the epithet *Perpetua*, forecast much later developments in the official coinage. Incidental to the discussion is a differentiation of *perpetua* and *aeterna*. In the former "the suggestion is that this peace needs to be worked for and will not come with the inevitability of fate. Such a conception is consistent with the sober and laborious spirit of Tiberius' rule, and deserves to rank with *Moderatio* as one of its peculiar catch-words" (p. 86). Other legends, DEO AVGVSTO, PROVIDENTIAE AVGVSTI (spelled out in full), GENETRIX ORBIS (of Livia), and IVNCTIO (of Germanicus and Drusus) have only much later parallels or none at all.

The title "Imperator Perpetuus" (*I. L. S.*, 121) of Tiberius shows up in note 67 on page 48 and then in the text on page 86, with citation of Hammond, Charlesworth (news of whose most untimely death comes as this is being written), Guey, and Momigliano. Now Dessau warned that the *perpetuus* should be taken with the preceding *sacerdos* and *flamen*, not with *imperator*. Hammond repeated that warning; Charlesworth ignored it. Guey, remarking that *imperator perpetuus* had lost the meagre support of Florus, II, 34, where editors now read *dictator perpetuus*, reverted to Wilmanns (*ap.* Mommsen, *C. I. L.*, X, p. 774) and understood *im perpetuum*, comparing the frequent *im pace*. This Momigliano warned is conjectural, though to the present writer very attractive. But what all these scholars pass over very lightly is that IMP PERP is engraved in an erasure where there remains no trace whatever of the original phrasing. Therefore the words post-date the rest of the inscription and, however one chooses to interpret them, they stubbornly remain irrelevant to Tiberius' titulature.

Chapter three treats of the family of Tiberius; the Gens Iulia; the younger Julio-Claudians; Divus Augustus; and most importantly Julia Augusta. She is discussed as Goddess (Ceres, Juno, and Genetrix Orbis), as "Virtue" (Pietas) and as Priestess. It was on

this last formula, Grant shows, that Tiberius founded his attempted solution (not to be sure entirely successful) of the problem presented by her formidable position in the State, for which naturally no Augustan precedent was available. Tiberius found a *Roman* solution in Republican coins honoring the Vestal Virgins. Grant has very salutary remarks on her position: that she was not co-ruler; that she had no *imperium*; that she inherited less of Augustus' *auctoritas* than did Tiberius; that she could not exercise it as he could through the senate by *tribunicia potestas*.

The great interest of the summary "Conclusion" may be hinted by quoting two sentences. "Thus, if in one sense A. D. 37 marked the end of an era, it is equally true to say that, despite the wishes of the new *princeps*, A. D. 14 marked the beginning of one." "DEO AVGVSTO and GENETRIX ORBIS, on the coinage of Spanish colonies, show respectively the repercussions, ominous for the future, of the embarrassing greatness of Tiberius' predecessor and his no less embarrassing will."

The appendices discuss in some detail matters or problems touched more lightly in the text. Grant now considers that of the crocodile series from Nemausus (cf. *From Imperium to Auctoritas*) the first issue is local, the main Augustan and Neronian issues are official, and some of the Gaian and Claudian are medallie (p. 135, n. 4). One wonders why AVG or A on Utican coins with duoviral names is interpreted as Augustalis or [duovir] Augusti, when the apposite note remarks "one specimen is now seen to read *Augur*" (pp. 139 f.). There is a fifteen-page bibliography, two pages of addenda, nine of indices (persons, places, and general) and a five-page key to the plates.

In notes 79 on page 27, 88 on page 28, and 23 on page 151, for "Rogers" read "Smith." Other *errata*, not very numerous, are not likely to trouble the reader.

This reviewer makes urgent protest against the form of cross-reference which the author employs, i. e., cf. such and such chapter, section, sub-section. This is a plague upon the reader, who must in each case refer to the table of contents, scan it for the page on which the cited sub-section commences, and then turn through the pages of the sub-section until he comes upon the relevant passage. Let us have cross-references by page.

But these criticisms and objections, which bulk large in a review's proportions, are of very minor moment in relation to the book itself. The work is highly illuminating and importantly valuable to our present knowledge and further study of Tiberius.

ROBERT SAMUEL ROGERS.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

M. SCHUSTER, ed. *Catulli Veronensis Liber*. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1949. Pp. xiv + 153.

This new edition of Catullus in the enlarged Teubner format comes from the hands of a competent scholar to whom we are indebted for the learned article on the poet in *R.-E.*, s. v. *Valerius Catullus* (1948), cols. 2353-2410. Through sagacious exploitation of the fruits of other scholars' studies and through judicious avoidance of the recklessness of some of his predecessors Schuster has succeeded in producing a text which is, on the whole, both conservative and sensible. It might be said that the editor shows the mediocrity of little originality, for he has prudently resisted the temptation to introduce even a single *scripsi* (he does allow himself one *delevi* on 55, 14—unnecessarily; see the commentaries of Ellis and Lenchantin *ad loc.*). But this self-restraint in the now traditional cruces of the text may in most cases be well considered a virtue, especially since, except for sure corrections, guesses are best relegated to the *apparatus criticus* or the other usual depositories. Schuster himself refers to a discussion on many of the readings in this edition to be found in his article "Marginalien zu einer neuen Ausgabe Catullus," *Wien. Stud.*, LXIV (1950), a work not accessible to me at the time of writing. Of course, it is also safer, though not always wiser, to use emendations proposed by others, and in one poem, at least, I shall have occasion to show that Schuster was definitely misguided in his choice of ingenious emendation (on 66, 54 and 77-8).

In the *praefatio* the more important manuscripts are very briefly described, but on this subject Schuster adds nothing to what has already been said by his predecessors. Differing with Morgenthaler he feels inclined to agree with Hale that O (Oxonienensis) is derived directly from V (the now lost Veronensis), though he gives no reasons for his stated preference. On the other hand, and quite rightly surely, he rejects with Morgenthaler Hale's thesis that r (Romanus) is a twin to G (Sangermanensis) and that the *deteriores* are derived principally from the former. The editor timidly refrains from presenting a stemma of his own, but citing Rubenbauer, who is actually repeating the words of W. G. Hale in *T. A. P. A.*, LIII (1922), pp. 107 and 112, he expresses the belief that the sources and relationship of the *deteriores* constitute a much more complicated problem than earlier editors have allowed and that cross-currents represent an important factor in their tradition.

It is regrettable that Schuster, instead of contenting himself merely with these generalizations, did not elaborate on the subject, especially since in his *apparatus criticus* (for the sake of clarity and economy, no doubt) the variants of the *deteriores* are only irregularly reported and consequently no satisfactory picture of the situation can be constructed. In fact, a complaint may justifiably be made that Schuster's tidy *apparatus*, which contains really only a selection of readings given in the editions of Schwabe, Ellis, and Schulze, often fails to reveal the peculiar characteristics of even the two main codices, O and G. While there is no need to clutter up an *apparatus* with the familiar orthographical variants of mediaeval

flavor, still the rules which an editor chooses to follow should be stated and consistently adhered to. This Schuster does not do. For example, on 5, 10 he reports the reading *millia* in G, but from his silence in 16, 12; 41, 2; 48, 3; 66, 78 the trusting soul might be led or rather misled to assume that in those places G offers *milia*. The editor also rather arbitrarily omits obvious errors of the type which should be listed to assist the interested reader in reconstructing for himself the archetype V on the basis of the readings of O and G. Thus, for example, we miss the variant of O in 4, 7 (*insula vegeladas*), that of V in 7, 1 (*quod*), albeit he reports it in 24, 2, the corrected transposition of G in 15, 2 (*pudentem peto*), the omission of G in 21, 5 (*nam*, later superscribed), the variant of O in 39, 20 (*expolitor*), that of G in 61, 200 (*rememorare*), that of G in 100, 6 (*perfecta est exigitur est*), where the reading of O (*perfecta est igitur est*) is incorrectly ascribed to V. Similar variants of T (Thuanus) in 62 are wanting, as, for example, *avelle* in line 22, *vir* in line 28, *carpiunt* in line 37. These few instances of many such omissions should serve to indicate, if nothing else, the fact that this new edition by no means renders obsolete the older critical works of Schwabe, Ellis, and Schulze or more recent ones such as the very respectable critical text by E. Cazzaniga (*Catulli Veronensis Liber* [Turin, Paravia, 1945]). Of this last work Schuster seems to have been unaware.

As for the constitution of the text itself the readings adopted are by and large satisfactory. In some instances a critic might disagree with the editor in the choice he makes where different but equally supported lections are found or where to remedy obvious corruptions various emendations have been proposed. However, I see no cogent reason to admit in 2, 7 the *ut* of Pisanus in place of the *et* of V. The apparent difficulty in the syntax is due to the following *solacium*. Many refined explanations have been offered by various commentators, but Lenchantin is doubtless right when he considers this word coordinate with *kanum* in line 6, which is the internal object of *iocari*. The construction may be difficult, but it is not impossible. In 65, 12, where V offers the puzzling *tegam*, Schuster receives into the text the reading *canum* of the Datanus (and Riccard. 606). The explanations given for *tegam* by its defenders (cf. the commentaries of Ellis and Lenchantin *ad hoc*) are scarcely more convincing than Munro's attempt to show how an original *canam* was corrupted into *tegam*. If some change is necessary, the simplest solution by far, it would seem, is to read *legam*, a correction of the *Itali*. It adequately supplies the sense required, closely approximates the reading of V, and explains how the variant *canam* might have arisen as a gloss.

On the basis of new papyrus evidence which apparently was not accessible to Schuster we know now that in 66 the healing hand was at least twice applied though the disease lay not in the text but in the mind. The reading in line 54 (*alis equos* V) has been a perpetual source of embarrassment to editors and commentators alike. When a fragment of Callimachus' *Coma Berenices* was published by G. Vitelli in *Pap. Soc. It.*, 1092, it became clear from the phrase $\theta\eta\lambda\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\eta\tau\eta\varsigma$ that the horse of Catullus referred to a wind. But since

winds were usually regarded as horsemen rather than horses (cf. A. E. Housman, *C. R.*, XLIII [1929], p. 168; R. Pfeiffer, *Philol.*, LXXXVII [1932], pp. 197-201), it was felt that the *equos* of the text must be returned to the barn. Schuster, accordingly, followed Bickel (*Rh. Mus.*, XC [1941], pp. 112-15) in corrupting *alis equos* into *alitebos*, which, we are informed, stands for the vernacular *halitibus*. However, in *P. Oxy. ined. C*, fr. 1 *recto* another fragment of the same passage is found. It supplies a very crucial lacuna of the previous fragment and shows beyond all reasonable doubt that Callimachus too referred to the wind as a horse (ἵππο[ς]). For details on this new fragment and its relationship to the text of Catullus reference should be made to R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus*, I, *Fragmenta* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1949), pp. 116 ff. Thus the *textus receptus* can stand with only the slight change of *alis* to *ales*, as already found in the Datanus. Bentley's correction *Locridos* in this same verse for the manuscript *elocridicos* is confirmed by the reading of the new papyrus.

In 66, 77-8 Schuster was again unfortunately dazzled by the brilliance of unnecessary emendation. The manuscripts read:

quicum ego dum virgo quondam fuit omnibus expers
unguentis una milia (millia G) multa bibi.

However this sentence is to be punctuated, the difficult word is *milia*. Instead of concentrating on the root of the problem, Schuster appropriates the emendations of Eschenburg and Bickel (*Rh. Mus.*, XC [1941], pp. 136-146) and presents the following text:

quicum ego, dum virgo quondam fuit Hymenis expers,
unguenti euatum milia multa bibi.

Fortunately there is no longer need to go to such extremes. In *P. Oxy. ined. C*, fr. 1 *verso* we find the Greek verses corresponding to this passage (cf. R. Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 120):

ἦς ἄπο, παρ[θ]ενίη μὲν ὅτ' ἦν ἔτι, πολλὰ πέρ' ἐπωκα
λιτῆρά, γυναικείων δ' οὐκ ἀπέλαυσα μύρων.

It should be added that the antecedent of ἦς in the Greek is κορυφῆς. Thus Lobel, by making the simple change of *milia* to *vilia* on the basis of the Greek λιτά, restores tolerable sense to the two lines. Pfeiffer is doubtless right in placing a comma before *omnibus* and after *unguentis* with *expers* understood to agree with *ego*, in view of the Greek γυναικείων . . . μύρων, though Maas, cited by Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 502, would delete the comma before *omnibus*. Maas' explanation of *quicum* . . . *una* as standing for *cum quo* (sc. *vertice*) *una* must be correct. Those who are still troubled with *omnibus*, which Pfeiffer feels should correspond to γυναικείων, will find themselves in good company.

Apart from the text which, except for a few such aberrations, is reasonably satisfactory, a virtuous feature of this new edition is the set of references on every page between the text of the poems and the *apparatus criticus*. Here attention is directed not only to testimonia and parallel passages in Greek and Latin literature illustrating similar usage and thought but also to scholarly works

which are concerned with a particular poem or a part of it. Such references can, of course, represent only a selection of material available, but they should nevertheless prove helpful to the student of Catullus. The conscientious critic, I suppose, might be tempted to deplore the omission of many important parallels or learned articles and to add several recondite references of his own harvest, but that would be sheer pedantry. Worthy of mention also are the *index metricus*, in which the meters and prosody of Catullus are discussed, and especially the *index verborum et locutionum*, in which verbal, grammatical, and rhetorical peculiarities of Catullian usage are conveniently collected and arranged in alphabetical order. The brief geographical, historical, and biographical notices and pertinent references to special studies incorporated in the *index nominum* at the end of the book are not without their merit.

In conclusion, it may be said that though this edition of Catullus represents no great milestone in the history of Catullian scholarship, still for its several virtues and careful execution (typographical errors are few and far between) it would be a safe investment for the Classical student who wants to have a Teubner of his own.

PHILIP LEVINE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, edited with translations and notes by E. LOBEL, E. P. WEGENER, C. H. ROBERTS, and H. I. BELL. Part XIX. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1948. Pp. xvi + 180; 13 plates.

The preface of part XVIII of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* declared that part XIX was "designed to contain among other things much more Alcaeus and Sappho." This promise was not kept, although the copy was ready, for the excellent reason that Professor Pfeiffer had progressed so far in his work on the Clarendon Press edition of Callimachus that "it seemed proper to postpone everything else to the making available to him of *all* of this author that could be found among the Oxyrrhynchus fragments." Accordingly most of the literary part of this volume consists of Callimachus fragments and some scraps of Euphorion and Nicander bearing upon Callimachus. Seven, possibly eight, of the papyri contain material from the *Aetia*, two add scraps of the *Iambi*, two belong to the *Hecale*, and two to the *Hymns*. The general editor of the volume is Mr. H. I. Bell; the papyri connected with Callimachus were edited by Mr. E. Lobel, and the documentary papyri, prepared by Miss E. P. Wegener under the supervision of Mr. C. H. Roberts, were finally checked by Mr. Bell. A valuable and comprehensive set of indices completes the volume.

Pap. 2208, frag. 1 [2].¹ Parts of ten lines from the passage

¹ Numbers in square brackets give the number of the pertinent fragment in *Callimachus*, ed. Pfeiffer (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949). The abbreviation Pf. refers to Pfeiffer's *Callimachi fragmenta nuper reperta* (Bonn, 1923).

between the "Telchines" Prologue to the *Aetia* and the first *aition* show that in his description of the dream in which the Muses appeared to him Callimachus obviously recalled Hesiod's prologue to the *Theogony*.

Pap. 2208, frag. 2 [113]. The suggestion of Lobel that *εὔρυ* (lines 4 and 9) formed part of a name has led Pfeiffer to recognize this scrap as part of the Ciris story, which may have occurred in Book I.

Pap. 2208, frag. 3 [114]. From the cooperative efforts of Lobel and Pfeiffer it is clear that we have here the remains of a dialogue between the poet and the statue of Apollo at Delos made by Angelion and Tectaeus. This dialogue technique recalls Iambus IX, which consists of a dialogue between an ithyphallic herm and a lover (cf. *Y. C. S.*, XI [1950], pp. 91 ff.). The *aition* probably belongs to Book III.

Pap. 2209A [21]. The second *aition* of Book I, to which this papyrus belongs, discussed two rituals at Anaphe and Lindus, both marked by raillery. The combination of similar stories is found also in Iambus X (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 96 ff.). But here Callimachus goes even farther; in describing the rites at Anaphe he apparently makes reference to mockery in the rites of Demeter, and in the Lindus *aition* he introduces the encounter of Heracles and Thiodamas, source of yet another sacrifice accompanied by mockery. We note, too, that whatever differences may or may not have arisen between Apollonius Rhodius and Callimachus, in the Anaphe incident, at least, Apollonius followed the steps of his master closely. It is possible that the same is true of the account of the subsequent stop at Aegina, described by Callimachus in Iambus VIII (*Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 84 ff.).

Reconsideration of this fragment and other fragments dealing with the arrival of the Argonauts at Anaphe shows how precarious it is to arrange any fragmentary Callimachean narrative on a strictly chronological basis. We can now see, for instance, that some kind of catalogue of the heroes was introduced at this penultimate stage of their journey and that some of the events at the start of the journey were recalled here—an instance of the "flash-back" technique which Callimachus apparently also used in the *Hecale*.

Pap. 2209B [118: possibly from Book I]. Lobel shows that some building operation is described; Pfeiffer further suggests that two temples are mentioned, one built *ex tempore*, the other by skilled architects. A similar contrast of the crude and the artistic is perhaps found in the accounts of two statues of Hera at Samos in two successive *aitia* of Book IV [100, 101].

Pap. 2210. Twenty-four unhappy scraps, only two of which can be identified with known Callimachean material. Frag. 1 [119] forms part of frag. 465 Schn., and frag. 16 [43] belongs to the account of Sicilian cities in Book II. All 24 fragments may belong to this book.

Pap. 2211 provides further evidence that neither Book III nor Book IV of the *Aetia* was "one continuous song," but separate pieces merely juxtaposed (cf. *Y. C. S.*, XI, pp. 144 ff.). The verso of frag. 1 contains an *aition* explaining the exclusion of unmarried Attic girls from certain rites of Demeter [63]. It is followed immediately by an account of Simonides' tomb and its destruction given by the dead man himself [64]; for a similar technique, suggesting expansion

of a sepulchral epigram, cf. Iambus XI (Y. C. S., XI, pp. 101 ff.). After the loss of some lines at the bottom of 2211 verso, the recto continues with the end of a poem dealing with the four Argive springs [66]. Immediately, with a coronis to mark the start of the poem, there begins the well-known Acontius and Cydippe *aition* [67]. The variations in length and tempo and the sudden transitions clearly advocate discretion in the reconstruction of Callimachean material. Fragment 2 verso can be combined with 2208, frag. 3 and 2212, frag. 19 to form part of the account of the statue of Apollo at Delos (see above, p. 100); there are also indications of some unrecognizable Thracian story [114]. The recto, combined with P. Oxy. 2167, frag. 5, deals with an unknown Onnes [115].

Pap. 2212 consists of 30 scraps which probably belong to the end of Book III of the *Aetia* or to the start of Book IV. Verse 1 of the last *aition* in Book III (Euthycles of Locri) can be recognized in frag. 1b [84]. Part of the story of Heracles and Molorchus, also from Book III (P. Oxy. 2169) is found in frag. 18 [59], and Pfeiffer has subsequently combined fragments 2, 4, and 5 as remnants of the love story of Phrygius and Pieria [80], which must have immediately preceded the Euthycles *aition*—an extraordinary example of what can be accomplished by careful study of the scraps.

Pap. 2213. Most of the 25 fragments belonging to this papyrus look unpromising, but with Lobel's assistance Pfeiffer has assigned fragments 1, 9, and 17 to the Phrygius and Pieria story of Book III [80-82], and shown that in frag. 2 we have bits of the end of an *aition* concerning Elis and the start of another about Isindus [77a. 78]. Frag. 8 contains 16 mutilated lines of the Euthycles *aition* [85], and frag. 11—30 letters in nine lines!—was recognized by Lobel as part of the Acontius story. A most important contribution is that of a single letter in frag. 25 (Addenda, p. 145): this scrap, which belongs to the right side of frag. 1, bears the number ξ and indicates that somewhere in the Euthycles *aition*, last in Book III, the book reached a length of 1,000 lines. Lobel knows of "no other direct evidence about the length of any book of the work."

Pap. 2214 is a comparatively large fragment of 30 mutilated lines. Its Callimachean origin is attested by coincidence with known Callimachean citations, and it may be assigned with reasonable probability to the *Aetia* [186]. Most of what is preserved refers to the gifts sent to Delos by the Hyperboreans.

Pap. 2215, frag. 1, partly fills the gap in the middle of Iambus I as preserved in P. Oxy. 1011 (Y. C. S., XI, pp. 32 ff.). The length of the poem is now determined at 39 verses, and a suggestion previously made that the poem contained the complaint of a poor poet-lover, rejected for a richer rival, is fully confirmed (cf. A. J. P., LXVII [1946], pp. 1-15). Lobel, in one of his rare lapses into literary criticism, comments on this fact, but also confesses an unjustified, and surely misplaced, surprise at the fact that a stichic poem has an odd number of verses. Fragment 2 comes from the early part of Iambus IV.

Pap. 2218, a scrap which is clearly the beginning of a trochaic poem dealing with Artemis and Crete, is included with due caution because of the possibility that it is the beginning of Iambus XII

(Y. C. S., XI, pp. 107 ff.). There can be no doubt about the identification.

Pap. 2216 [238] and Pap. 2217 [260] preserve fragments of the *Hecale*. On the recto of the former there are remains of an address by one character to another (Theseus to Aegeus? Aegeus to Aethra?), on the verso are parts of the description of a storm (mentioned in the *Diegeseis*). Unfortunately we gain no knowledge of the poem's general arrangement, since the relative order of recto and verso cannot be determined. The other papyrus contains the beginning of the crow's prophecy about the punishment of the raven which brought bad news to Apollo. But "no light is thrown on why and how the crow and her auditor were introduced into the narrative or who her auditor is."

Pap. 2225 offers parts of verses 11-243 of Callimachus, *Hymn IV*, often very scrappy, but more nearly complete in verses 158-212. We learn nothing, however, about the defective ends of 177-8 and gain only the beginnings of 200-201. Moreover, in place of 177 we find traces of two entirely unknown verses, while 83 and 189 are replaced by fragmentary lines which suggest no improvement. Some variations may be careless errors, others confirm happy emendations. In general the papyrus raises more problems than it solves.

Pap. 2226 disturbs the hitherto stable text of Callimachus, *Hymn VI* by omitting verses 118-137 and adding at least one verse after 138. Lobel sees no means of resolving this problem. But it should be noticed that 116-17 and 138 make a satisfactory, if somewhat abrupt, closing appeal by the poet for Demeter's favor.

Pap. 2219 and Pap. 2220 possibly contain fragments of the *Dionysus*, the *Hesiodus*, and the *Chiliades* of Euphorion. They do not further our knowledge of the poet, but suggest that certain fragments often associated with Callimachus are wrongly attributed: Callimachus, frag. 36 Pf. is found in 2220, and frag. an. 110 Schn. may be included in 2219.

Pap. 2221, part of a commentary on Nicander, *Theriaca* 377-95, possibly by Theon, includes a new quotation from Callimachus, Iambus IX (Y. C. S., XI, pp. 91 ff.), as well as quotations from other authors. The text of Nicander presupposed by this commentary is about one thousand years older than ms. II.

Pap. 2223 and Pap. 2224, verses from Euripides' *Bacchae* (1070-1136) and *Hippolytus* (579-604), are edited by Roberts. The former papyrus was available to Dodds when he published his edition of the *Bacchae*, and Roberts is content to quote his estimate of the text: the fragment comes from a careless copy of a text far better than our sole complete manuscript of the *Bacchae*. It is of some interest that the papyrus confirms no less than 13 modern corrections. There is evidence of an entirely new line between 1104 and 1105; verses 1091 and 1092 are omitted, rightly in Dodds' opinion, though 1092 seems much less questionable than 1091. Verse 1074 is also omitted, but no comment is made by the editors—somewhat surprisingly, since verse 1073 has been suspected and could be dispensed with, whereas 1074 seems necessary as an expansion of the metaphorical ἀναχαίρειε of 1072. The chief interest in the second papyrus, I think, lies in the use of *ἰάν* in verse 585 (*ἰαχάν*

codd., ἀχάν edd., ἰωάν schol.); the ἀχάν of our modern texts shows how successive corrections leave the original farther behind.

Pap. 2222 (first century after Christ) is part of a chronological list of the Ptolemaic kings; its presence among the literary papyri seems rather incongruous. The chronicle is valuable in clearing up a few undetermined points, if the scribe can be considered reliable. We learn that Ptolemy Neos Philopator did succeed his father before he was executed by Euergetes II; that Alexander II, whose exact age was unknown, reigned 15 days with Berenice and was killed at the age of 11; that Ptolemy XI Auletes was in exile for two rather than three years and died at the age of 42. An interesting feature is the chronicler's reluctance to include women in the list of rulers: Berenice, who ruled briefly with Alexander II, is apparently not mentioned, and there is no reference to the interregnum of Cleopatra Tryphaena and Berenice IV.

The bulk of the Callimachean papyri belongs to the second century after Christ; two come from the third and fourth centuries. The Nicander and Euphorion fragments are probably from the first century, and Pap. 2214 was written *circa* 10 B. C. Pap. 2211 and Pap. 2216 are third century codices.

The documentary papyri are presented in five groups: letters from officials, declarations to officials, petitions, contracts, and accounts.

In the first group we find a mutilated letter from a prefect (?) to a strategus (Pap. 2227: A. D. 215-16), attesting the existence of a *πολέμαρχος*, a magistrate hitherto unknown in Egypt; an order for the delivery of a prisoner (Pap. 2229: A. D. 346-50); and part of a copy of a strategus' correspondence (Pap. 2228: A. D. 283?). Parts of seven letters are preserved in the last document, the sixth and seventh almost completely. The papyrus is remarkable palaeographically, since it is written in six different hands, for which at least two and perhaps five clerks are responsible; and the sixth letter, an order for the delivery of mules, is interesting, since it is clear that there was some dispute between the government and the senators, who, for personal reasons, were anxious to set the price as high as possible. The price indicates a period of inflation.

The second group consists of a declaration by the guild of cloth-dealers in Heracleopolis that they have valued 200 military blankets, delivered them, and received payment (Pap. 2230: A. D. 119); a nomination of two men to the offices of collector of chaff and collector of meat (Pap. 2232: A. D. 316); the beginning of a report by some irenarchs who had been ordered to investigate an attack by people from the village of Tychinphagi upon a neighboring hamlet (Pap. 2233: A. D. 350); and a statement by Aurelia Thermuthion that she is the legal heir of her daughter, who died intestate, and that she is providing a claim, in duplicate, to a deed of succession (Pap. 2231: A. D. 241). This document is the first instance of a *παράθεσις* of succession.

Two petitions are included in the volume. Pap. 2234 (A. D. 31) is an appeal by one Hermon for redress and protection against some fishermen who were violating the fishing rights of the property on which he paid taxes. In Pap. 2235 (A. D. 346) Aurelius Horus

presents a petition on behalf of his grandchildren against the scribe of Terythis, who was trying to levy taxes on their property, although it was not within his jurisdiction. Here is an illustration of the illegal expedients which officials had to adopt to try to reach their tax quotas.

Three of the contracts are simple and straightforward. Pap. 2236 (early third century after Christ) deals with the sale of half of a house; Pap. 2237 (A. D. 498) is an acknowledgment of a loan; and in Pap. 2238 (A. D. 551), a deed of surety, three people guarantee the return by one Onnophris of some gold stolen by him and undertake to produce him whenever required. More significant is Pap. 2239 (A. D. 598), an overseer's contract, which supplies evidence on the functions of the ἐπικείμενος and on the salary of such an employee, and shows that it was accepted practice for the overseer to increase his income through perquisites. The contract is unusual in that no term of appointment is given, whereas elsewhere contracts are valid only for one year. One might assume that this meant that the contract was a renewal, but the reference to an εἰσβατικόν, the entrance fee, makes this improbable.

The remaining documents are mostly financial accounts. Pap. 2240 (A. D. 211) preserves columns 15 and 16 of the accounts of a large estate, giving a list of arrears owed to the landlord, then the expenses; the account was apparently checked later. On the back of this papyrus is a list of rents in wheat (Pap. 2242: third century after Christ); the rents were presumably paid only on naturally irrigated land; for instance, in one area of 15 arourae rent was owed only on $1\frac{7}{8}$ arourae; the rest of the land was probably not reached by Nile waters. Pap. 2241 (A. D. 283-4) is part of another list of rents in money and kind from State lands; the entries are κατ' ἄνδρα. Here, as in Pap. 2241, the arithmetic is frequently incomprehensible. From some of the well-known Apion family estates comes an account of receipts and expenditures (Pap. 2243a: A. D. 590). This account resembles other documents of the Apion family (cf. Pap. 1911, 1912, and 2195, from 557 and 576 A. D.) and provides "a remarkable proof of the strength of tradition" in management. The back of column I contains a brief, casual list of documents belonging to the same family. The last papyrus (Pap. 2244: sixth-seventh century after Christ) is an account of axles supplied for water-wheels. The various entries mention the γεωργός, his locality, the μηχανή concerned, and the number of axles supplied. Sometimes there is added the date of issue and the source of supply. Receipts for axles or spare parts have been occasionally published before, but there has been no list so comprehensive as this papyrus.

Most of the documentary papyri are translated, a valuable help to those less well acquainted with the technicalities of Hellenistic Greek. Practically no help of this sort is given for the literary papyri, and the notes are far from copious. It is to be regretted that Lobel clings so closely to his austere concept of the duty of a papyrologist. Those who have come to know Lobel's wide knowledge of Greek literature and his critical sense will not believe that this reticence is "to be accounted for by the limits of the editor's com-

petence" (*P. Oxy.*, XVIII, p. vi). This is, perhaps, the complaint of an indolent reader. It cannot invalidate the achievement of the editors of the XIXth part of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*; the book is a worthy member of a series of great volumes.

CHRISTOPHER M. DAWSON.

YALE UNIVERSITY

A. A. VASILIEV. Justin the First. An Introduction to the Epoch of Justinian the Great. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950. Pp. viii + 439. \$6.00. (*Dumbarton Oaks Studies*, I.)

To the many works of fundamental importance which he has produced in nearly sixty years of devoted scholarship, A. A. Vasiliev, the eminent and revered dean of Byzantinists, has now added a definitive study of the reign of Justin I (518-527). Careful interpretation of a wide range of sources, searching critical analysis of complicated problems, some of which are treated with almost monographic thoroughness, and convincing conclusions whenever they are possible, these are the merits of a book which should be a source of gratification and pride to a great scholar. Occasionally the machinery of investigation intrudes into the text and interrupts the smooth flow of the narrative, but the author's lively interest in his subject and his lucid exposition are assurance that the reader's attention will be stimulated and maintained.

Aside from Ernest Stein's long article, "Justinus," *R.-E.*, X (1919), cols. 1314-29, no special study until now has been devoted to the elderly emperor Justin, who has been overshadowed by his brilliant nephew and successor, Justinian. Vasiliev gives a portrayal of Justin against a background so broad that the book is also a reconstruction of the whole period. He shows how Justin was dominated by Justinian, whose rule from behind the throne began from the moment of Justin's elevation. When, in 527, Justinian became emperor, he continued policies unquestionably inaugurated under his influence during the nine years of his uncle's reign. Justinian's principal ideas, his ambitious plans for the reconquest of the west, his religious orientation as one of the foundations for his future western campaigns, his conception of a great legislative work, his building activities, all these were definitely formulated during Justin's reign. Professor Vasiliev's book, is, therefore, as the subtitle indicates, an introduction to the epoch of Justinian, and as such it will be a necessary point of departure for any new study of that period.

The book consists of a brief sketch of the historical background; eight chapters devoted respectively to Justin's rise from swineherd to emperor, his domestic rule, religious policy, foreign policy (in two chapters), economic conditions, and legislation; an epilogue describing his death and burial; an excursus on the Archangel Ivory in the British Museum and the coins of Justin; and an excellent index of

names and subjects, including sources and modern writers. Scholars will be grateful for the extensive notes which provide full bibliographical data.

The longest, and in many respects the most interesting, chapter considers Justin's religious policy. Justinian's influence on the development of that policy is demonstrated, and the imperial efforts to enforce the Chalcedonian creed and to restore normal relations with the Pope, after the breach of 482, are very carefully analyzed. The chapter includes a translation of contemporary documents of observers at the Synod of Constantinople in 518. The records, probably by eyewitnesses of the stormy popular response to Justin's restoration of orthodoxy, have never before been translated into English. Together with other documents which are summarized, they bring out vividly the importance of Christological questions in Byzantium, not only for religion, but also for politics, ecclesiastical as well as secular, if indeed the distinction can be made in Byzantine history.

Vasiliev's book was written before the appearance of Ernest Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, II. *De la disparition de l'Empire d'Occident à la mort de Justinien* (476-565) (Brussels, 1949; Vol. II of his *Geschichte des spätromischen Reiches* [Vienna, 1928]). Stein's chapter on Justin I (pp. 219-273) in no way diminishes the value and the importance of Vasiliev's study which is much more detailed and more fully documented. There are naturally some differences of opinion, but on minor points rather than on larger problems. Some examples may be given. Stein, p. 221, following his article in *R.-E.*, X, col. 1315, states that Justin was a *patricius* at his accession to the throne, whereas Vasiliev, p. 68, n. 50 end, is unable to find the evidence for this. Vasiliev, p. 251, n. 1, accepts, but Stein, p. 795, Excursus F, rejects, Duchèsne, *L'église au sixième siècle*, p. 74, n. 2, on the date of Pope John's voyage to Constantinople. Vasiliev, p. 272, does not know how to account for the abrupt retirement of a Byzantine army after an invasion of Mesopotamia in 527, while Stein, p. 272, attributes the retreat to the summer heat which caused great hardship among the troops. In this connection it may be noted that Stein, p. 272, n. 2, not only provides a convincing reconstruction of the event, but establishes the correct sequence of Byzantine commanders. Finally, Vasiliev, p. 414, following contemporary sources, attributes Justin's death to an old reopened wound in the foot, whereas Stein, p. 273, accepts the opinion of a Brussels physician that the cause of death was "en réalité de gangrène sénile ou syphilitique."

One or two additional suggestions may be made. Vasiliev used (p. 10, n. 5 *et passim*) the first edition of K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur* (Munich, 1891), instead of the extensively revised second edition of 1897. Vasiliev's chapter on economic conditions has little material on Byzantine Egypt; A. C. Johnson and L. C. West, *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies* (Princeton, 1949) now provides some additional data. Vasiliev, p. 375, accepts Procopius' statement (*Anecdota*, XIX, 4-8) that Justin spent the reserve of 320,000 pounds of gold left him by his predecessor, Anastasius. Vasiliev argues cogently that the expenditure of this

vast sum was necessary and denies Procopius' accusation of prodigality. There is, however, some question that Justin actually spent the whole amount, for according to John of Ephesus, *Hist. Eccles.*, Pars III, v. 20 (*C. S. C. O., Scriptores Syri*, 3rd Series, III, 205), the treasure of Anastasius was not completely exhausted half a century later in the reign of Tiberius II (578-582) (cf. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 244, n. 2). Finally, in connection with Vasiliev's discussion of the Decree on Prescription (pp. 404-6) it should be noted that the question of *possessio* receives special attention in Ernst Levy's recent book, *West Roman Vulgar Law (Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, XXIX [Philadelphia, 1951])*, chap. III B (pp. 176-94).

If there is today a larger interest in Byzantine history, a greater appreciation of its importance, much of the credit belongs to the great Byzantinists, Krumbacher, Bury, Baynes, Diehl, Schlumberger, Grégoire, Stein, and, as his latest book so clearly demonstrates, Vasiliev—*primus inter pares*.

SOLOMON KATZ.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.

MARCEL DURRY. *Éloge d'une matrone romaine (éloge dit de Turia)*. Texte établi, traduit et commenté. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1950. Pp. xviii + 83. (*Collection des Universités de France*.)

The so-called *Laudatio Turiae*, found in collections at Rome, is a Latin inscription of about 5 B. C. with the funeral oration delivered by an old man over the courageous woman who had saved his life during the proscriptions and been his companion in a happy marriage for forty-one years. It consists of seven fragments of which the first were published separately by R. Fabretti, *Inscriptionum antiquarum* . . . (Rome, 1699) and G. Marini, *Iscrizioni . . . delle Ville e de' Palazzi Albani* (Rome, 1785) and were united and illustrated in a masterly study by Mommsen, who reported his discovery in 1863. The last two fragments, one discovered in 1898 near the fourth milestone along the Via Portuense and the other in a Roman museum in 1949, were identified respectively by Giuseppe Gatti and Arthur E. Gordon. The inscription is familiar to most scholars from the editions of Dessau (*I. L. S.*, 8393) and Arangio-Ruiz (*Fontes*, III, 69), but the two most important studies of the inscription as a whole are those of Mommsen and Durry.

The importance of Durry's edition lies both in its clear report on the contributions from other scholars and in what he himself contributes. It is a pity that the book was published seven months before Gordon's fragment, which contributes both to the text and to an evaluation of previous efforts at reconstruction, but that is a misfortune which has befallen many workers in the field of epigraphy. As far as the reviewer can judge, the index is about perfect, the translation excellent, the bibliography complete, and the commentary very useful, but what the reviewer particularly respected was the beautifully written introduction of 98 pages, in which Durry

not only discussed the modern reconstruction of the inscription, the historical, prosopographical, and even legal problems, but treated the document within the framework of Roman funeral and marriage customs and literary parallels in such a comprehensive, competent way that the cultural significance of the inscription fully emerges. The philological mastery is everywhere apparent, and there are passages of such elegance and discernment as to make the book a delight to read.

In respect to the mention of Milo and to the controversial historical background of the fragment from the Via Portuense, Durry concludes that the events occurred in 49-48 B.C., and that the anonymous speaker, at that time the fiancé of the anonymous deceased, was in exile as a partisan of Pompey. Durry makes, moreover, a lucid analysis of the relation of the *laudatio* to the consolations, panegyrics, and other "descendance illégitime" of the funeral oration as a type; and he analyzes brilliantly the unique, essentially nonliterary character of this *laudatio*.

A contemporary editor of such a text has perhaps more of a problem than Dessau faced, because conjectural restorations, if not entirely outmoded, are more severely censured today. Durry was not deceived as to the conjectural character of almost every restoration in this inscription, but he decided that at least Mommsen's restorations, now a kind of vulgate, were sufficiently probable to justify their retention in view of the gain in readability from restoration. The latest discovery probably vindicates this decision, because, as Gordon points out (*A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], p. 224), the new fragment shows that in six out of nine lines Mommsen had more or less correctly inferred the true sense and in one line had made a perfect restoration. But on p. 45, in respect to the reconstruction of the fragment from the Via Portuense, where we do not have Mommsen's guidance, Durry comments, "Sans méconnaître l'intérêt des tentatives de Dessau, influencé par Hirschfeld, et de De Sanctis, je m'inspirerai des compléments de Costa, *parce qu'ils tiennent le mieux compte du nombre de lettres à restituer* (italics mine); mais toutefois pour les lignes 6a, 7a, 8a, je propose des compléments nouveaux, avec des corrections aux lignes 3a, 9a, 10a." Well, then, counting "I" as only half a letter, let us compare the number of letters restored:

Line	De Sanctis	Dessau	Arangio	Costa	Durry
2a	13½	..	13½	13½	13½
3a	12	8½	12	10	12
4a	15	12	15	13	15
5a	17	8½	..	15	15
6a	15	12	12	17	14½
7a	15	23½	22	11	11½
8a	20½	28	20½	15	12
9a	15½	..	15½	15	17½
10a	17½	..	17½	23	18½
11a	25	..	29	36	36

The vertical fracture visible in the photographs suggests that lines 2a through 9a have lost about the same amount. In line 10a, however, about 6 letters more have been lost than in line 9a, while in line 11a about 18½ letters more have been lost than in line 9a.

The latest discovery, which permits but has not yet produced an accurate measurement of the width of the column, could be used to control the extent of the lacunae on the fragment from the Via Portuense, among others. As for the disputed first letter of line 6a, Arangio rejected and Durry accepted Costa's reading on the basis of Costa's photograph without checking the stone itself; Gordon's photograph seems to support Dessau and Arangio, but Gordon, who saw the stone, does not mention the disputed letter.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

GEORGE HADDAD. *Aspects of Social Life in Antioch in the Hellenistic-Roman Period.* New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1949. Pp. 196. (Diss.)

The commentaries of the fathers of the Early Christian Church in Antioch and the bitterly satirical *Misopogon* of the apostate Emperor Julian laid a very understandable foundation for ascribing to the people of that city levity, riotousness, poor morals and all the less attractive characteristics of the population of a large city of the Roman empire.

This reputation Dr. Haddad attempts to analyze and refute, laying the blame, with considerable verisimilitude, on the conditions of rule and the examples of the rulers. The fact that Antioch was a great political and military capital, first of the Seleucids and later of the Roman East, led to its being spoiled by the favors of kings and emperors, and exposed it to repeated contacts with a dissolute soldiery, and the author insists repeatedly that the bad name enjoyed by the city in the comments of modern writers is due in large measure to their failure to see that for better or worse the Antiochenes shared neither more nor less in the characteristics common to the age.

In approaching this problem, which is the main theme of the dissertation, Haddad considers at length the political and economic status of the city, its size and growth, together with the question of the racial or cultural origins of its population. A study of these elements results in the conclusion that "we have not been able to find a more accurate racial or national label to apply to the Antiochenes except that of the 'Antiochene race and nationality'." In this part of the study the evidence for the various languages in use is considered, and seems to show that both Latin and Greek were common as written or spoken languages there, and that there are proofs that the Syrian tongue was used as a spoken language. There are many references in ancient literature to the people of Antioch as being Greek, such as in Julian, *Misopogon*, 367 c, but it is generally to be taken in the broader sense of the greater Hellenistic World, nor can Pausanias' reference (VI, 2, 7), where they are spoken of as Syrians living by the Orontes, be considered a serious racial term.

A section of the dissertation also considers the Jewish population of the city, mentioning among other quarters the Keration which Haddad places near the eastern gate on the authority of Leclercq writing in 1907. More recent study of the topography of the city, which being as yet unpublished was not available to the author, suggests that this quarter is better placed in the region of the Daphnetic gate to the southwest.

Estimates of the population vary in ancient authors to a surprising degree, and are almost always inconclusive or obviously exaggerated. In reviewing the figures Haddad concludes that for the end of the first century a figure of 200,000, excluding slaves, and for the fourth century approximately 250,000 free inhabitants is somewhere near the truth. With the slave population this would bring the later figure close to the half million mark.

The study is fully documented and contains a very ample bibliography. If the results are less conclusive than one might wish, the author has presented a very considerable body of material, discussed and weighed the relative merits of evidence and presented a very good case in favor of the population of Antioch as being no worse, nor any better than in any other city of those times of comparable population. We are too well acquainted with the diatribes of reformers of more recent times to put overmuch faith in the picture of Antiochene morals painted by Chrysostom and others of like purpose.

RICHARD STILLWELL.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

ERNESTUS DIEHL. *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, editio tertia. Fasc 1: *Poetae Elegiaci*; Fasc. 2: *Theognis*, *Ps. Pythagoras*, *Ps. Phocylides*, *Chares*, *Anonymi Aulodia*. Leipzig, Teubner, 1949, 1950. Pp. 144; viii + 116. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*.)

Editio tertia on the title-pages of these fascicles is qualified in a prefatory note signed by the publishers and Rudolf Beutler. The present edition is not a new recension but merely records marginalia left by Diehl, chiefly bibliographical, together with similar new bibliographical material culled from other sources. The text itself remains virtually the same. There are a handful of minor alterations, such as <ἴσως> for <ὁμῶς> in Tyrtæus 8, 6, or ἡ λέοντες for ἐθέλοντες in Xenophanes 13, 1; some rearrangement of papyrus lines, as in Tyrtæus 1; better readings of epigraphic material, as in Sophocles' *Pæan* (based on Oliver's work). But these new little books are nevertheless indispensable for their citations of new critical and interpretive work, apparently quite complete despite the editor's depreciation of omissions as being due to war conditions. The neat presentation of such a volume of information in so small a compass is a miracle of condensation. The exploitation of this material is left to the reader or to a subsequent editor. Reference is made, for example, to Lattimore's suggestion in *Mimnermus' Smyrneis*, but

the text is not changed. Despite its accretions the printed page of the new edition is more spacious and more handsomely arranged than its predecessor. Other improvements also are in the realm of taste: the substitution of Greek titles for Latin; the relegation of pseudepigrapha to the end of the volume; and, most of all, the omission of Diehl's shriekingly nationalistic preface which laid the frustration of a noble German victory to the *hostium partiumque fraudibus et fallaciis* and made the chief use of Greek poetry the inculcation of militant patriotism.

MOSES HADAS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

Professor N. I. Herescu has requested that the attention of the readers of this Journal be called to a reply which he has published to a review of his book, *Bibliographie de la littérature latine* (Paris, Les Belles-Lettres, 1943), by W. C. McDermott (*A. J. P.*, LXIX, pp. 342-4). The reply is entitled "Notes additionnelles à la *Bibliographie de la littérature latine*, au sujet d'un compte rendu singulier" (Paris, Institut Roumain d'Études Latines, 1951).

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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Brøndal (Viggo). *Théorie des Prépositions. Introduction à une sémantique rationnelle*. Traduction française par Pierre Naert. Copenhague, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1950. Pp. xxii + 145.

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Cilento (Vincenzo). *Plotino, Enneadi. Prima versione integra e commentario critico*. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1947-49. Volume I: pp. xv + 461; Volume II: pp. 588; Volume III, Parte I: pp. 439; Parte II: pp. 662. (*Filosofi Antichi e Medievali. Collanda di Testi e di Traduzioni*.)

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Landmann (Michael). *Elentik und Maieutik*. Drei Abhandlungen zur antiken Psychologie. Bonn, *H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag*, 1950. Pp. 141. DM. 6 (kart.); 7.50 (geb.).

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